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Advance Praise for Ignorance Is Risk “During my career as a prosecutor, I had the opportunity to observe firsthand the deceptive practices prevalent in the securities industry. Unfortunately, I also observed the consequences to “investors”, many of whom had lost their life savings. Jim’s book, Ignorance is Risk! should be required reading for any investor not wanting to become a victim.” Kent Neal, Former Chief Prosecutor of the Economic Crime Unit, 17th Judicial Circuit of Florida “Fascinating, insightful, and honest, with an occasional helping of dry humor. Ignorance Is Risk! reads like a novel but teaches like a textbook. It exposes the seamy side of the securities industry and sounds a clear wakeup call for the small investor. Hit that snooze button one more time and it just might be too late.” John Davis, Clinical Psychologist, President, Thought Leadership, Inc. “I love the stock market, but it was amazing to find out how much I didn’t know about it. Now that I know, I don’t love the market that much. In fact, now I’m scared to death of it. That’s what this book does to you - informs, enlightens, and warns - Jim Keenan is not kidding. Ignorance is not bliss- it’s risk.” Regis Philbin, Television personality and talk show host Regis and Kelly Live “I can’t tell you the number of times intelligent people met with me in my Securities and Exchange Commission office and proceeded to tell me how they lost a significant amount of money by investing before they learned all the facts. If you want to learn the facts about investing before you make your next investment, you should read Ignorance Is Risk!” Charles C. Harper, Principal, Lewis B Freeman & Partners, Inc., Forensic Accounting and Consulting, Former Associate Regional Administrator Southeast Regional Office of the SEC “Ignorance Is Risk! does a terrific job of explaining how the securities markets really works and the risks involved in investing. Funny, scary, entertaining, enlightening and informative. Everything you wanted to know (plus a few things you didn’t want to know) about how the securities markets really work. I recommend you read it, re-read it and then tell all your friends to read it! Because this book is a winner.” Willie Jolley, Author of It Only Takes A Minute To Change Your Life and A Setback Is A Setup For A Comeback! “Money matters. To make yours profitably matter to you, read this book.” Mark Victor Hansen. Co-creator #1 New York Times best-selling series Chicken Soup for the Soul® “No one who is still working on Wall Street could risk writing this book and telling the real story behind how the markets and individual investors are being manipulated.” Albert Rickey, CFP and Vice President Investments Prudential Securities (retired) “Reading Ignorance Is Risk! could be the smartest move you ever make. It includes true-to-life stories and real-world examples to provide clear, convincing and compelling reasons for investors to re-evaluate the way they invest. The book opened my eyes to how the game is really played.” Robert Manela, Partner, Manela & Associates, CPA’s, PL “Apparently not everyone in the securities industry practices The Platinum Rule, but Jim does an excellent job of exposing the risks and explaining the essentials involved in successful securities investments. Ignorance Is Risk! is a compelling source of information for any smart investor.” Tony Alessandra. Ph.D., CPAE, CSP, Author: The Platinum Rule, and Charisma “Ignorance Is Risk! is written for both the novice and experienced investor. I now have a much better understanding of the penetrating questions I must ask before making investment decisions and why assuming could cost any of us a fortune. This book could help you save that fortune. Keenan is sounding an alarm and you had better pay attention. Your financial security, perhaps your ability to retire, may be at risk.” Mark Halpert, MBA, Seasoned Investor, Executive Director, 3D Learner Foundation “Ignorance Is Risk! is a must for any investor! In simple and lucid language, Jim Keenan tells the truth and nothing but the truth about the stock market. Jim wants to help those on the side of the angels, not the brokers after a fast buck. Taking Jim’s advice will save you money on your Prozac or Zoloft bills big time!” Frederick J. Parrella, Ph.D. Director of Religious Studies, Santa Clara University “A deadly serious topic seasoned with wit and humor. Jim does an excellent job of converting complex concepts into easily understood ideas through the use of clear examples and analogies and in the process exposes the pitfalls that await the individual investor. More than informative, this book is an absolute revelation of the problems faced by the investing public. I am telling all my friends that they are crazy if they buy another share of stock before they buy and read Ignorance Is Risk!” Allison Blakeship, President, Florida Speakers Association, Executive Director, The Enrichment Center of Southwest Florida, Inc. “Ignorance Is Risk! is a page turner…crisp, clear and right on the mark. It should be required reading not only for investors, but also for every financial advisor or anyone considering getting into the business.” Peter Rukrygl, President, Concord Trading “Thought provoking. Full of great stories, analogies, facts and analysis that will change the way you approach investing from now on.” Dr. Brian Grossman, Peak Performance Miami Beach, FL “When it comes to the world of investing, Jim knows his stuff…and his stuff is fascinating. The common wisdom about investing is to be patient and hold for the long term. Jim shows you why that common wisdom may be more common than wise.” Bill Gove, CSP, CPAE, Cavett Award Winner, Founding President of The National Speakers Association “With the abundance of literature I have read on the US financial markets, I had yet to read a book that provided such clear, candid, and compelling information in such an extremely captivating fashion. The insights that Jim Keenan reveals in Ignorance Is Risk! go a long way towards leveling the playing field for individual investors. Wall Street will have a difficult time trying to spin the sobering hard facts presented in this book.” Jorge J. Sarria, President, Optimal Performance Solutions, LLC “Jim Keenan strips the façade off the securities industry and gives us a lucid behind the scenes look at the motivating factors and incentives which drive securities analysts, brokers, and the firms they represent.” Jack McAllister, Management Consultant, President & CEO, Lupus Foundation of America, Southeast Florida Chapter “You can’t help but make better investment decisions once you read this book. It is worth its weight in diamonds.” Ben Draznin, JD “A real eye-opener…it forced me to rethink my retirement plan. Anyone who has money in the stock market should read Ignorance Is Risk!” Nina O’Shea, Systems Administrator, Barry University “Ignorance Is Risk! contains valuable information and insights for novice and experienced investors alike. Jim doesn’t pull any punches and he lets the chips fall where they may.” Robin Landry, CEO Landry Asset Management “A primer for the prospective and newer investor...and a great reminder for the more experienced investor that you’re not #1 in the interests of the securities industry. Caveat emptor is still the most basic rule when investing.” Tom Wozniak, President Strategic Compensation Planning, Inc  

 Ignorance is Risk What Wall Street Doesn’t Want You To Know    James J. Keenan CFP   First Edition Cogent Publishing, Boca Raton, Florida ©2002 

Published by: Cogent Publishing Boca Raton, FL 33431 U.S.A. http://www.cogentcom.com All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system without written permission from the authors, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review. IGNORANCE IS RISK: Copyright © 2002 by James J. Keenan, CFP Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Control Number 2002090910 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Keenan, James J.           Ignorance Is Risk!: What Wall Street Doesn’t Want You to Know / James J. Keenan CFP; Edited by Elbert E Rogers Jr. --1st ed. Includes Glossary and Index. ISBN 0 9711658-1-5 1. Personal finance. 2. Investing. 3. Business 4. Self Help 

Dedication Dedicated to the memory of William H. Gove, CSP, CPAE A friend, mentor, and cheerleader who generously provided encouragement, support, wisdom, and kindness to me and to innumerable others whose lives he touched in the eighty-nine years he blessed this earth. Without his encouragement, I might have abandoned this project. 

  Cogito ergo sum. (“I think, therefore I am.”) --Rene Descartes 17th Century Philosopher   Sum ergo cogito. (“I am, therefore I think.”) --James J. Keenan, CFP 21st Century Author   Wishing you all good fortunes! Jim Keenan 

Table of Contents Preface. vii Acknowledgments. x Disclaimer 1 Chapter 1 Myths and Problems. 3 Chapter 2 My Rude Awakening. 7 Chapter 3 The Story of Girlie Girl 15 Chapter 4 The Capital Gains Tax. 25 Chapter 5 The Second Trap. 39 Chapter 6 The Myth of Long-Term Holding. 61 Chapter 7 The Real Impact 75 Chapter 8 Why Would They Lie?. 81 Chapter 9 The Buy Bias. 91 Chapter 10 The Mechanics of The IPO.. 99 Chapter 11 Bringing the IPO to Market 121 Chapter 12 Conflicts of Interest 135 Chapter 13 Pity The Broker 153 Chapter 14 Conclusion. 179 Glossary. 182 Index. 200 Preface Today, it appears that we are all invested in the stock market. If we have not made direct purchases of individual stocks or mutual funds in our personal savings and investment accounts, including our IRAs and 401(k)s, we probably own them indirectly through our company’s pension plan. When I started in the securities industry as a securities broker over twenty years ago, I thought that I fully understood how the stock markets worked. Over time, I came to recognize that, like most investors, I lacked some significant pieces of information. Most of that information is not generally available to the public because it is information that the securities industry (commonly referred to as “Wall Street”) doesn’t want you to know. If we make our investment decisions without having all of the facts, we are taking a risk, the risk of making flawed investment decisions. Over a lifetime of experiences (some people call them mistakes), I have made a few significant observations and established several rules by which I conduct my life. One of the most important observations I have made is that if you don’t fully understand what you are doing, you are likely to end up doing something you really don’t want to do. (I can still remember vividly the first time I ever replaced an electrical outlet.) My most basic rule evolved from that experience. Don’t mess around with things you don’t fully understand! I wrote this book to provide the individual investor with a complete understanding of how the securities markets work, not just in theory but in the real world. Like most businesses, the securities industry is about making money. As an individual investor, this concept probably excites you because you believe that the industry is about everybody making money. Unfortunately, that simply isn’t true! The securities industry is primarily about making money for the securities industry, which includes money managers, mutual fund managers, underwriters, analysts, brokerage houses, individual securities brokers, and financial consultants. Notice I didn’t mention the individual investor. Everyone is happy when the individual investor makes money, but all too often, when that happens, it is merely a coincidence. As I travel around the country delivering seminars on finance, accounting, business analysis, and investing, I am surprised at the response of my audiences to information that I had assumed was common knowledge. Participants frequently approach me after a seminar and ask where they can read more about some of the ideas that I introduce during the session. After checking the shelves of major bookstores and local libraries, I was amazed to find that no one had addressed these issues. There are many books telling you how to make a million dollars a year in the futures market or how to pick the hottest mutual fund, but there are no books explaining how the securities markets work in the real world and the impact this has on the individual investor. I really shouldn’t be surprised since most of the people who are qualified to write a book like this are not interested in sharing this information with the investing population at large. After all, the book does expose some of the more unsavory practices that are engaged in every day by too many members of the securities industry. My objective in writing this book is simple. I want to level the playing field. I just want to provide you, the individual investor, with a more realistic perspective on the securities markets based on insights and information that are critical to your personal financial well-being but which you are unlikely to receive from the majority of professionals working in the financial services industry. There are, of course, exceptions. I have been privileged to work with many individuals of uncommon integrity who, on a daily basis, face the ethical challenges imposed by corporate policy yet still consistently place the best interest of their clients before their own. Several of them have provided me with encouragement as I wrote this book. A few of them have even expressed a hope that it may, in some small way, contribute to reform in an industry that seems to have adopted greed as its guiding principle. The opinions and conclusions in this book are based on over thirty years of personal experience as an investor, twenty years as a financial consultant (fifteen as an active securities broker with two of the largest brokerage firms on Wall Street), interviews with almost five thousand investors, and a large dose of critical thinking. Based on a more complete disclosure of how the securities markets really operate and the application of a more independent and critical thought process to the investment decision-making process, it is my hope that you will be better positioned to protect your financial security and that of your loved ones. I believe that this book will dramatically improve your chances of reaching your financial goals and averting personal financial disaster. I wish you good luck and great fortune. James J. Keenan, CFP 

 Acknowledgments Since this book is a product of who I am today, and I am a product of all those people who have influenced my growth and development over the years, I suppose the acknowledgments must begin at the beginning. Thanks to Mom and Dad, Kathryn and Frank Keenan, who gave me life and then taught me how to live it by their example. To my older brother Frank and sister Mary, who were my earliest companions, confidants, and protectors. Thanks, too, to those amazing teachers at St. Anselm’s Parochial School in the Bronx, who taught me more than they will ever realize and provided me with an incredible foundation for high school and college. A special thanks to the people who, through the various stages of my life, have provided direction and advice, a sympathetic ear, a model to emulate, unflinching honesty, or simple acceptance. T. J. Curry and Mary Ellen Curren, who ushered me through high school. Warren Ellenwood, Fred Parrella, and Marcia Milne pointed me in new directions in my college years. Paul Kinsley, El Rogers, Deborah Young-Benson, Don and Judi Estes, and Howard and Andrea Randolph are friends and mentors from my years at IBM. My friends and associates in the National Speakers Association and our Florida Chapter, The Florida Speakers Association (http://www.florida-speakers.org). They have not only been a rich source of professional expertise but also an incredibly encouraging and supportive group of people. Thanks to all the people who generously gave their time to review and comment on all or a portion of the manuscript. Their suggestions and recommendations were invaluable. I would also like to thank those people who provided support in the actual production of the book: my copyeditor, Elbert E. Rogers, for his painstaking efforts in the interest of clarity and correctness. Campbell Harvey, who provided permission to quote extensively from his glossary, and my book designer, Scott Carnes, worked with me on both the interior and cover design. And lastly and most importantly, I want to thank my wife, Karen. She somehow manages to keep me grounded while encouraging me to fly in new directions. She has lived through this process for three full years and has always managed to maintain her faith (and mine) that there would be a finished book one day. 

Disclaimer This book is just one source of information on this subject. The objective of this book is to provide the individual investor with information concerning the tricks, traps, problems, myths, and conflicts of interest that he or she will encounter when investing in the public securities markets. The content of the book is based on the author’s extensive experience as a private investor and as a professional securities broker. The opinions and conclusions are those of the author alone, and you are encouraged to accept or reject them in part or in whole based on your determination as to whether they meet the tests of logic and common sense. Every effort has been made to ensure that the information presented is unbiased and accurate. However, there may be mistakes, both typographical and in content. It is the author’s strong belief that it is the responsibility of the individual investor to personally investigate and research thoroughly any investment or investment strategy before committing his or her funds. For this reason, you will not find specific recommendations for individual securities or a single investment philosophy. The purpose of this book is to educate and entertain. The author and Cogent Publishing are not engaged in the rendering of legal, accounting, or specific investment advice and shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information contained in this book. 

          “The first step in finding a solution is to define the problem” Anonymous           

        Chapter 1 Myths and Problems At one time or another, you have probably heard the saying: “Knowledge is Power.” Although I have never heard anyone argue with that aphorism, there is no time that it is truer than when you are investing your hard-earned money. Unfortunately, the reverse of that statement is also true. You see, ignorance is a lack of knowledge and, therefore, a lack of power. And if you lack power (if you are power-less), then you are unable to protect yourself, and you run the risk of becoming a victim of your investment decisions. The mission of this book is to help keep you from becoming a victim of bad investment decisions. Ignorance is not a lack of brains or smarts. It is just a lack of knowledge of information. And you shouldn’t be too hard on yourself if you lack that information because Wall Street has, in many ways, done its level best to keep you ignorant, to keep you in the dark. What I am going to share with you are the lessons I have learned during two decades as a financial consultant and a securities broker with some of the largest brokerage houses on Wall Street. I will expose many of the inherent problems in the way brokerage houses conduct business. And I will explode many of the myths perpetrated on Wall Street. Whoever said, “What you don’t know can’t hurt you,” was not an investor! Here are some of the popular myths and common problems that should be of interest to you as an investor or potential investor. The Myths Do you believe that you can’t get hurt holding stocks for the long term? It’s a myth! Do you believe that bonds are always safer than stocks? That, too, is a myth! Do you believe that you absolutely can’t lose money in government treasuries? Another myth! If you think that commission-free stock is always a great deal, you should think again. It’s a myth! Do you believe that Wall Street analysts provide you with better information on a publicly traded company than you can obtain yourself? Guess what…? And finally, if you believe that your broker works for you, I have some bad news. Unfortunately, that, too, is a myth! The Problems Did you know that most securities analysts working for Wall Street brokerage houses are faced with an inherent conflict of interest? It’s a major problem. The methodology that Wall Street’s brokerage firms and fund managers use to measure their performance is another problem. When you recognize how brokerage firms determine who their best brokers are, you might see how it could lead to some serious problems. It’s possible that you might not consider the way in which a broker earns the designation “financial consultant” to be a problem as much as a bad joke. The way that the branch manager reassigns your account when your broker leaves might create a few problems for you. And the way in which brokers are compensated might make you a little nervous. If you knew how Initial Public Offerings are handled and how that market may be manipulated, you would know that it is an extremely serious problem. And finally, misconceptions about how the markets work and what really drives them might be the biggest problem of all. In the next chapter, I will tell you about my rude awakening on Wall Street by addressing the myth that your broker works for you. What you don’t know can hurt you. So read on! 

           “A little knowledge is a dangerous thing.” Alexander Pope 

        Chapter 2 My Rude Awakening By the time I joined the securities industry, I had some very solid business experience. I had spent 13 years on a fast-track career with IBM. During that time, I had the opportunity to serve in several staff and management positions in a variety of business operating units. Nevertheless, I knew as much about what drove the securities industry and how securities were sold as I did about the mating rituals of a tarantula. When I joined IBM in 1969, it was a somewhat conservative company, to say the least. I still haven’t broken the habit of wearing dark suits, white shirts, and conservative ties. Let me tell you, they were especially conservative in the way they marketed their products. Nothing in my experience even vaguely prepared me for what I was about to encounter when I joined the securities industry. There was a standing joke within IBM about the fact that promotions usually involved relocation. It was said that IBM didn’t stand for International Business Machines; it stood for “I’ve Been Moved!” After thirteen years, I was looking for a career that would allow me to settle down in one place and stay there. When I decided to leave and change careers, I simply called the local branch of the largest brokerage house on Wall Street. They had an excellent reputation and the best broker training program in the industry. I set up an appointment with the branch manager. After a half-hour interview, I was asked to take a one-hour test. They corrected it on the spot. The branch manager told me that I had the highest score he had ever seen and that I had a bright future ahead of me. (I have often wondered how many candidates he told that to.) He offered me peanuts as a salary for the five months I would be in training. After that, I would be on a 100% commission compensation plan with a draw that matched the initial salary. It was that simple. I was hired on the spot as a broker trainee. It turned out that my timing was excellent. I gave two weeks’ notice and left on July 31, 1981, a few years before the company began downsizing and just before the stock market took off. I reported for work at the brokerage firm on August 1, 1981. That first day, they gave me a tour of the office that ended at a storage room hidden away in the back of the office complex. It contained a library of forms and sales literature, odds and ends of old pieces of equipment, and in the center of the room, a table and a chair. I was told that this was to be my home for the next three months. This room was hidden so far back from the front entrance that I had to draw a map to find my way back out at the end of each day. Until you were licensed to sell securities, you were just an expense, and they weren’t going to waste front office space on you. If they were trying to motivate me to study hard so that I could pass the Securities Licensing Exam and join the ranks of brokers in the main office, they were doing a fine job. They gave me and the other trainees stacks of sales and promotional literature and securities regulations manuals that had to be literally three feet high. We were told that they didn’t want to see us out of that room for the next three months. Once a week, a training manager would spend one morning with us, answering questions and coaching and testing us on sales techniques. That may just have been the longest three months of my life. I swear they could have sold those manuals as a nonprescription cure for insomnia! After the study period, they would send me to Philadelphia to take the Securities Licensing Exam. If I passed, I would spend four weeks in New York attending their new broker training school. This was basically an advanced sales training program. Heads of various product departments would serve as guest instructors and extol the benefits of the securities that they provided, along with instructions on how to most effectively present them to clients and prospects. We were required to develop scripts that we would use to present various products to clients, and we attended practice labs in which our skills were tested. It was an intense four weeks, with long nights of preparation after long days in class. Some new licensees dropped out, and others were invited to leave based on the evaluations of the guest instructors. If you managed to survive the class, you would be a broker. If you failed, you would be unemployed. When I left IBM to start my new career in the securities industry, I had been an investor for over 10 years. So, I thought that this would be an easy transition for me. What I didn’t know was that when it came to understanding how securities were sold, I was about as naive as a fourteen-year-old boy on his first date. I really didn’t have a clue. I’ll never forget my first day as a licensed securities broker. I almost managed to get myself fired! Each morning before the trading day started, all the brokers gathered in the branch manager’s office to listen to the morning call. The Morning Call is an institution in Wall Street brokerage houses. It is a conference call initiated out of the home office, and it goes out to all of the branch offices in the brokerage firm’s network. It provides the brokers with a brief overview of any breaking news and what the firm thinks is happening in the market, along with some specific sales recommendations from the brokerage firm’s technical and fundamental analysts. Technical analysts are responsible for evaluating and predicting price movement and trends for the market as a whole as well as for individual stocks based on past price performance and various measures of investor sentiment (emotion or the mood of investors relative to the market as a whole or specific stocks). Some of these measures are highly sophisticated and involve a variety of charting and graphing techniques, as well as advanced statistical analysis and complex models and formulas. Other measures are less sophisticated and attempt to correlate the direction of the market with such mundane events as the movement of hemlines or whether the American or the National League won the World Series. Fundamental analysts are responsible for evaluating the underlying value of individual stocks as well as the market as a whole based on financial data. By calculating various financial ratios and comparing them to historical norms, they attempt to assess whether individual stocks or the market as a whole are reasonably priced, overpriced, or undervalued. Of course, fundamental analysis has to take into account projections of financial data because the market price of stock is based on what investors are willing to pay for future earnings. If this were not the case, investors would only be willing to pay a price equivalent to the liquidation value of a company (its book value or assets minus liabilities). The validity of these projections of financial data is crucial to determining an accurate valuation of a company. So, part of the fundamental analyst’s job is to assess the soundness of the projections provided by the company he is analyzing. If you are interested in learning about fundamental or technical analysis, there are scores of books available on the subject. Just drop into your local bookstore and head for the section on investing. This was my first day with my license in my pocket, and I was psyched up for the morning call. The best minds on Wall Street were going to tell me what to buy and sell and why. I was going to pass this information on to my clients and prospects, and we were all going to make money. On this particular day, one of the analysts presented an option strategy. My only problem was that he had a recommendation on a stock option that just didn’t make sense! He said that we should purchase calls on XYZ stock at a price of one dollar. We should then sell them when they went up a quarter for a profit of 25 percent. That part made sense. But then he said, “OR if the price goes down a quarter, cut your losses and sell the option in the interest of preserving the CLIENT’S capital.” Later that morning, the branch manager approached me at my desk. He asked me if I was presenting that recommendation to prospective clients. When I told him no, he became incensed and went ballistic! He “invited” me into his office to provide him with an explanation. I told him that, to my way of thinking, it didn’t matter whether the stock was in an uptrend, and it didn’t matter what the underlying value of the stock would be in one week at the expiration of the option. Based on recent volatility in the price of the underlying stock, the likelihood of the options’ first ¼ point move being up was about as likely as the options’ first ¼ point move being down. In other words, the odds of the client making money upon the sale of the option was about 50-50. That is the equivalent of your odds on a coin toss. And that is simply gambling. If you are going to gamble, you may as well have the benefit of the bright lights and the great shows in Las Vegas. Of course, whether the option price moved up or down, the client would pay two commissions. Statistically and mathematically, that practically ensured that the client would always lose money. This infuriated the branch manager. I thought he was going to have a heart attack. His face turned bright red. His eyes turned dark and started to bulge. He may have looked like a bright red toad, but he bellowed like a wounded rhinoceros. Even though he had closed the door to his office, I knew that everyone in the entire building could hear him screaming. “Your job is to present the recommendations of the firm. You don’t have to like them. You are a salesman, not an analyst.” I couldn’t believe this guy. I had told him I didn’t agree with one of the firm’s recommendations, and he was reacting as if I had questioned his ancestry. Apparently, emotions run high on Wall Street, and I found myself getting into it with him. I shot right back that my education and my past business experience had taught me to use my native intelligence and common sense. I let him know that I had no intention of letting my brain atrophy and my ethics evaporate so that he could show a higher short-term profit on the branch office operating statement. He suggested that perhaps I was in the wrong business. At that point, I felt like I might be a little over my head. I was beginning to feel the nervousness of that fourteen-year-old boy again. That, plus a hint of what General Custer must have felt about halfway through the battle of the Little Bighorn. Since this wasn’t going exactly the way that I had planned, I decided to change my tactic and appeal to his core value… greed! I took a deep breath to calm myself down and told him that I had left a very successful career to enter the securities industry, and I was quite sure that I could find another job. Then I shared with him that it had been my observation that the turnover (the dropout rate) for new brokers in their first year in production was over fifty percent. I told him that I thought that this was due to the fact that their relationships with clients were transaction-based. In the short term, transaction-based businesses may generate more revenue, but the longer-term result is that it eventually burns out clients and ultimately burns out brokers. It seemed to me that most brokers were constantly seeking to replace lost clients rather than building and expanding their business on a solid base. This had to be costing him a lot of money. We ended the conversation with my branch manager offering me a “gift.” He told me he was going to give me enough rope to hang myself. I am not telling you that there are no ethical brokers or branch managers. What I am telling you is this: throughout my entire career in the securities industry, I found that brokers were under constant pressure to sell securities, regardless of the investment climate or the quality of the firm’s recommendations. This pressure to sell was the first of many lessons I learned as an insider in Wall Street investment firms-- lessons about “WHAT WALL STREET DOESN’T WANT YOU TO KNOW.” 

          “We learn geology the morning after the earthquake.” Ralph Waldo Emerson The Conduct of Life, 1860 

        Chapter 3 The Story of Girlie Girl Almost everyone has heard about Beanie Babies. Some of you probably have one or more of them at home. They are the small stuffed animals manufactured by the Ty Corporation, and they are everywhere. My wife Karen bought a Beanie Baby. According to the manufacturer, her official name is Hoppity. My wife renamed her Girlie Girl. She is a small, pink, fluffy little rabbit (the Beanie Baby, not my wife), and sometimes I carry her with me when I travel. (Again, the Beanie Baby, not my wife.) Don’t get me wrong. It hasn’t been my habit to travel with plush toys, and at first, this was completely unintentional. You see, my wife slipped her into my luggage with a little love note just to brighten my time on the road. Now, she keeps me company on trips and watches over me like a talisman. Most importantly, she reminds me of Karen and of home. Sometimes, when I’m going on a trip, I’ll slip Girlie Girl out of my luggage and hide her someplace where my wife will stumble upon her after I’m gone. It’s a little game we play, and somehow, it narrows the distance. In any case, we have developed a sentimental attachment to this little bundle of cloth and beans. Obviously, Girlie Girl has a special meaning to Karen and me, so the value of Girlie Girl to us certainly exceeds the five dollars Karen paid for her. Way more! Sometimes, like the famous Portrait of Dorian Gray, she absorbs our sins for us. For instance, one time when I was working at home, I met Karen at the door and told her that Girlie Girl had been bad. Then I broke the news to her that she had dropped Karen’s favorite vase and shattered it into a million pieces. You may think I’m nuts but think about it. Who could be angry at an adorable, soft, fluffy, pink rabbit? This became a mechanism for diffusing anger and was our way of saying, “I have made a mistake; please don’t be angry with me.” Still, even though this little bundle of cloth and beans holds special value for Karen and me, if we were to betray this sentimental bond and attempt to sell Girlie Girl at a garage sale, we probably wouldn’t get more than 25 cents. The only reason I’m telling you all this is as a prelude to a discussion of how the stock market sometimes operates. You see, Beanie Babies provides an excellent analogy for how the stock market frequently works. As a matter of fact, The Beanie Baby Story is a perfect example of the underlying forces that drive any market that you will ever encounter. I can’t tell you with certainty exactly how it began, but I suppose somewhere at a K-Mart or a Lord and Taylor department store, two customers reached for the last Beanie Baby of a particular discontinued design. The company may have stopped production on this particular design because it was extremely ugly or simply not popular, or maybe because they were brilliant at marketing. Regardless of the reason, they just stopped making certain Beanie Babies. Both of these customers had a child, niece, nephew, or someone special in their lives who really wanted this particular Beanie Baby. I mean, these kids had been mercilessly pestering them for weeks. You know how compulsive little kids can be. They will grab onto your pants leg or skirt and look up at you with those big eyes, knowing that it breaks your heart to say no. Well, these two customers saw this last-of-its-kind Beanie Baby at the same time. One of them grabbed it first, and the other one immediately said, “I’ll give you ten dollars for that right now.” We were off to the races! Somebody bought it for 10 bucks, and all of a sudden, because it was the last of its kind (because they weren’t making them anymore), it became “a collector’s item.” It was still in its original wrapping when somebody decided to offer to buy it for 20 bucks. (Hey, if it went from 5 to 10, why not 10 to 20.) Greed took over, and the kid was forgotten. The person who sold it for twenty dollars had bought it for ten dollars. She might have already been feeling a little buyer’s remorse for having paid ten dollars for a five-dollar toy. So now, she certainly wasn’t going to pass up a twenty-dollar offer. She was feeling pretty bright. She could buy the kid any other three Beanie Babies and still have change left over. Now, it had gone from five dollars to ten dollars to twenty dollars. The next person to buy it thought to himself, “This thing has already quadrupled in price. These things are going up like crazy.” He offered thirty-five dollars for it and then watched the price go to fifty dollars, and then one hundred and then two hundred. The price of these Beanie Babies was soaring. Soon, people were paying five thousand dollars for them. Do you remember the original price of the brand-new Beanie Baby? About five dollars. What was its intrinsic value? Let’s see, some cloth, some beans, a little thread... probably about fifty cents. What drove the market was that people started to look at Beanie Babies and say, “Hey, the price is going up. I’ll buy one, and I’ll sell it at a higher price.” I can only guess that the person who paid five thousand dollars regretted that he hadn’t bought it when it was only two thousand dollars. I am also guessing that he felt sure that it would continue to rise to ten or even twenty thousand dollars. What kind of logic tells someone that a stuffed toy will someday be worth twenty thousand dollars? And what kind of thought process allows you to pay five thousand dollars for a bag of beans? The “logic” behind the price projection was based on past price performance. People lost touch with reality and deluded themselves into believing that the price would continue to rise indefinitely. The thought process that allowed them to “invest” five thousand dollars involved the belief that they weren’t at risk for the full five thousand dollars they had “invested.” The person who bought the Beanie Baby for five thousand dollars didn’t really feel like he was risking the full amount because he probably bought it from somebody who had paid four thousand dollars for it. So, he figured his real risk was only one thousand dollars because the real value was at least four thousand dollars. In his mind, the last price that somebody else had paid for it became the base price and the proof of its value. This is the “logic” of past price performance. People use this “logic” to delude themselves into believing that they are not at risk for the full amount they “invest” and to project future pricing. When we get into this mode, we tell ourselves that, in a worst-case scenario, we can always sell the item for the price the prior purchaser had paid. In this case, we paid five thousand dollars, and the prior purchaser paid four thousand dollars, so our risk would only be one thousand dollars. The belief that, because somebody else paid a particular price for something, that price becomes its real value is absurd. The idea that when you have overpaid for something, someone else will be willing to pay even more to buy it from you is such a common error in judgment that it has been given a name. On Wall Street, it is known as “The Greater Fool Theory.” Well, at some point, there were no other people left who were willing to buy the Beanie Baby at a higher price. It got to ten thousand dollars, or to whatever the highest sales price was, and there was no one left in the market willing to pay more. The price stopped going up. The last person who bought it for ten thousand dollars said to himself or herself, “The price isn’t going up anymore; I had better sell it and get my money back. I bought it from somebody who paid eight thousand for it, so let me first see if I can sell it for ten thousand and get my money back out of it. If I can’t do that, I’ll sell it for something lower, but at least I can get eight thousand.” Well, lo and behold, that person couldn’t get eight thousand, or seven or six or five and realized ultimately that the value of that Beanie Baby was about five dollars. That person got caught up in what we call an “overheated market.” An overheated market is a market in which the underlying value of an item is exceeded dramatically by what people are willing to pay for it because they believe the price is going to continue to rise. It doesn’t matter if the item is a Beanie Baby or a share of stock. And this is what frequently happens to people in the stock market. They buy stock simply for price appreciation, which is, at least theoretically, based on an increase in the value of the underlying company represented by the stock. But frequently, the company doesn’t really appreciate in value. The stock just goes up in price. And the reason for that is the same reason that all prices move up or down: supply and demand. Sellers represent Supply or the availability of an item for sale. Buyers represent Demand or the desire to purchase an item. If there are more buyers than sellers, the price will go up. If there are more sellers than buyers, the price will go down. And that’s what’s responsible for many of the run-ups on Wall Street. Sometimes, you’ll be approached by a representative of Wall Street. It might be a stock broker, a fund manager, an analyst, or a market commentator on the news. Although the wording might be a bit more conservative, the basic message will be the same. A broker might tell you: “Buy this stock; it’s hot, it’s moving up fast.” So you become a buyer. The broker creates demand, and the increase in demand pushes the stock price up, and the broker’s story becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. It may be true that a stock price is moving up, but the question you have to ask yourself is, “Why is it moving up?” Don’t get me wrong: If you can buy a share of stock at $10 and sell it at $20 even though its real value is only a dollar-fifty, that’s great! But somewhere along the line, people are going to look at the fundamentals of the company and figure out that the stock is overvalued. The speculative bubble will burst. Demand is going to dry up, and you’re going to be out there selling with no buyers. When that happens, the price of the stock is going to drop like a rock. What you’re dealing with when you buy into a situation like that is gambling. You’re simply hoping that you will sell out of the stock before the price crashes. There are two basic traps here. In the first trap, greed sets in and is followed by “magical thinking.” Greed is that force that makes it practically impossible for you to sell stock while it is still moving up. The behavior emotion or thought process that I have dubbed “magical thinking” is that force that keeps you from selling a stock once it starts to move down. It’s a belief that somehow (magically) the stock will go back up just so you can get the price that you feel you should. You see, once a stock hits a high and starts to drop off, we start to think that we are somehow entitled to that highest price. We don’t think about the fact that during the run-up in price, every available share of stock may have sold two, three, or even ten times. The reality is that while tens of millions of shares may have exchanged hands during the run-up, there may have only been a few hundred shares that sold at the high. But, we tell ourselves that we are not going to miss out on those few extra dollars, and we are determined to hold the stock until it reaches that high again. We tell ourselves that we will sell the stock when it reaches its former high. But when the stock drops 10 percent from the high, we begin to compromise, and we tell ourselves that we will sell it when it goes back up five percent. We are setting ourselves up for disaster. Who do we think we are compromising with? The market doesn’t compromise any more than a computer program compromises. It has one set of rules. The underlying force that drives the stock market is the same underlying force that drives any market-- Supply and Demand! When a stock finally drops below the price that we paid for it, if not before, we can be found pacing the kitchen floor at three in the morning, muttering to ourselves over and over, “If only… if only… if only….” We are now paralyzed by depression, immobilized by self-loathing, and we are really, really angry with ourselves. This greed factor helps to explain why almost everyone gets hurt when the market finally tops out. There are always buyers and sellers in the market, but the number of buyers doesn’t always match the number of sellers. At the point where holders of stock are beginning to believe that it’s just too good to be true, they start getting nervous. The vast majority of them don’t necessarily sell out of the market. They just stop buying. There are now fewer buyers, which is the same as saying there are more sellers, and stock prices begin to fall. This only makes holders of stock even more nervous. Magical thinking takes over, and holders of stock begin to tell themselves that they are going to sell as soon as their stock reaches its former high. At this point, they become frustrated, irritable, and even more nervous as each day goes by. Emotion begins to take over, and logic goes out the window. Depending upon their varying levels of conviction, courage, fear, and greed, individuals with different psychological profiles will sell at lower and lower price points as the stock moves down. Finally, when the remaining holders of stock who are not blindly committed to the long-term hold philosophy sell their stock, we have what is known as a climactic sell-off or capitulation. Wall Street has a euphemistic phrase for this. They say, “Stock is passing into stronger hands.” It’s a comforting phrase. It makes us feel better about having lost so much of the value of our portfolio. It also makes us more comfortable with the “Long Term Hold” strategy. In my experience, significant sell-offs in the market are generally much more rapid and much more violent than run-ups. It wouldn’t be unfair to compare the process to rolling a boulder up a hill versus rolling that same boulder down the other side. And when that boulder is at the bottom of a particularly steep hill, it takes people a long time to build up the energy to start pushing it up again. But that’s a topic I will cover a little later. I told you that there was a second trap. This second trap also involves greed and magical thinking, but it is an even more dangerous variation because it involves a tax trap. Before we cover the second trap, it might be a good idea to review the basics of the capital gains tax. I feel obligated to warn you that although the illustrations in the next chapter (The Capital Gains Tax) offer some excellent quick-study examples of various capital gain/loss situations, the chapter itself is not exactly exciting. As a matter of fact, it’s pretty boring. If you are comfortable with how capital gains taxes are calculated, you can save yourself some time and tedium by simply skimming or even skipping over the next chapter. If, on the other hand, you feel you need a review of capital gains, then press on. You can always change your mind later. 

          “Education costs money, but then so does ignorance” -         Sir Claus Moser 

        Chapter 4 The Capital Gains Tax Individuals “invest” for income, for appreciation in the price of the purchased asset, or for a combination of both. A capital gain is the appreciation in the price of a purchased asset. The following discussion will be limited to capital gains on investments in securities and particularly on the impact that they have on our tax liability. In order to understand how capital gains taxes work, we must first define a few terms. A capital gain or loss is the difference between the purchase price and the sale price of a security. A capital gain is the difference between the purchase price and the sale price of a security when the sale price is higher than the purchase price. A capital loss is the difference between the purchase price and the sale price of a security when the sale price is lower than the purchase price. You would have a capital gain (Illustration 4-1) when you sell a stock at a price that is higher than the price you paid to purchase it. You would have a capital loss (Illustration 4-2) when you sell a stock at a price that is lower than the price you paid to purchase it.  Capital gains and losses on stock transactions are categorized as either short-term or long-term. Gains or losses resulting from the purchase and sale of a security within a one-year period are categorized as short-term. Gains or losses resulting from the purchase and sale of a security in a period that exceeds one year are categorized as long-term. Short-term refers to a transaction in which a security was held for less than one year. The terms “short-term capital gain” and “short-term capital loss” refer to transactions in which there was less than one year between the date of purchase and the date of sale of a security. Your holding period begins the day after the trading date you bought the security. It ends on the trading date after you sell the security. The trading day on which you sell the security is part of the holding period. If we purchased a security and then sold it at a profit after holding it for less than one year, it would be a short-term capital gain. (See Exhibit 4-3) Since the stock was held for less than one year, the gain would be classified as a short-term capital gain. Let’s look at another transaction. This will produce a short-term capital loss. If we purchased a security and then sold it at a loss after holding it for less than one year, it would be a short-term capital loss. (See Exhibit 4-4) Since the stock was held for less than one year, the loss would be classified as a short-term capital loss. Long-term simply means that a security was held for one year or longer. The terms “long-term capital gain” and “long-term capital loss” refer to transactions in which there was more than one year between the date of purchase and the date of sale of a security.  If we had included the dates for the purchase and sale of Stock “A,” we would have seen that it produced a long-term capital gain. (See Exhibit 4-5) If we had included the dates for the purchase and sale of Stock “B,” we would have seen that it produced a long-term capital loss. (See Exhibit 4-6) For the purpose of determining our tax liability, we must first sort all gains and losses resulting from our transactions into two categories: long-term and short-term. Our first step is to net long-term gains against long-term losses. Netted long-term capital gains or losses are calculated by subtracting the total of all long-term capital losses from the total of all long-term capital gains. If the dollar amount of long-term capital gains was higher than the dollar amount of long-term capital losses, you would have a netted long-term capital gain. If the dollar amount of long-term capital gains was lower than the dollar amount of long-term capital losses, you would have a net long-term capital loss. The previous examples would yield the following result. (See Exhibit 4-7) Our second step is to net our short-term gains against our short-term losses. Netted short-term capital gains or losses are calculated by subtracting the total of all short-term capital losses from the total of all short-term capital gains. If the dollar amount of short-term capital gains was higher than the dollar amount of short-term capital losses, you would have a netted short-term capital gain. If the dollar amount of short-term capital gains was lower than the dollar amount of short-term capital losses, you would have a netted short-term capital loss. The previous examples would yield the following result. (See Exhibit 4-8) Finally, netted long-term gains or losses are matched to netted short-term gains or losses. If you have both netted long-term losses and netted short-term losses, you may use up to three thousand dollars ($3,000) in any given year to offset income from other sources. Your netted short-term capital losses are used first against your maximum capital loss deduction. For individuals, the maximum deduction is $3,000. Married couples filing jointly are treated as one individual. Married couples filing separately are limited to a $1,500 maximum deduction, and neither can deduct any part of the other’s losses. If, after using your short-term losses, you have not reached the limit on the capital loss deduction, use your long-term losses until you reach the limit. Any excess losses are carried forward to the next tax year, and they retain their character as long-term or short-term losses. In the following year, they are first netted against that year’s net capital gains on a dollar-for-dollar basis and then used as a deduction to other sources of income up to the three thousand dollars ($3,000) limit. If there is still an excess net capital loss, it can be carried forward indefinitely until it has been exhausted. The same rules governing use continue to apply. If you have both netted long-term gains and netted short-term gains, then you must pay taxes on all gains at the appropriate tax rate. If you have both net long-term and net short-term capital gains, you must pay taxes on the net long-term capital gains at the appropriate capital gains tax rate and pay taxes on the net short-term capital gains at your nominal tax rate. If your nominal tax bracket is fifteen percent (15%), the current tax rate on net long-term capital gain is ten percent (10%). If your nominal tax bracket is twenty-eight 82 percent (28%) or higher, the current tax rate on net long-term capital gain is twenty percent (20%) The current tax rate on short-term capital gains is the same as your nominal tax bracket. If you have both netted long-term losses and netted short-term gains or netted long-term gains and netted short-term losses: Net them one last time, subtracting the smaller number from the larger number. (See Exhibit 4-9) The resulting number takes on the character of the larger number… in our case, a long-term capital loss. If the netted short-term gain was larger than the netted long-term loss, you would subtract the netted long-term loss from the netted short-term gain, and the resulting figure would be treated as a net-net short-term loss. There are some new regulations that affect sales transactions that are executed in calendar year 2001 and beyond. They allow for lower capital gains tax rates under certain circumstances. If you have held stock for five years or more, when you sell it at a profit, you will only have to pay long-term capital gains taxes of 8% if your nominal tax bracket is 15%. If your nominal tax bracket is 28% or higher, your capital gains tax rate will be 18%. Be certain to consult with your tax advisor or CPA for current tax regulations before making investment decisions that have tax implications. There is no limit to the amount you can pay in capital gains tax. But, even though you might have massive losses (whether carried forward from prior years, incurred in the current year, or a combination of both), under current law, you can only deduct $3,000 in net losses each year against other income! Last year, you may have booked one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) in net capital gains from the sale of stock. If you had no capital gains loss carry forwards, you would have had to pay capital gains taxes on all of those profits. If this year you have a net loss of one hundred thousand dollars as a result of stock sales, you can only take a three thousand dollars ($3,000) deduction against your personal income. You have to carry the excess loss of ninety-seven thousand dollars ($97,000) forward because you can only take deductions for three thousand dollars ($3,000) in net losses each year until they are exhausted. Assuming you never showed a capital gain, it would take approximately 33 years to use up your carried-forward loss. Realized or recognized gains or losses are gains or losses that result when both a purchase and a sale transaction have been completed. Unrealized or unrecognized gains or losses are gains or losses that result when there has been a purchase of a security, but it has not yet been sold. To determine the unrecognized gain or loss, you simply calculate the difference between the price you paid for a security and its current market value. If the market price of the security went up, you would have an unrecognized capital gain. If the market price of the security went down, you would have an unrecognized capital loss. A short sale is a transaction in which you first sell a stock in anticipation of a drop in its price. You do this with the hope that you will be able to purchase the stock (cover your “short” position) sometime later at a price that is lower than the price at which you sold the stock. For example, if you believe that “Stock X,” which is currently at $20/share, is going to drop in price to $10/share, you could arrange to borrow “Stock X” from your broker and then sell the borrowed stock at the current market price of $20/share. The proceeds of the sale are credited to your account, and you now owe the stock that you borrowed to your broker. At some point, you will have to purchase the stock in the open market and pay it back to the broker. (This is known as covering your short position.) If your assumption was correct and the price of the stock did drop, your profit would be the difference between the price at which you initially sold the stock and the price you paid to purchase the stock (cover your short position). For example, if we sold the stock for $20/share and the stock dropped to $10/share, we could purchase it in the open market at $10/share and pay back our stock loan to the broker. In that case, we would actually make a profit of $10/share. (proceeds of sale $20 minus purchase price $10 = $10 profit) Of course, the stock could go up in price rather than down after you sold it. In that case, you would incur a loss. Theoretically, your potential loss is unlimited because there is no limit to how high the price of a share of stock can go. On the other hand, your profit is limited because the price of a stock cannot drop below zero. In the example given, the maximum profit per share that you could make if the price of the stock dropped to zero would be $20/share. (proceeds of sale $20 minus purchase price $0 = $20 profit) On the other hand, if the stock rose to $100 per share, you could lose $80/share. (proceeds of sale $20 minus purchase price $100 = $80 loss) If the stock rose to $200/share, you could lose $180 per share. (proceeds of sale $20 minus purchase price $200 = $180 loss) Of course, there are always transaction costs (commissions) to consider, and since you are borrowing stock, you will pay interest to the brokerage house for as long as your position is “short” (uncovered). In the case of a short sale, there would be an unrealized gain or loss if there has been a sale but no purchase of a security. To determine the unrecognized gain or loss in a short sale, you simply calculate the difference between the price you sold the security for and its current market value. In the case of a short sale, if the market price of the security went up, you would have an unrecognized capital loss. If the market price of the security went down, you would have an unrecognized capital gain. In the case of a short sale, the gain or loss is realized when you buy back the security in order to deliver it back to your broker. Be careful. In determining whether your gain or loss is long-term or short-term, the holding period begins on the day after your purchase. Even if you sold the stock short fifteen months ago, if you buy it back today and immediately deliver it to your broker, your holding period is less than one day. There is one other issue to discuss regarding capital gains taxes, and that is the “wash sale.” It is actually a strategy designed to reduce capital gains taxes. It is more easily explained when you are presented with a concrete situation. Since I will be providing such a scenario in the next chapter, I will defer discussing its application for a few minutes. Armed with this review of capital gains taxes, let’s return to our discussion of the overheated market and take a look at our next chapter, “The Second Trap.” 

           “It’s necessary to relax your muscles when you can. Relaxing your brain is fatal.” —Stirling Moss 

        Chapter 5 The Second Trap Now that you have read through (or skipped over) the chapter on the capital gains tax, it is time to introduce you to the second trap. It also involves greed and magical thinking but is a doubly dangerous variation because it involves a tax trap. In this scenario, we sell a stock at a profit in an overheated market and then turn around and buy back into that overheated market by purchasing another hot stock. We are feeling pretty smart because we have closed out a stock position with a profit. We might even start bragging about how well we are doing in the market. The stock was way overvalued, and we were sharp enough to know it. What we may fail to recognize is that overheated stocks usually get overheated in an overheated market, and overheated markets have a tendency to cool off! We are at even greater risk after buying back into the overheated market. As human beings, we have a tendency to believe that things go on forever. When we are optimistic, we think that the good times will never end. When we are pessimistic, we think that things will never be good again. As a result, when we are in a hot market, we tend to reinvest our original capital and profits until the bottom drops out. I say this second trap is a dangerous variation because you have booked profits even though you have not taken any money out of the market. Even though your profits and perhaps even a significant part of your initial investment may later evaporate in a sharp downturn, you have incurred a tax liability for the capital gain you booked when you sold the original stock at what may have been a substantial profit. What makes it even worse is that frequently, when a market is hot, people have a tendency to put all of their liquid cash into it. Then, if they get caught in a steep downturn, they do not have any cash reserves available to pay the capital gains tax on the profits that they booked earlier. They are forced to sell some or all of the stock that they hold at prices well below their purchase price just to pay taxes on gains they booked from the previous sale. At this point, it is no longer a matter of making a bad choice. They have no choice! They have lost control of their portfolio and are now making purchase and sale decisions based on tax legislation rather than investment intelligence. If the downturn in the market happens towards the end of the calendar year, the pain is compounded. Typically, the market enters the tax-selling season at the end of the year. This is a time when people sell off their losers to offset their capital gains. This extra selling can push depressed stock prices even further down. The result may be that you are forced to sell at the absolute worst time. Now that’s ugly! The simple solution to the problem is to exercise some discipline. You should keep track of your capital gains and losses through the tax year. Whenever you are in the enviable position of having a net capital gain, you should hold back enough cash to cover your tax bill. That will enable you to make buy and sell decisions based on sound financial judgment rather than forcing you to liquidate positions simply to cover your capital gains tax liability. Let’s take a look at a scenario that might develop if you don’t exercise this discipline and then look at the options available to you to resolve the issue of your tax liability. We will assume that on January 01, 2000, your assets consist of $100,000 in cash and that you have no liabilities. Your Balance Sheet or Position Statement would look like Illustration 5-1  On January 15, 2000, you invested your entire $100,000 in the stock market. You purchased 10,000 “Original Stock” shares at $10/share for a total investment of $100,000. Your Balance Sheet or Position Statement would look like Illustration 5-2. We will assume that it is a hot market and that the market value of your “Original Stock” has increased 100% to $20/share or $200,000 by August 16, 2000. At this point, you sell it. You now have $200,000 in cash and a contingent tax liability on $100,000 of realized short-term capital gains. Assuming you are in a nominal 20% tax bracket, your tax liability would be $20,000. (See Illustration 5-3) As of August 16, 2000, your Balance Sheet or Position Statement would look like Illustration 5-4  Although you have not taken any money out of the market, you are still responsible for the tax liability on the capital gain you incurred when you sold the original stock at a profit of $100,000. On August 17, 2000, you then take all of the sale proceeds ($200,000) and use the money to purchase a different stock. You purchase 10,000 shares of “New Stock” at $20/share for a total investment of $200,000. You have not left any money in cash as a reserve against your capital gains tax liability. Your Balance Sheet now looks like Illustration 5-5.  By December 6, 2000, the market has suffered a sharp correction, and you have watched the market price of your “New Stock” decline by 62½ %. (A wonderful example of “Magical Thinking” at work!) “New Stock” drops to $7.50/share, and what was a $200,000 portfolio is now worth $75,000. Your Balance Sheet now looks like Illustration 5-6. As a result of reinvesting all of the proceeds of your sale back into the market, you have lost all of your profits plus 25% of your original capital investment. Uncle Sam doesn’t care. You are still liable for the capital gains tax on the profit you booked when you sold the “Original Stock.” At this point, the current value of your portfolio is $75,000, but your net worth is only $55,000 because of your contingent tax liability. Since you are still in the same tax year in which you recorded the capital gain, there are two ways in which you can cover your tax bill by using some portion of your unrecognized losses. Neither option is pleasant! Under the first option you would have a realized capital gain of $100,000 resulting from the sale of your “Original Stock,” but you also have an unrealized capital loss of $125,000 contained in your shares of “New Stock.” You could sell off enough “New Stock” at a loss to approximate your previous gain. That would eliminate your tax liability. Let’s see how that would work. On December 07, 2000, you completely offset your realized capital gain of $100,000 by selling 8,000 “New Stock” shares at $7.50/share. This provides you with $60,000 in cash (8,000 shares X $7.50/share) and a realized capital loss of $100,000 ($12.50 loss/share sold X 8,000 shares = $100,000 in realized capital loss). After this transaction is completed, you will have eliminated your capital gains tax liability. (See Illustration 5-7) You would still have a remaining unrealized capital loss of $25,000 that would reside in your remaining shares of “New Stock.” Because your realized capital gains equal your realized capital losses you have eliminated your tax liability. What you do have is $60,000 in cash from the sale of the “New Stock” (8,000 shares X $7.50/share) plus 2,000 remaining shares of “New Stock” valued at $7.50/share or $15,000. Your total portfolio value including cash and stock is $75,000. Under Option 1, your Balance Sheet now looks like Illustration 5-8 Even though you have lost 25% of the value of your original capital, you can not claim any loss when you file your taxes. The “unrecognized loss” of $25,000 is resident in the remaining 2,000 shares of stock to the tune of $12.50/share. From a tax perspective, that loss will only be recognized if you sell off the remaining shares of stock at a loss. It may look like a real loss to you, but that’s not the way the boys and girls at the IRS see it! Any potential tax benefit you may have is contained in the remaining stock and is categorized as an “unrecognized loss.” Your second option to resolve your tax problem would be to sell off enough “New Stock” at $7.50/share to pay the 20% capital gains tax on a reduced net capital gain. To accomplish this, you would have to sell 2,000 shares of “New Stock” at $7.50/share. The result of this transaction would be that you would generate $15,000 in cash proceeds from the sale (2,000 shares X $7.50/share) and would recognize $25,000 in capital losses ($12.50 loss/share X 2,000 shares) on the sale of “New Stock.” (See Illustration 5-9) When you net the $100,000 recognized capital gain on the sale of “Original Stock” against the $25,000 recognized capital loss on the sale of “New Stock,” you are left with a net recognized capital gain of $75,000. Assuming a 20% capital gains tax rate, this would leave you with a tax liability of $15,000 ($75,000 in realized capital gains X 20%). This capital gains tax liability would be covered exactly by the cash proceeds from the sale of 2,000 shares of “New Stock.” (See Illustration 5-10) That leaves us with no cash and 8,000 shares of “New Stock” valued at $7.50/share or assets valued at $60,000. Our unrecognized loss on the eight thousand remaining shares would be $100,000. ($12.50/share unrecognized capital loss X 8,000 shares = $100,000 in unrecognized capital losses). Under option 2, Your Balance Sheet would look like Illustration 5-11. The advantage of handling our tax liability using Option 1 is that we do not have to pay out any cash to the IRS because we have effectively eliminated our tax liability by recognizing losses equal to our gains. We have no cash, but the current market value of our “New Stock” portfolio is $75,000. The disadvantage of this approach (assuming that the price of “New Stock” will recover) is that we have had to sell off more stock than we would have if we had handled our tax liability using our second option. The advantage of handling our tax liability using Option 2 is that we do not have to sell off as much of our stock. Again, this is only an advantage if we assume that the “New Stock” price will recover. (If you wish to consider it an advantage, the second option leaves you with an additional $75,000 in unrecognized capital losses, which you may convert to recognized capital losses somewhere in the future by selling off the stock. You could then use these recognized capital losses to offset future capital gains.) The disadvantage is that we actually do pay out cash to the IRS, and the remaining value of our entire portfolio, including cash and stock, is only $60,000. (Cash = 0 + the current market value of our remaining 8,000 shares of “New Stock” at $7.50/share) The above example assumes that the “New Stock” decline occurs in the same calendar year you took your profit in “Original Stock.” If that was the case, you could use either Option 1 or Option 2 to use all or part of your losses on “New Stock” to cover your tax liability. This at least allows you to decide how you will cover the tax liability by utilizing your unrecognized losses. However, if “New Stock” had not declined in price, you would have a distinctly different situation to consider if it had remained at $20/share. You could sell off enough “New Stock to cover your tax liability on “Original Stock” (just 1,000 shares at $20/share). (See Illustration: 5-12) That would leave you with $20,000 in cash to cover your tax liability and $180,000 in “New Stock” (9,000 shares X $20/share) remaining in your portfolio. Your net worth would be $180,000. You would use the $20,000 in cash proceeds to wipe out your tax liability, and you would be left with no cash and 9,000 shares of “New Stock” valued at $20/share. Your net worth would be $180,000. Your Balance Sheet would look like Illustration 5-13. Or, you could hold on to your position in “New Stock” in the hopes that it would increase in value, and you could sell it in the next calendar year at an even higher price and use the proceeds to cover your current tax liability of $20,000 at the last minute. Of course, if you actually do sell it at a higher price next year, you would incur additional capital gains tax liability. I really don’t have a problem with that. I have a problem with the real risk that if you hold the “New Stock” until your taxes are due next year, the stock may decline in the interim. That is really the worst-case scenario. Let’s see how that would work out. If you recognized your gain last year and did not sell any of your “New Stock” until this year, you would have to pay $20,000 in cash to Uncle Sam when you filed your tax return. (20% Capital Gains Tax on $100,000 in realized capital gains). Let’s assume it is April 10, 2001, and nothing else has changed in your financial condition except that “New Stock” waited until the new tax year to decline to $7.50/share. You would be forced to sell off enough “New Stock” to raise $20,000 in cash to cover your tax bill. (See Illustration 5-14) You would have to sell 2,667 “New Stock” shares at $7.50 to generate the $20,000 needed. (2,667 shares X $7.50/share = $20,003) You then write a check for $20,000 to the IRS. That would leave you with $3 in cash and $54,997 in “New Stock” (7,333 shares X $7.50/share). You would use $20,000 of the $20,003 proceeds from the sale to cover your tax liability. You would have $33,331 in realized short-term capital losses that you may or may not be able to use this year and your Balance Sheet would look like Illustration 5-15. By not addressing the problem in the year in which it developed you limit your available options. Possibly the worst situation would occur when you realized that “New Stock” wasn’t going to recover, and you sold it out in 2001. You would receive $75,000 in proceeds (10,000 shares @ $7.50/share) from the sale and would have to pay $20,000 in taxes on last year’s gain. You would be left with only $55,000 in cash and $125,000 in capital losses that you would carry forward until you amassed $125,000 in capital gains. Of course, you could stay out of the market and take your $3000 deduction each year, but it would take you almost forty-two years to use it up that way! Keep in mind that the $3000 is a deduction, not a refund. You only get a fractional benefit from it. For example, if you are in a 30% tax bracket, a $3,000 deduction reduces your tax bill by only $900. Even if you developed the courage to re-enter the market, you would have to see your $55,000 portfolio increase to $180,000 (an increase of over 225%) to use up these losses carried forward. Ironically, it would have to increase to $205,000 (a 272% increase) for you to break even because you would be liable for a capital gains tax of $5,000 on the additional $25,000 capital gain. The good news is that if the market provided a consistent 12% annual compounded rate of return, it would only take you twelve years to break even. The bad news is that twelve years from now, your $200,000 probably wouldn’t buy nearly what it would today. Even though this discussion has been about the additional trap that taxes create for us, I don’t want you to lose sight of the quintessential problems. To begin with, the factors that get us into trouble are “Greed” and “Magical Thinking.” There is one other issue in this tax conundrum that I should probably address here. We can invoke another alternative to resolve our capital gains tax problem, “the wash sale.” Some of you might have already considered recognizing enough capital losses to offset your recognized capital gain and immediately buying that stock back. You could have your cake and eat it too. You would have been able to recognize your loss and still effectively hold on to your position in “New Stock.” Unfortunately for us, someone at the IRS figured this little trick out a while back, and they initiated “the wash sale,” or “thirty-one-day rule.” This rule states that if you sell a stock at a loss and then buy it back within thirty-one days, it is considered a “wash sale.” Simply put, it means that they disallow the use of the loss. The disallowed loss is added to the cost of the replacement stock you purchased, and the result becomes your basis for the replacement stock. The effect is to defer the use of your loss deduction until you sell the replacement stock. Your holding period is calculated from the date you sold the replaced stock. Ouch! If we wait thirty-one days to repurchase the stock, the loss is considered to be a valid “recognized capital loss,” and we can use it to offset recognized capital gains. The additional risk we face in implementing this strategy is that the stock price might move up over the thirty-one-day period, and we would have to pay a higher price to reacquire the stock. Of course, the stock could continue to move down, and we might be able to acquire it at an even lower price. Somehow, I’m not sure if that would make me happy either. If we wanted to take advantage of the loss and still hold our position in the stock, we have one other alternative. We could buy additional stock, hold both positions for thirty-one days, and then sell off the original position. The risk here is that we have doubled our exposure if the stock declines during this period. Perhaps the simplest and best solution to the problem is to deal with the problem head-on. If you take a profit out of the stock market, do not reinvest all of the proceeds. Hold back enough funds to cover your tax liability. I know that is difficult to do. After all, we are all greedy and don’t want to miss out on having that tax money work for us for as long as possible. The hotter the market, the more difficult it is to exercise restraint. You must keep in mind that the hotter the market, the closer it is to a correction. We all know that bear markets follow bull markets. Yet, generation after generation, we find ourselves getting caught in the trap of the overheated market. Even when we profit by selling stock, we tend to turn right around and reinvest all of our capital to ensure that we will be in the market for the next inevitable downturn or Bear Market. Are we just crazy, or is there a more rational (and perhaps slightly more sinister) reason behind it? That is the next chapter’s topic: “The Myth of Long-Term Holding.” 

         “All ships rise on the tide.” —   Anonymous             “No error is so monstrous that it fails to find defenders among the ablest men.” —Lord Acton Letter to Mary Gladstone April 24, 1880 

        Chapter 6 The Myth of Long-Term Holding If you ask anyone these days, they will tell you with absolute authority that the only way to make money in the stock market is to hold stocks for the long term. The only smart way to invest in the stock market is to hold stocks for the long term. The only safe way to invest in the market is to hold stocks for the long term. If you ask them why, they will probably tell you that it’s common sense. Everybody knows it. Listen to the guys on television. Listen to the gurus on Wall Street. Listen to money managers, financial planners, and people at cocktail parties. For the love of Mike, ask your cab driver or your mail carrier. Everybody knows that! Then, ask them again. Say something like, I know that, but why? If they are reasonably well informed, they may tell you that the stock market has always outperformed bonds, bank accounts, CDs, and inflation over the long term. They would be right. They might further explain that the market has ups and downs, but if your investment strategy is to hold on to stocks for the long term, you will always reap the rewards of patience. They might be less right. They might tell you that it’s hard to pick market tops and bottoms, and if you just plan on hanging in there through the upswings and downturns, it will work out fine. They are right on the first point, but on the second point, they just might be dead wrong! There is an old saying that goes like this, “Figures don’t lie, but liars figure.” It addresses the fact that the same numeric data can be presented in a variety of ways. The way in which the numbers are presented can lead you to draw totally different conclusions. Often, we are misled or misdirected by the omission of data or the analysis of only a portion of the data available. This can be true when presenting individual stocks as investment candidates and when presenting the overall performance of a securities market. Let’s take a look at the presentation of an individual stock as an example. If I were interested in having you invest in a particular company (I’ll call it “Company B”), I might tell you that the company’s Return on Equity is two times as high as the standard in the industry for companies with an equivalent asset base. The obvious and probably immediate conclusion most investors would draw is that the company is two times more efficient and probably two times more profitable than the industry as a whole. This might motivate them to invest in the company. In fact, it might be that the company achieved this unusually high return on equity through the use of extraordinarily high leverage. In other words, the company might not be running the business any more efficiently than its competitors. They have just taken on an extraordinary amount of debt relative to competitors within their industry with the same base of assets. Assuming they were no more or less efficient in running their business, that would increase their return on equity, but it would also make an investment in that company highly risky in comparison to an investment in one of their competitors. Let me show you what I mean by way of example. Both “Company A” and “Company B” generate net income of fifteen thousand dollars on an asset base of two hundred thousand dollars. “Company A” has assets of two hundred thousand dollars and liabilities of fifty thousand dollars. (Illustration 6-1) Illustration 6-1  “Company B” has assets of two hundred thousand dollars and liabilities of one hundred twenty-five thousand dollars. (Illustration 6-2) Illustration 6-2 The data presented was completely accurate, and the arithmetic was completely correct, but the information you were supplied with did not provide an accurate representation of the risk involved relative to an investment in its competitors. Company B’s Return on Equity is 100% higher than Company A’s, but Company B’s Liability (debt) is 150% higher than Company A’s. We all tend to accept numbers and numeric data at face value. If someone else has done the calculation for us, we sometimes let our brain go on a vacation. I am not an accountant; however, given the same data for a typical manufacturing company, I could legitimately structure the way I present my financial statements based on what I want your perception of profitability to be. I could show you a minimum of six significantly different bottom-line profit figures without breaking a sweat. More importantly, I wouldn’t be committing fraud, breaking the law, or deviating from generally accepted accounting principles. With numbers and statistics, as in fine cuisine, a lot of the appeal is in the presentation. If something looks good enough, we sometimes skip the smell test. The application of the same concept, partial analysis, can also lead us to inaccurately appraise the risk involved in the stock market. The long-term holding philosophy espoused by most of the securities industry is based on statistical data using relatively long-rolling periods of time, say twenty years. All that I mean by a rolling period is that you count twenty years from a specific year and then do it again, adding one to your first year, i.e., January 1, 1939, through December 31, 1958, followed by January 1, 1940, through December 31, 1959, etc. When you look at the market that way, it would be extremely unusual to find a twenty-year period when the stock market was down relative to Treasuries, CDs, and Corporate Bonds. Additionally, even if the market was flat or down for ten of the twenty years, there would be ten years distributed on either side of that twenty-year rolling period that would represent positive gains. If you took the time to critically evaluate the buy-and-hold strategy, you would find that it works really well in some circumstances and very poorly in others. Not surprisingly, the strategy works best in bull markets. Again, it should come as no surprise that as a strategy in a bear market, it is a disaster! The result you encounter when you utilize this strategy is totally contingent on the period during which the strategy is in effect. I can hear some of you saying to yourselves, “If I decide to hold stocks for the long term, I will hold through both bull and bear markets, and I will do just fine.” Perhaps you will, but you need to consider a few things before you recommit to the philosophy. What most people don’t realize is that it is often extremely difficult (sometimes impossible) to adhere to our initial strategy based on the realities of personal finance and our psychological makeup. Consider these scenarios. If you stuck to your buy-and-hold approach between 1929 and 1932, you would have lost almost exactly ninety percent of your capital. Aside from the loss of wealth in the stock market, this was not a particularly happy time. People were out of work. Some people were losing their homes and other possessions through foreclosures and repossessions. The truly unfortunate were practically starving. Do you really believe that in an environment where you were about to lose your home to the bank and your children were going hungry, you wouldn’t sell your stock to pay the mortgage or buy groceries? When you consider that the market was down ninety percent and people were literally forced to sell off their assets at ten cents on the dollar, it gives you a whole new insight into the term applied to that period, “The Great Depression”! A lot of people are aware that the Dow industrials reached an intraday high of 386 in September of 1929 and then dropped almost 90 percent over the next three years to a low of 40.56 in July of 1932. What most people seem to have forgotten (or were never aware of) is that it wasn’t until November of 1954, twenty-five years later, that the market reached that high of 386 again. Twenty-five years is certainly a long time to hold on to stocks just to break even! (See Chart, Illustration 6-3 “DOW Intraday Highs 09/03/29 – 11/24/54) Illustration 6-3 But break-even isn’t exactly accurate. We can’t disregard the fact that inflation during that period would have significantly eroded your purchasing power. Even assuming an average inflation rate of four percent, the purchasing power of your “break-even” dollar would only be thirty-eight cents. You still lost sixty-two percent of your store of wealth. (See Chart, Illustration 6-4 Decrease In Purchasing Power) Illustration 6-4 Let’s take a different look at that same period of twenty-five years. Let’s consider what our financial picture would be if we had exited the market before the crash and invested our money for a six percent return. If we had a $200,000 portfolio in September of 1929 and we had exited the market, we should have been able to invest our money at approximately two percent over our assumed inflation rate to receive a six percent return. Over the twenty-five-year period, our two hundred thousand dollars would have grown to over eight hundred fifty-eight thousand dollars. That is four and one-half times more money than we would have had if we simply took the buy-and-hold approach. Although historically, no one seems to be exempt from suffering the experience of an economic depression in his or her lifetime, I am not saying that we are going to have that experience in the foreseeable future. (The ultimate oxymoron!) What I am saying is that if (God forbid) a depression does happen and you are blindly holding on to stocks with the expectation that you will not sell until after the recovery, you may find the realities of your situation force you to abandon your plan at what may be a ten or twenty or thirty-year low. It doesn’t get much worse than that. Because I started in the securities industry back in 1981, I have been fortunate enough to have had many clients who were old enough to have lived through The Great Depression and were in the stock market during the crash of 1929. Over the years, I developed a close friendship with one gentleman in particular. Although he was a sweetheart of a guy, when it came to investing, he seemed to have a perspective that was very different from mine. Occasionally, he was extremely challenging to work with. He had very definite opinions, and at times, I didn’t understand where he was coming from. One afternoon, we were having lunch together, and he shared with me the story of how he lost a dear friend after the crash of 1929 through a planned accident. His friend was only 42 years old and had a wife and four children. He had steadfastly held on to the belief that things would get better. They didn’t. He was heavily over-invested in the stock market, and he had lost everything. His home was about to be repossessed, and the only way out that he saw for his family was through the insurance policies that he held. He was a man who was not known to drink much or smoke often, and yet he got drunk and fell asleep with a lit cigar. He died in the resulting fire, and his wife collected the insurance on both the house and his life. It was almost with admiration for this man’s courage that my friend told me, “It was a horrible way to die, but that is probably why the insurance company did not question that it was an accident.” The pain that a blind commitment to the buy and hold for the long-term philosophy can cause is not limited to the financial arena. Sometimes, the emotional and psychological trauma to the individual investor and to his or her loved ones is even more devastating. Ok, Ok, that is an extreme situation. And that crash happened over seventy years ago. It would be fair to say that this is not exactly a common occurrence. All right, I admit it. It is definitely not a common occurrence! But that makes it an uncommon occurrence, and now we are faced with the question of what time frame makes something uncommon. Is it two hundred years, one hundred years, or perhaps seventy-five years? I don’t know either, but I think it is pretty obvious that this is precisely where the problem lies. We just don’t know when it will happen again. Let’s look at a more recent period of time. This was a period during which the market didn’t really decline too much... it just played dead. That period was between 1967 and 1981. For all practical purposes, if you had bought stock to hold for the long term in 1967, you would not have received any appreciable return on your investment for over fourteen years. On January 19, 1966, the Dow Jones Industrial Average broke the 1,000 mark for the first time in history, reaching an intraday high of 1,000.60. On February 09, 1966, it broke that record by one-half point when it squeaked to an intraday high of 1,001.10. It did not break through that record again until November 10, 1972, when it hit an intraday high of 1,007.20. Over that five and three-quarter-year period, your portfolio value would have increased by a whopping six-tenths of one percent. See Chart 2 It gets worse. It was not until January 10, 1983, that the DJII broke through the 1,100 mark when it hit an intraday high of 1,100. That means that between February 09, 1966, and January 10, 1983 (a period of seventeen years), the increase in your portfolio value would have been just ten percent. That is an average annual return of less than six-tenths of one percent per year for seventeen years. (See Chart, Illustration 6-5) Illustration 6-5 Assuming you were fabulously wealthy and had more money than you could spend, you might have weathered this period fairly well. You could have held on to your stock portfolio without feeling any severe financial pressure. Unfortunately, most people aren’t fabulously wealthy. At some level, they depend on the money they invest in the stock market. Picture this scenario and ask yourself how you would react. Let’s say that between your retirement accounts and your personal investment accounts, you had $250,000 in the market back in 1967. Let’s also say that you had an alternative investment available to you that would pay an eight percent annual return. At an eight percent annual return, your $250,000 would have grown to almost three-quarters of a million dollars during that fourteen-year time frame. By 1981, you would have accumulated $734,298.41, and you would be almost one-half million dollars richer! As you watch your portfolio sit idle and non-productive, your mental and emotional state might progress in this fashion. After a year, you might be disappointed with no return, after two years annoyed, three years angry, four years concerned, and after five years, you would probably be frantic and depressed. Even if you had more money than you would ever need, even if two of your children were not about to start college over the next three years, even if you were not nearing retirement and wondering how in the world you were going to fund it, you would almost certainly still feel immense pressure to sell out and place your resources into some more productive alternative investment. You would probably have clung desperately to the magical thought process and suffered the pressure as long as you could. You would probably get out too late, and it is likely that you would have lost most of the opportunity afforded by alternative investments. The problem with the buy-and-hold strategy is that for a multitude of reasons, financial, economic, and psychological, we cannot stay the course. We end up getting whipsawed. We sell at or near the low, and when we can’t stand the pain of missing the next upmove any longer, we buy in again at or near the high. Ironically, trying to be long-term holders of stock frequently turns us into stock market traders. And sadly, we become the worst kind of traders: the ones who make purchase and sale decisions under conditions of extreme financial and economic pressure and high emotion. Before you enter the market, you must have specific goals and establish a personal set of rules that determine the circumstances under which you will buy stock and, particularly, when you will sell it. You must also pay special attention to diversification, not as it is defined by Wall Street (publicly traded securities and their derivatives) but as common sense and your needs define it. Unless you take a more proactive approach to establishing an investment strategy, you will have no control over your financial destiny. Both of the periods I have discussed briefly are dramatic. The 1929-1932 crash reduced market values by ninety percent. Recovery took twenty-five years. The 1967 - 1981 period involved a fourteen-year period during which the only change in your portfolio was the negative impact of inflation on your buying power. In the next chapter, I will present an example of how even a minor correction of ten percent that is short in duration can have a major effect on your wealth. I hope that it will make clear the real impact that a buy-and-hold philosophy can have on your net worth, even in a relatively stable market. 

            “The truth is rarely pure and never simple.” —Oscar Wilde The Importance of Being Earnest, 1895 

        Chapter 7 The Real Impact We think nothing of ten percent corrections in the market. We have been conditioned to expect and, as a result, ignore them. Well, maybe it would be beneficial to look at the real impact of even a short-term ten percent correction on our overall net worth. If you think of yourself as a long-term investor, you should consider the application of the long-term philosophy to other areas of your financial landscape. Consider the following scenario. Let’s pretend you have a $200,000 portfolio and you liquidate it in advance of a ten percent decline in the market. In the interest of developing a conservative rather than an extreme example, let’s say that the decline was not over a protracted period. We will assume it was over in six months. If you took your $200,000 and just put it in a money market with an annual rate of four percent you would have earned an additional $4,000 in interest over the sixmonth period. At the end of the six-month decline in the stock market you would have $204,000 in your money market account. Since the stock portfolio you sold at $200,000 has declined ten percent in price, it is now valued at just $180,000. You buy back your old portfolio for $180,000 and have an additional $24,000 in cash. Let’s assume that you are carrying a thirty-year mortgage on your home with a modest principal balance of $100,000 and an interest rate of only six percent. Your monthly payment would be $599.55. If you applied the $24,000 in cash to pay down the principle on your loan, your principle balance would be reduced to $76,000. You could retain your thirty-year payback period and your monthly payment would drop to $455.66, a saving of $143.89 per month. You would save $51,800.40 in mortgage payments over the next thirty years. It doesn’t stop there. If you invested that $143.89 each month at an annual rate of 6% (which is in effect what you are doing by paying down your mortgage) it would grow to more than $145,000 over the next thirty years. If you are looking at long-term investing in the market, it is only reasonable to look at your other long-term alternatives. By the time you paid off your mortgage you would have an additional $145,000 in cash. What is most appealing about this scenario is that your return from paying down the debt is absolutely risk free! Wall Street may tell you that investing for the long term and not addressing these minor ten (or twenty) percent corrections is the way to go. Let me assure you that they don’t want you thinking about the fact that a single ten percent correction on a $200,000 portfolio is enough to reduce your overall long term net worth by $145,000! On Monday, March 12, 2001 at 11 a.m. as I listened to the morning news while having breakfast, the financial commentator was talking about the NASDAQ market. It closed the previous Friday night right around 2,050. She mentioned, almost casually, that the NASDAQ index was down sixty percent from its high one year ago. Sixty percent! That means that if you had a portfolio that represented the NASDAQ market and was valued at two hundred thousand dollars a year ago, it would be worth eighty thousand dollars today! You would have lost one hundred and twenty thousand dollars in just twelve months. That is money that you will never see again. Regardless of what happens to your eighty thousand dollar portfolio, that one hundred and twenty thousand dollars has been lost forever. If that money had been rescued from the market at last year’s high and invested at a very conservative annually compounded rate of six percent for the next thirty years, it would have grown to almost seven hundred thousand dollars ($689,218.94)! Long term, you would be almost three-quarters of a million dollars richer. By the way, that 60% drop didn’t all happen in one day. I seem to recall analysts talking about a 10% correction being normal. Then one day when it appeared that the market might still continue down, I started to hear that 20% “in this market” wouldn’t be anything to be concerned about. After all, we had quite a run up in prices and this correction was nothing more than a healthy adjustment. Now that the market is down 60% they are pretty sure we are at or near the bottom. Not certain, but pretty sure. But of course, if you are a long-term investor you shouldn’t be concerned about it. You know that the market will recover again. And for goodness sake, don’t worry about the fact that I heard that report at eight o’clock in the morning and that the index was down almost an additional three and one-half percent just three hours later. And that night the gurus of Wall Street were on television hedging again as they explain that we are probably near the bottom and that although the market could go a bit lower, it might be a good time to do some bargain hunting. We will be assured that it will come back to its former highs and exceed them over time. But it will take time. How much time? Well…. One thing I am confident about. We will never see the typical analyst telling us to get the heck out of the stock market now. They know that if you stay in the market long enough either it will recover or you will die of old age. That ensures that they did not give you bad advice, or at least they won’t be accused of giving you bad advice in their lifetimes. Of course there is one benefit to being a long-term investor. You don’t have to worry about what is happening because you made a conscious decision never to think (sorry, I meant to say worry) again. It really disturbs me that these folks don’t seem to realize that you make critical life decisions based on what they spew over the airwaves and in print. They don’t seem to care that your stock portfolio represents in some cases the major portion of your store of wealth. Wealth that you have accumulated over a lifetime of hard work. I don’t care if at the high point your stock portfolio was valued at two hundred thousand or ten million or fifty thousand dollars. It represents real money. Money that you accumulated over a lifetime however long or short that lifetime has been. Accumulating money is difficult. First you have to make it and then you have to exercise a great deal of discipline to keep from spending it. If you earn $100,000 dollars in a year you probably only see about $60,000 after federal, state, local, sales, real estate and social security taxes. Everyone wants more than they can afford so it is difficult to save even a few dollars out of every hundred you earn. If you are earning $100,000 a year and saving five percent of your gross income you are probably in the top one percent of savers in the United States. Even so, you are only saving $5,000 per year. Assuming you had the discipline to do this and managed to receive an eight percent return on your money, it would take you over a dozen years to accumulate $100,000. From a financial standpoint that $100,000 represented the net financial result of twelve years of your life, twelve years of hard work, of sacrifice, and of saving. Wall Street seems to have an “easy come, easy go” attitude towards your money. In the next chapter I’ll tell you why. 

          “Reality Impinges” —James J. Keenan, CFP 

           “How often the sight of means to do ill deeds make deeds ill done.” —William Shakespeare King John Act 4, Scene 2 

        Chapter 8 Why Would They Lie? Based on the brief discussion in the prior chapter it is obvious that we would all be a lot better off if we exited the stock market before it corrected and re-entered when the correction had run its course. Then why is it that the mavens of Wall Street constantly barrage us with messages that tell us to stay in the market for the long haul. Why do they encourage us to suffer through the corrections that are so destructive to our net worth? Wouldn’t we be more than happy to pay double or triple full brokerage house commissions and even send year-end bonuses to our brokers and financial advisors if they would simply tell us when to exit the market? Then why is it that they persist in perpetuating this myth that we are better off holding on to our portfolio for the long term? I told you in Chapter Six that there is an old saying that says, “Figures don’t lie, but liars figure.” It addresses the fact that people accept numbers, numeric data at face value. There is no question that if you compare the returns on stocks to corporate or government bonds or certificates of deposit over a long enough period of time, stocks provide a better return. Usually your financial advisor will present this information to you showing fifteen or twenty-year periods. Often the data is presented in a comparative graph using different colors for each type of investment and showing how a set amount would have grown over the specified period of time for each category of investment. Frequently there will be a table accompanying the graph that breaks out the return into rolling fifteen or twenty-year periods i.e., the return would be listed for 1981 through 1995, then 1982 through 1996, etc. This table reinforces the fact that if you stayed in the investment for the long haul over any fifteen or twenty-year period, you would always do better in stocks. The problem with this type of presentation is that it is deliberately structured to avoid addressing the issue of fluctuations in the market. Again we come back to the question. Why? In order to answer that, let me first ask you a few questions. They may seem frivolous and perhaps a bit strange, but they are designed to make a point. They may change the way you process data and accept the conclusions of the professionals on Wall Street. Do you believe in the tooth fairy and witches? How about the Easter Bunny and Santa Claus and Leprechauns? What about soothsayers and fortunetellers? I am going to assume that you answered these questions with a no. Then why do you believe that there is anyone who can consistently predict the future of the market? If you could provide me with a copy of The Wall Street Journal one business day in advance of publication, I could make enough money to wipe out world hunger. No one (unless he has inside information and is willing to risk jail time by using it) knows for certain how the market or a particular stock will perform tomorrow. After over thirty years as an investor, I am still looking for someone to explain to me why any analyst who felt he could really predict the performance of an individual stock or the market as a whole would work for a brokerage firm or a mutual fund or anyone else. If he knew with certainty how a stock or a market would perform he wouldn’t share that information with anyone else unless he was totally nuts! Instead, he would be out buying and selling securities in his own account. I know that if I wanted to buy a stock or an index of stocks, I certainly wouldn’t want other people competing with me to buy it first. I would want the rest of the world to believe that the stock or index was overvalued. I would encourage them to sell out of the market thereby driving prices down. Then I would buy the stock or index at the lowest possible price in my own account. Sure, I would be more than happy to let everyone else know what a great buy a stock was after I had bought every last share I could get my hands on, but I wouldn’t want them to know that until after I had established my position. Why in the world would I tell other people about a sure thing before I bought the stock myself? By telling other potential investors I would be creating buyers who would push the price up. I would simply be destroying my own opportunity to make a fortune. So why would an analyst work for one hundred or two hundred or three hundred thousand or even a million dollars a year providing advice to others if he could predict the market and make almost unlimited profits simply by picking up a phone and placing some buy and sell orders? The answer is simple. He wouldn’t! And neither would the gurus on Wall Street. Then why do they tell you what to buy? Again the answer is simple. They earn their income by providing information and advice to others. At best it is simply their best judgment. At worst it could represent a conflict of interest. Predicting the market is to a large extent a matter of guesswork. If you don’t believe me just take a look at any business periodical and see what those in the know have said just prior to major changes in the market. Invariably the majority of them are wrong. Here is a quote from The Wall Street Journal on August 26, 1987, the day after the market hit its peak and just two months before the famous October Crash. “In a market like this, every story is a positive one. Any news is good news. It’s pretty much taken for granted now that the market is going to go up.” This shouldn’t be a surprise to anyone. If you think about it, it makes perfect sense. Logically a market will be at its high point when news has been consistently good and prices have consistently been going up. Conversely, when news has been consistently bad and stock prices have been consistently going down you would expect to be at a market low. The problem is that while a market is still going up and reaches a new high no one really knows if it is the ultimate high and if the market is still going down and reaches a new low, no one really knows if it is the ultimate low. If the market is moving higher and higher and someone declares it the top, they are likely to be wrong at least in the short term. If they haven’t picked the top with absolute precision, they are scoffed at the next day and every day after until ultimately the market makes its inevitable turn. Nobody wants to be scoffed at and so they go with the crowd and refuse to fight the tape. I sometimes think that there is something intrinsic in our human nature, some fear of separation, that tells us it is preferable to risk death in a crowd rather than strike out on our own. Now the herd instinct may explain the actions of the average investor, but I would expect something more from the experts, the professionals. Why is it that the analysts and the mutual fund managers seem so willing to go along with this mob psychology? Shouldn’t they know better? Perhaps they do know better! I could be wrong, but I’ve given this a lot of thought and have come up with some interesting possibilities. Doesn’t it make sense that the brokerage firms and the analysts that they hire make more money when the market is moving up? Isn’t it obvious that the more people that are invested in the market the more money is flowing into the hands of the brokerage firms? When a market is a bull market, they certainly don’t want to kill the goose that is laying the golden eggs (I am officially submitting that last sentence for The Mixed Metaphor Award) and so they tend to be bullish in a bull market. Another reason they maintain this group consensus is that (as if by some unwritten agreement) if they are wrong, they don’t want to be unfavorably compared to their competition. If all or at least a majority of the brokerage firms’ gurus and analysts get caught at approximately the same time, no one can point to them and tell them that they were the worst prognosticators on the street. They want to differentiate themselves from the competition, but not too much. That’s one of the reasons that brokerage firms advertise through vague and meaningless advertising campaigns. See if you can fill in the blanks. “Solid as _ ____”; “We make money the old fashioned way, we ____ __”; We’re bullish on _______” What the h___ do these slogans mean? The answer is of course, nothing. But it sure beats the heck out of advertising your results which, to say the least, would be somewhat risky. The primary objective of this kind of advertising is to obtain name recognition for the brokerage firm. Name recognition translates into a comfort level for potential clients and customers. If you encounter a stranger on a dark street, you might be a bit uncomfortable. If you encounter someone whose name you know, you feel secure. This feeling of security is what draws us to the big brokerage houses. After all, with the advent of the Internet and the information age, almost all of the information these firms provide can be obtained at no cost. When you get right down to it the old saying on Wall Street “All ships rise on the tide” says it all. When the market is booming, they are all geniuses. When the market is in the toilet, they are all something less than brilliant. They are all consistent in trying to stay bullish as long as possible. That helps to keep people buying into the market and the predictions of the prognosticators become self-fulfilling prophecies. In effect, keeping the public bullish creates demand, which pushes prices up, which makes them right. When the tone of the market is bullish, investors who purchase individual stocks continue to put money into the market thereby generating commissions to the brokerage firms. Even if the money is invested in mutual funds the cash has to be put to work and even the institutions pay commissions on stock purchases. Of course, when there is more money invested in securities, more fees are generated. Managed money, whether it is in mutual funds or in the so-called individually managed accounts, is assessed an annual fee that is usually based on the market value of the assets under management. If stock prices go up then the value of the managed portfolios goes up and the managers collect larger fees. It’s pretty obvious that it is in the interest of the securities industry to try to maintain a bullish posture for as long as possible to keep additional monies flowing into the market. The quandary faced by the industry is what do you do in a bear market? Common sense would tell you that when you think you are in a bear market, you should get out as fast as possible. If a majority of the advisors and money managers on Wall Street took this position with their clients there is a real danger that the market would implode. With everyone rushing for the door, sellers would swamp buyers. There would be no support for stock prices and there would be a panic. Brokerage firms, money managers and individual brokers would be left with nothing in their accounts but the small amount of cash that resulted from the liquidation of portfolios. Most of their clients would have been badly shaken by the experience. The cash would find its way into safer investments, many of them outside the securities industry. Investors might not return to the stock market for a long period of time. Typically, the deeper the pain inflicted in a dramatic market sell off, the longer a market recovery will take. (Remember the twenty-five year period that it took the market to return to its former height after the 1929 sell off!) Investors might avoid the stock market for truly extended periods of time. Pity the poor money managers, brokerage firms and individual stockbrokers. They would be left with little or no resource (clients’ capital) with which to earn a living. They would have contributed to the demise of their livelihood as well as the precipitation of a market crash. Quite a dilemma. Fortunately for the industry there is a simple solution that provides for relative stability in the markets and allows it to retain clients and capital through good times and bad. The first thing it does is to define a bear market as a drop of twenty percent from the market high. That allows the industry to talk about a correction in a bull market rather than entrance into a bear market for quite a while. After all, most declines in the market are less than that twenty percent. More importantly, if the market does decline twenty percent, the typical verbiage out of Wall Street talks about the fact that the worst is probably over and it would be foolish to actualize the loss by exiting the market at that point. By the time you get anywhere near a twenty percent correction Magical Thinking has taken over and investors find support and consolation in the “Long Term Hold Philosophy.” People will stick around because they think that they will be able to hang in there long enough to at least reach the former high. When the market does go back to its high, the direction and momentum of the market will quite naturally be up and so they will probably maintain their positions in anticipation of a further move to the upside. When we do encounter a bear market, every analyst and money manager on the street who did not exit the market early is dragging out and touting the “Long Term Hold Philosophy.” Historical comparisons will be made to support the concept. Thousands of articles and television interviews will present their best graphics covering corrections and crashes from the past and conclude that in the end all will be well. I will venture a guess that no individual in the industry will create or display a graphic showing where an investor would be if they somehow managed to avoid the majority of the historical downturns. Every analyst and money manager who is interviewed will claim to have warned his or her clients of the potential correction. They will refer to a single line from a twelve page published report or a single phrase from an extensive television interview that represents a disclaimer to their otherwise bullish forecast. There will be trite (if not true) catch phrases bandied about. These may be the same phrases that you have been hearing during every routine correction. “We see this as a buying opportunity.” “We feel that this stock is now substantially undervalued.” “We are selectively purchasing in advance of the recovery.” “We believe this market/sector/ individual stock has been severely oversold.” “The fundamentals in the company remain strong and we are continuing to hold our position and take advantage of any further dips to acquire more stock.” I think you can recognize the pattern of spin that is typically applied in these situations. Meanwhile, investors become impatient with inactivity and they will be ripe for buy and sell recommendations to strengthen their portfolios. Particularly towards year end, there is a tendency to re-evaluate portfolios. Certainly the analysts’ opinions on some of the stocks held in your portfolio have deteriorated. Surely it would be better to sell off some of these and reposition the money into stocks that are true bargains and will participate more strongly in the next cycle. After all, as a subscriber to the long-term hold philosophy, we are still bullish for the long-term prospects of the market as a whole and we want to stay fully invested. Any capital gains losses that we book at this point that exceed the three thousand dollars that we can apply to other income can be carried forward and used to offset future gains when we sell off portions of our improved portfolio at a profit. One of the results of this philosophy of staying in the market for the long term is to generate more commissions and fees to the Wall Street community. If they pointed to the fact that they are wrong as often as they are right, you would invest your money elsewhere. Once you left the market you might not come back. Keeping you in the game is a primary objective of the industry. By maintaining a long-term bullish posture they meet that objective. Ultimately, the Bullish Long Term Hold Philosophy proves itself to be a wonderful marketing tool. But this bullish bias is not limited to the long term. It is pervasive on Wall Street even in the short term. Did you know that it is something of an inside joke with brokers that when analysts change their recommendation from buy to hold (or even from a “buy aggressively” to a simple “buy” recommendation) that for all practical purposes it means sell? Outright sell recommendations are rare. There is definitely a “buy bias” on Wall Street. There are a number of reasons for this. If you have caught on to the rhythm of my writing you have probably guessed by now that the title of my next chapter is “The Buy Bias.” 

           “There are three kind of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.” —Benjamin Disraeli 

        Chapter 9 The Buy Bias By now it is pretty obvious that there is a bullish bias on the part of the institutions on Wall Street. It is in the best interest of big brokerage houses, mutual fund and money managers to keep people buying into and/or maintaining positions in the stock market. The way they do this is both obvious and subtle at the same time. They constantly barrage you with advertising disguised as news or public service information. A great deal of this is accomplished through conventional current news and information sources. These include television and radio news and talk shows, newspapers and magazines. Let’s start with the broadcast media. Television and radio are commercial enterprises. They are in business to make money. Their source of revenue is advertising. It is no coincidence that we call television and radio advertising “commercials!” As I said, the revenue (money) is in the advertising (commercials). The expense is in the overhead and in programming. Programming is what goes out over the airwaves between the commercials and it represents a significant expense to the broadcasters. Since profit is the difference between revenue and expense it would make sense that broadcasters would want to keep expenses as low as possible. The lowest expense figure I am familiar with is zero. That is generally what it costs to have a market commentator on your radio or television show. The reason is simple. These commentators, analysts and market experts are really promoting their product, service or company. In effect, they are getting free advertising. What we sometimes fail to notice is that the entire show is advertising. Some of it is paid for and some is not. In reality, the free advertising has more of an impact on the audience for a number of reasons. First, we usually don’t recognize that we are being sold something and so our normal defenses against a sales pitch are not engaged. Second, since these program guests are introduced with a formidable set of credentials (usually the introduction is written by the guest) we regard them as experts in their field. Third, they usually speak in generic terms and avoid making specific recommendations. However, they will tell you what securities their company likes or what stocks they currently hold in their portfolios. They know that we love a bargain and free information certainly looks like a bargain. They also know that to actualize the value of this free information, we are likely to be moved towards purchasing the stocks that they hold. If I had an established stock position in a mutual fund that I managed, I would love to address several million people at no cost and let them know what a great stock it was. If even a small percentage of the viewers decided to buy the stock it would create enough additional demand to move the stock up in price. As a result, my performance as a fund manager would be that much better. In addition, if I sounded reasonably intelligent or informed, a number of people would buy into my fund directly. The additional monies invested in my fund would help to push up the price of most if not all of the stocks in my fund’s portfolio. I would have to invest the new money flowing into my fund in the purchase of additional shares of the individual stocks that comprised the fund. My company would earn ongoing management fees on a higher fund value and, depending on its structure, the fund might generate commissions on the money coming in to purchase additional fund shares. Analysts for major Wall Street securities firms often appear on these shows to develop additional interest in the stocks their companies recommend. Sometimes they will be invited to comment on just one specific stock. Usually that occurs when the stock has made a significant move up or down. It’s fun to watch how they handle questions. If the stock is up, they usually put on a modest face and tell us that they believe it has further to go and provide all of the data available to support that view. If the stock is down, they typically provide the same data and explain how the stock is now significantly undervalued and how they would be acquiring additional stock at current prices. You should be aware that the analyst touting a particular stock might hold that stock in his or her own account. Although the issue has been raised recently, at this point in time there is no legal requirement that they disclose this information. Even if they don’t motivate individual investors to buy the stocks they tout, at the very least they are spreading name recognition for the stock and for their own company. And name recognition is one of the reasons you feel comfortable buying a particular stock or deal with a particular company. If they are on a news/talk show, they must be recognized leaders in their field. Isn’t that who you want to be dealing with? The same is true for articles and opinion pieces in newspapers. The payment received is usually nominal or nonexistent for these articles, but they provide name recognition or branding for the authors and sometimes they incite potential investors to buy a particular stock or fund. They are the ultimate in free advertising. I am not saying that the factual information provided through the media is inaccurate. What I am saying is that frequently it is not edited, frequently it is biased, and most of the time it has more spin on it than a propeller. Remember, “figures don’t lie, but liars figure.” The vast majority of experts who comment on the market are bullish. There is a reason for that. If they were bearish they would be talking themselves out of a job. Most of the analysts in the securities industry work for brokerage houses or mutual fund managers. Some of them work for insurance companies that sell variable annuity contracts, which frequently contain stocks as part of their investment portfolio. All of these entities have a vested interest in selling their products and in keeping the public invested in the market in general and/or in the stocks they hold in their portfolios in particular. Brokerage houses generate revenue in several ways. In addition to commissions they earn when they broker transactions for individual and institutional clients, they underwrite corporate stock and bond offerings for which they collect substantial remuneration. These offerings may represent the initial public offering of stock (the IPO) or they may be a subsequent offering of stock known as a secondary offering. The owners of a privately held company have an obvious interest in the price performance of their stock after it is offered to the public. After the company has become a publicly traded stock company, the principals who were the only shareholders when the company was private are still shareholders just like you and me. Of course, they hold a substantial portion of the outstanding stock. Once the company has gone public the stock that they hold as individuals (which to a large extent determines their personal net worth) is valued at the price the stock sells for in the open market. Just like you and me they want to see the price of the stock that they own move up. Investment banking/brokerage firms that bring a stock company public usually assign an analyst to follow and report on that company. Can you imagine how upset you would be if you just brought your company public through an investment banker/brokerage firm and that firm’s analyst initiated coverage on your company with a sell recommendation? Don’t worry, it never happens. The same is true of secondary offerings. There isn’t a company in the world that would bring a secondary offering through an investment banking firm that had an affiliation with an analyst with a negative opinion on their company’s stock. That is why the majority of analysts (those working for investment banking firms and brokerage houses) tend to be bullish. Negative analysts scare away clients. Even the analysts working for mutual fund and money managers are not going to publicly bash individual stocks or the market. If I were selling out a position in a mutual fund that I managed, I wouldn’t want my company’s analyst on CNN telling everyone else to get out of the stock before I had cleared out my position. There are some independent (or independently minded) analysts out there, but they are in a minority. After all, swimming against the tide is a tough way to make a living on Wall Street. The buy bias exists at every level in the securities industry. It is prevalent in the investment banking companies that bring IPOs and secondary offerings to market. It extends to the insurance industry because the insurance industry offers annuity contracts and life insurance products that are tied to the performance of the securities markets. It is a dominant theme with mutual fund and portfolio managers as well as with stock analysts and individual brokers. If these people didn’t believe, or at least tell you that they believed, that the securities markets were moving steadily higher they would have nothing to sell, you would have nothing to buy, and they would be out of business. Try to picture what would happen if all of these representatives of the securities industry abandoned their Buy Bias and one day told us candidly that now is not the time to be in the securities markets. It would create a crash in the markets that would be heard around the world. Although IPO stock only represents a small fraction of stock transactions, to some extent it serves as a microcosm of the securities markets at large. Analysis of the IPO market dramatically presents us with a picture of the buy bias in action and the dynamics involved in the movement of stock prices overall. For this reason it is important that we spend some time to develop an understanding of the IPO market. In the following two chapters we will answer several questions about the IPO market. Why does it exist? Who benefits and how? What is involved in bringing a company public and finally, how is the market manipulated? In the next chapter, we will review the mechanics of the IPO as well as the motivation of the owners of a private company about to “go public.” You will be able to see clearly the financial impact an IPO can have on the original owners of a corporation, as well as on the corporation itself. 

        “Those friends thou hast, and their adoption tried, grapple them to thy soul with hoops of steel; but do not dull thy palm with entertainment of each new-hatch’d, unfledg’d comrade.” —William Shakespeare Hamlet, Act 1, Scene 3 

          “Trust but verify” —Former President, Ronald Reagan 

        Chapter 10 The Mechanics of The IPO Let’s take a quick look at why and how private corporations become publicly traded corporations. Let’s assume that you decide to start a business. You decide that you want to open a men’s clothing store. You also decide that you want to incorporate the business because you want the protection of limited liability that a corporate form provides. Initially you will be the sole owner of the corporation and will fund the start up from your private reserves of cash. Before we get into the actual numbers, we first need to define a few terms that are used in accounting. Assets are things of value owned by an entity. (A corporation is a legal entity and for all practical purposes is treated as a legal person under the law.) Assets are measured in monetary terms, that is dollars and cents. Since assets have value, there are claims on those assets that equal the value of those assets. These claims are called equity. Equities are simply claims on assets. There are only two types of equities or claims on assets. The first type of equity represents those claims on the assets of the entity by creditors (people you owe money to) and these are called creditors’ equity. They are debts for which the entity is legally obligated. To be legally obligated is to be liable and so creditors’ equities (claims on the assets of the entity) are more commonly referred to as liabilities. Liabilities (Creditors’ Equity) are the legal claims that creditors have on the assets of an entity. If you want a simpler definition, liabilities are the debts of an entity. The second type of equity represents those claims on the assets of the entity made by the owners. After the claims of the entity’s creditors are satisfied the owner of the entity claims any remaining value. These claims are known as owners’ equity. In a corporation the stockholders are the owners of the corporation so this ownership is referred to as stockholders equity. Stockholders Equity is the remaining unclaimed value of assets after liabilities have been satisfied. These definitions lead us to the basic formula upon which accounting is based. Assets = Liabilities + Stockholders (Owners) Equity If you are thinking, “What if liabilities exceed the value of the assets?” the answer is that the stockholders equity can be a negative number. Armed with this basic understanding of accounting, which represents exactly what we see on a balance sheet, let’s start a company. You incorporate under the name “The Typical Men’s Retail Store, Inc.” and infuse one hundred thousand dollars of your personal cash reserves into the company. In effect what you have done is purchased the company. “The Typical Men’s Retail Store, Inc.” now has one hundred thousand dollars in assets (cash). You receive all of the company’s stock in exchange for your money. The stock represents ownership of the company and since you own all of the stock, you own one hundred percent of the company. You decided to authorize and issue one hundred shares with each share representing one percent of the ownership of the company. There are no debts (liabilities) since you did not borrow any money. In effect you bought the company and received shares of stock for the money you paid. When you issue stock, under most state laws you have to assign a Par Value to each share of the stock. Par value is tied to the concept of limited liability enjoyed by corporations. If you assigned a par value of ten thousand dollars to each share of stock, the total par value of the one hundred shares would be one million dollars. If a company is liquidated through bankruptcy, the personal liability of the corporation’s stockholders (you) is limited to the total par value of the stock less the amounts actually contributed by the individuals who initially organized the corporation. In this particular instance, you only contributed one hundred thousand dollars in purchasing the stock and if the company went bankrupt you would be liable for an additional nine hundred thousand dollars--the difference between the par value of the stock (one million dollars) and the amount contributed by the individuals purchasing the stock (one hundred thousand dollars). The net result is that when corporations are established they set a par value on the stock that is low enough to avoid the personal liability that they would incur if the par value were higher than the price they paid for the stock. This insures that they will not have any additional personal liability if the company goes bankrupt. Since practically anyone starting a corporation is aware of the relationship of par value to personal liability, the concept of par value which was initially introduced to protect subsequent investors from the potential overstatement of the value of the stock no longer provides that protection. Usually the par value of stock is set so low as to eliminate any personal liability on the part of the original organizer(s) of the corporation. For this reason some states have eliminated the requirement for the assignment of a par value and you will occasionally see stock listed in the stockholders equity section of the balance sheet as having no par value. Again, using your company, if you set the par value of the stock at one hundred dollars per share, the total par value of the one hundred shares would only be ten thousand dollars. Since you contributed more than ten thousand dollars in establishing the company as a corporation, you would have no additional personal liability. You did however contribute one hundred thousand dollars to the company and the excess contribution over par value is $90,000 (the one hundred thousand-dollar contribution less ten thousand dollars in par value). This contribution in excess of the par value of the stock is referred to as “amounts contributed in excess of par” or “paid in surplus.” It should be noted that as shares of stock are sold or redistributed any potential personal liability transfers with them on a pro-rata basis. The simple definition of par value is a very low nominal value assigned to each share of original stock. If a stock split is later declared, the par value per share is reduced in direct proportion to the split e.g., if there is a two-for-one split of the stock, the par value of each share of stock is reduced to one half of its former value. If there is a twenty-for-one split of the stock, the par value of each share of stock is reduced to one-twentieth of its former value. The total of the sum of the par value of all shares of stock never changes. Book Value refers to the costs of a business’ assets, less depreciation if applicable (as opposed to current market value of assets), less liabilities. This typically excludes intangible assets such as patents and goodwill, but includes the liquidation price of any preferred stock issued. The Book Value Per Common Share is determined by simply dividing the book value of the corporation by the number of common shares outstanding. The book value of a company has no direct relationship to the total market value of the stock outstanding. Return on Equity is the profit that a corporation makes compared to the amount of net capital or stockholders equity invested in the company. If we had a profit of $10,000 and had stockholders equity of $100,000, our return on equity would be 10% and would be calculated by dividing our stockholders equity into our profit for the year i.e., profit of $10,000 divided by stockholders equity of $100,000 equals a 10% return on equity. Return on Assets is the profit that a corporation makes compared to (divided by) the amount of assets held by the company. If we had a profit of $10,000 and had assets of $100,000, our return on assets would be 10% and would be calculated by dividing our profit for the year by our assets i.e., profit of $10,000 divided by assets of $100,000 equals a 10% return on assets. If there are no liabilities, our assets equal our stockholders equity and so there is no difference between our return on assets and our return on equity. An Initial Public Offering (IPO) is the term applied when a corporation offers its stock to the public for purchase for the first time. Over the next few pages I will show how the net worth of the owners of a privately held company is impacted when a privately held company becomes a public company via an Initial Public Offering. To understand how an IPO and the IPO market work, let’s take a look at our company (“The Typical Men’s Retail Store”) to see how it interacts with the stock market. Let’s assume that you don’t have the $100,000 needed to start up the operation. You invite me and eight other investors to join you in forming “The Typical Men’s Retail Store.” We each contribute $10,000 to the new company for a total of $100,000. After we incorporate under the name “The Typical Men’s Retail Store,” we authorize and then issue 100 shares of stock. We could authorize any number of shares that we wanted to but 100 is a nice round number and each share will represent one percent ownership in the company. Each one of us receives ten shares of stock representing our individual ten percent ownership in the company. The total ownership represented by all the stock is 100 percent and is known as stockholders equity. If you had started the company all by yourself, you would own all the shares of stock and one hundred percent of the entire company. In fact, you would be the sole owner. Regardless of whether there is just one, or there are thousands or even millions of shareholders, the sum of all those shares owned by all of those individual shareholders represents 100 percent ownership of the corporation. Your percentage of ownership of the corporation is determined by dividing the number shares that you own by the total number of shares outstanding. As I mentioned earlier, when you establish a corporation you assign a par value to the stock. In our corporation we have decided upon one hundred dollars per share as a par value. Because we only authorized and issued one hundred shares of stock, the total par value for all stock would be ten thousand dollars ($100 par value for each share of stock x 100 shares of stock = $10,000). Since we each contributed $10,000 for a total of $100,000 the amount contributed in excess of par would be $90,000 ($100,000 contributed minus $10,000 total par value of issued stock). (See Illustration 10-1) Illustration 10-1 Illustration 10-1 provides a picture of what the Balance Sheet of “The Typical Men Retail Store” would look like after the formation and initial capitalization of the corporation. The assets section of the balance sheet would consist exclusively of our cash contribution of $100,000. The equities section would consist of liabilities (creditor’s equity) and stockholders equity. Since we have incurred no debt, liabilities would be zero. The stockholders equity accounts would consist of one hundred shares of authorized and issued stock at par. The total par value of stock would be one hundred dollars per share times the one hundred shares for a total of ten thousand dollars. The amounts contributed in excess of par would be $90,000 or the difference between the actual amount contributed ($100,000 less the par value of the stock, $10,000). The total of the stockholders equity accounts would be $100,000. Total assets of $100,000 would equal the total of the equity accounts, liabilities of zero, plus stockholders equity of $100,000. Let’s assume that we operated the company efficiently for the first year and that we made a profit of twenty-five thousand dollars. That would be a twenty-five percent return on assets and since there are no liabilities it would also be a twenty-five percent return on equity. Profit or Income (sometimes referred to as Net Profit or Net Income) is the difference between Revenue and Expense. Revenue is the money earned in the course of doing business usually from the sale of products or services. Expenses are the assets consumed in the course of doing business. Let’s also assume that we are all on the board of directors for the corporation and we have our annual meeting at the end of the first year. After some discussion we decide that we will not distribute the profits to the shareholders (ourselves) but will keep (retain) the profit in the business in order to use it for expansion. Retained Earnings are the profits that a company makes and keeps in the company rather than distributing them to shareholders in the form of dividends. Dividend is the name given to a distribution of all or a portion of a corporation’s profit to its shareholders on a pro-rata basis. The board of directors decides whether they want to distribute any or all of the company’s profits. When a figure for distribution is determined, that amount is divided by the number of shares of stock outstanding to arrive at the dividend per share. Since you can’t both retain the profits in the corporation and distribute them as dividends, the retained earnings increase for any given year is the net profit minus any dividends paid out to shareholders. The retained earnings figure that shows up in the stockholders equity section of the balance sheet is a cumulative figure. Any increase in retained earnings from the current year is added to retained earnings from prior years. The retained earnings figure on a balance sheet represents all of the income that was earned by a corporation since its inception minus any dividends that have been paid out. Illustration 10-2 provides a picture of what the Balance Sheet of “The Typical Men’s Retail Store” would look like after generating a profit of twenty-five thousand dollars during its first year in business. There were no dividends distributed to shareholders. Illustration 10-2 Our initial investment of $100,000 returned a profit of $25,000 in our first year. Our return on equity was 25%. (See definition of return on equity above.) If we retain the profits in the company and continue to generate a 25% return on equity, the stockholders equity will continue to compound at a 25% rate and will grow to over three hundred thousand dollars by the end of our fifth year in business. (See Illustrations 10-3 and 10-4) Illustration 10-3 In five years we made a profit of over $200,000 on an investment of $100,000. If we had started the company with one million dollars in assets and had managed to generate the same kind of return, we would have earned more than two million dollars on our investment. It is readily apparent that if we could maintain the same rate of return on our assets it would be beneficial to us to substantially increase the assets of the corporation and thus generate a greater profit. As the owners of the company we might decide that now that we have a proven track record it might be a good idea to seek additional capital to expand and accelerate the growth and profitability of the company by increasing our asset base. We decide that we want to raise an additional three million dollars to invest in the company with an eye towards maintaining our twenty-five percent return on assets. With an additional three million dollars working for us, we could become very rich very quickly. Illustration 10-4 We might consider borrowing money to finance this growth, but since we are still a relatively young company with only approximately $300,000 in owners equity it might be hard to convince a bank to loan us three million dollars. The bank might consider lending us an amount equal to the amount of our stockholders equity or $300,000. A loan of $300,000 would increase our assets to $605,176 and our liabilities to $300,000. That would increase our debt to assets ratio to almost 50% ($300,000/$605,176). It would also increase our debt to equity ratio to nearly 100% ($300,000 in debt/$305,176 in equity). It is unlikely that a bank would want to exceed those ratios when considering us for a loan. Banks tend to be somewhat conservative since even if we are outrageously successful they only get back the amount they loaned to us plus an agreed upon interest rate, but if we are an abject failure they could lose the entire loan amount. Additionally we would then have the burden of interest expense on the loan. If we were not able to generate the same level of return on the additional funding, or put it to work quickly enough, the interest expense might place us in a negative cash flow position and we could be risking bankruptcy. With a consistent history of profitability and growth, we might start to consider bringing in additional partners (shareholders) as an alternative. By selling shares of stock we are in effect giving up part of our percentage of ownership in the company. While this may appear to be a negative, there are two benefits: First, even though we may own less of the company on a percentage basis it is a smaller percentage of a much larger company. The dollar value of our share of ownership would increase substantially because the money raised from the sale of stock belongs to the company and as a result the company has more value. Second, there is no debt or interest to be paid off. Up to this point we have been a privately held stock corporation. Our stock has not been available to the general public and has not been listed or traded on any securities exchange. Let’s see what would happen if we decided to raise additional capital by offering stock to the public and becoming a publicly traded company. To accomplish this we would have an Initial Public Offering of our stock. We decide to raise three million dollars and agree among ourselves that we will be willing to give up fifty percent of our ownership in the company to accomplish this. After meeting with an investment-banking firm, we determine that we should be able to raise the three million dollars by offering fifty percent of our stock ownership to the public. The investment-banking firm recommends that we offer the stock at fifteen dollars per share. The first thing that we do is to have a meeting of the board of directors and propose a stock split. We decide to have a four thousand for one stock split. Since there are only ten of us who are shareholders in the company and we are all on the board of directors, this proposal is agreed to unanimously. At this point there are 400,000 shares of stock. Since we each received 4,000 shares for each of the original 10 shares we owned as individuals, we now own 40,000 shares of stock each. The par value of each share of stock would also be split and in effect would be reduced to 1/4,000 of its original value or two and one-half cents ($100 par value/4,000 = .025). Since we have decided to offer fifty percent of the ownership of the company, we each contribute half of our stock for sale to the public. We will sell 20,000 shares each for a total of 200,000 shares. In order to raise three million dollars from the initial public offering of stock, we will offer the shares at $15 each ($15 x 200,000 = $3,000,000). Once we have successfully completed the initial public offering, our company will have three million additional dollars in cash to work with. Our balance sheet would look like this. (See Illustration 10-5) Illustration 10-5 Let’s now take a look at how all parties involved in the company are impacted by the initial public offering. The original owners of the company have seen the book value of their shares drop from $3,052 a share to $8.26 a share. That doesn’t look too attractive until you recognize that each of the original owners previously owned only ten shares of stock with a book value of $3,052/share for a total personal net worth of $30,520 (10 shares X $3052). After the IPO they each own 20,000 shares with a book value of $8.26/share for a total personal net worth of approximately $165,200 (20,000 shares X $8.26)! That represents an overnight increase in the personal net worth of each of the original owners of almost $135,000. That is an increase of over 441%. Not too shabby! More importantly, that net worth is based on the book value of the company. The book value of a company is theoretically the liquidation value of the company. Liquidation Value is the value the shareholders would receive if the company were sold off for just the value of its net assets (assets minus liabilities). Stocks almost always sell in the public securities markets at some significant multiple of book value. The original owners still own half of the company and are entitled to half of the future earnings of a company that is now worth over 3.3 million dollars. If the company continues to return 25% on assets its value should compound at that same rate. If the company did not distribute any of its profits (retained all of its earnings) and let them compound over the next five years the company’s book value would grow to over ten million dollars. (See Illustration 10-6) Illustration 10-6 Each of the ten original investors (who after the IPO each owns 1/20th of the company’s stock) would have seen his original $10,000 investment grow to over $500,000 in ten years. The book value of each 20,000 shares of stock would have grown to $504,400 (20,000 shares each x $25.22 book value = $504,400)! (See Illustration 10-7) Assuming the same twenty-five percent return on equity, if the original owners had retained full ownership and not sold off half of the company to individual investors in the IPO, the book value of the company would have only grown to $931,323. Each of the original investors would have seen his investment grow to only $93,132. Each would have retained ten percent ownership in the company, but without the benefit of the additional three million dollars in assets infused by the IPO, at the end of the fifth year the stockholders equity would not have grown as rapidly. Illustration 10-7 Illustration 10-8 shows what the growth of owners equity would have been at the end of ten years without the benefit of the three million dollar infusion of capital from the IPO. Illustration 10-8 Illustration 10-9 shows what the balance sheet of “The Typical Men’s Retail Store” would look like at the end of ten years without the benefit of the three million dollar infusion of capital from the IPO. What makes the IPO particularly lucrative for the original owners of the company is that publicly traded companies rarely sell at book value. They sell at some multiple of book value. The reason for this is that the assets of the company are producing a stream of income that accrues to the shareholders either in the form of dividends paid out to shareholders or in the form of retained earnings that increase the stockholders’ equity. Illustration 10-9 These future cash flows are discounted to a present value and are used to determine the present value of the stock. (If you want a comprehensive and easy to understand explanation of Discounted Cash Flow, send for the special report titled “Discounted Cash Flow Explained.”) You can order it through my website https://www.ignoranceisrisk.com.) The Price to Book Ratio, The Price to Earnings Ratio and Discounted Cash Flow are all used in the determination of a company’s fundamental value. Fundamental analysis is a process that attempts to determine the value of a company and the appropriate price that its stock should be selling for. The process involves the evaluation of basic financial data using established financial formulas and ratios. The attempt to value a stock based on the emotion of the market place is called technical analysis and there are literally hundreds of ways to measure the emotion or sentiment of the market. Technical analysis is an attempt to determine whether supply or demand will be the dominant force in future price movement. It uses an assortment of tools including a variety of charts, graphs and trend-lines as well as a myriad of formulas, ratios and statistical data. Some of the methodologies appear to be quite scientific while others are downright whimsical. There are some people who swear that the market moves up and down with hemlines and others who will tell you it depends on who wins the World Series in baseball. Although it is beyond the purview of this book to present the tools of fundamental and technical analysis, it is well within its scope to discuss in general terms the risks and realities of both and to show how the market price of a stock may be totally incongruent with its fundamental value. The IPO is an excellent vehicle to demonstrate how the emotional component of a stock price can get out of hand and how Wall Street can manipulate that emotion and price movement. In the next chapter we will address how Wall Street brings IPOs to market and how that impacts the price of the stock in the after-market. We will look at how investment-banking firms make money by drawing in IPO clients. We will see how they keep these clients happy in an attempt to develop subsequent business. We will also look at how brokers are compensated for these “commission free” trades. You will see how IPO shares are delivered to the public and how the investment-banking firm can effectively manipulate the secondary market through the broker network.

         “The greatest mass of people… will more easily fall victim to a big lie than to a little one.” — Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf, 1925. 

        Chapter 11 Bringing the IPO to Market When a brokerage house brings a private company public by handling the offering of stock to the public, it receives a healthy fee. In exchange for that fee, the brokerage house will distribute the stock to the public through its own network of brokers. Often it will promise to support the offering price of the stock for a specified time. If the stock begins to drop, the brokerage house will purchase a set number of shares (up to a specified date) into its own account thereby supporting the price. (Remember Supply and Demand. If there are more shares being bought than sold, the stock price will go up!) Let’s return to our example of “The Typical Men’s Retail Store.” We are offering 200,000 shares of stock to the public at $15 per share to raise $3,000,000. A prospectus is put together describing the company’s basic business, its business plan, its management team including biographies and resumes, the financial statements for the company going back several years, and projected financial statements. These pro-forma statements indicate what the company’s financial statements are expected to look like in the future. These pro-forma statements are based on assumptions that are defined in the prospectus Of course, the prospectus makes it clear that there is no guarantee that the financial projections will be accurate. It is very clear on the fact that these projections are based on assumptions that may or may not prove to be correct. These disclaimers are often presented in a section of the prospectus titled “Risks” or “Investors Risks” or “Risks to Investors.” Most investors have become inured to the language used in prospectuses to define the risks involved. For this reason, investors tend to gloss over this section of the prospectus. A great number of investors in IPOs don’t even read the prospectus. What sells them on purchasing the stock is the broker’s recommendation along with the story that the broker tells. The potential investors are contacted for an “indication of interest” well before the stock is released. This becomes a firm order when the stock is released, but it is no guarantee that the investors will receive any or all of the stock they requested. In some cases, depending on how strong demand for the stock was, the investors will not receive any shares. In other cases they may receive a partial fill on their order. This of course creates a scarcity mentality in the minds of the potential investors. If something is scarce it simply means that there is more demand than supply and we know that usually means an increase in price. This provides a strong incentive to potential investors to place an order to purchase the IPO. Another incentive to the investor is that IPOs are sold without commission. For all practical purposes, the company that is going public pays the commission. Whether the investment banking fee is deducted from the proceeds of the sale or is paid out of other sources of cash by the company that is going public, ultimately it reduces the assets of the company making the offering of stock. The result is that the investment-banking fee reduces the value of the company that the investor is purchasing. The company is either receiving less than the actual proceeds of the sale of stock or it is reducing its pre-offering cash balance. Naturally the investment banking firm handling the offering takes the commission that will be paid to its brokers into account when they set their fee. What your dad told you was true. There is no free lunch. A good analogy for the free commission exists in the real estate markets. We all know that when we purchase a house through a real estate agent that the agent receives a commission. In theory the seller of the house pays the commission. In reality, we know that the commission is contained in the purchase price of the property and that if it were not for the commission, the seller would be willing to dispose of the property at a lower price. The investment-banking firm, along with the company offering stock for sale, establishes the offering price with the investment banking fees and the broker commission in mind. And just as in the sale of a house, the expectation is that the seller will receive a higher price as a result of the marketing and distribution expertise provided by their agent. Since there is a limited amount of stock to be offered, it is distributed to both brokers and investors based on their past performance. For the brokers, their allocation of stock is determined by how much IPO stock they have sold in the past. For the investor, their allocation of stock is determined by how much IPO stock they have purchased in the past. This is not limited to dollar volume. A primary factor in determining who gets the stock is determined by their participation in all prior IPOs, not just the “hot stock” deals. There are some IPOs that are “hot” (in heavy demand) because the company is well known or has a niche market or a proprietary technology. These are the IPOs that investors call the brokers to purchase. These stocks usually increase in price immediately after the Initial Public Offering because the demand is so high and the expectations for the company are so great. Since the brokers’ allocation of stock is limited, they often use these shares to keep their steady IPO clients happy, or to bring in new clients. Sometimes brokers will use these stocks as incentives to large prospective clients to do business with them. Brokers almost always look upon the distribution of hot stock as a favor to be redeemed from clients or prospects at a later date. When an investment-banking firm enters into an agreement to bring a stock company public there is usually a provision that guarantees a certain level of support to the price of the stock. For an agreed upon period after the initial offering, the investment-banking firm will agree to purchase up to a specified number of shares of the stock in the open market if the stock price begins to fall. Providing this extra demand for stock keeps its price up. Typically the investment-banker does not want to have to fulfill that obligation and buy falling stock in his or her own account. This is the reason that brokers are strongly encouraged to have their IPO clients hold the stock through this support period. If the original purchasers of the stock do not sell their stock then the supply of stock will be severely limited and any demand will move the price of the stock up. Often there are unofficial, informal, verbal agreements between the brokers and the IPO investors that stipulate that the investors will hold the stock for the support period that the brokerage firm has promised to the issuer of the stock. Sometimes the investors are even asked to commit to the purchase of subsequent IPOs, which are not “hot” in order to get stock. Brokers sometimes refer to these “not-so-hot” IPOs as “dogs.” Although purchasers of an IPO have a right to sell the stock at any time, brokers will often strongly encourage them to hold the stock until the support period has passed. In some cases the broker’s incentive is that his brokerage house will charge him back the commission he earned when the stock was initially purchased if it is sold out or “flipped” before the expiration of the support period. I have seen brokers hang up on clients who were trying to place a sell order on an IPO stock before the support period had expired. This type of behavior is completely illegal. It is rare in reputable firms but it does happen. If a client flips the stock, it is unlikely that he will have an opportunity to purchase the next IPO from that broker since the broker’s incentive to sell IPO stock to that client has been taken away along with the broker’s commission. The brokers who receive the largest allocation of stock are the brokers who have in the past sold the most IPO stock. If they have sold the “dogs” as well as the winners, their allocations will be high and they will make a lot of money through transparent commissions. Transparent commissions are commissions that do not show up on the clients’ trade confirmation statement. (Yes, even though these offerings are “commission free,” the brokers still get paid handsomely!) Brokers who only want to show the hot stocks to their clients will find themselves shut out of the allocation process. Let’s assume that the brokerage firm has one thousand brokers in its employ and that each broker has two hundred clients. That provides the brokerage firm with two hundred thousand potential buyers. Usually stock is sold in round lots of one hundred shares, but frequently, investors will want to buy thousands of shares of an IPO because they will be the first investors to buy into the company in the public markets and so they see this as a “ground floor opportunity.” (The reality is that the true ground floor opportunity was in the earlier private placement or venture capital stock. In addition to raising additional capital for the company, the IPO also provides a means for the early investors in the company, including its founders, to dispose of some or all of their stock at a huge profit over their original investment.) If every client wanted to buy one hundred shares that would create a demand for twenty million shares. If only one in ten clients wanted to buy just one hundred shares the demand for stock would be for two million shares. Keep in mind that many investors want to buy thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of shares of an IPO. The brokers are credited with gross commissions based on a flat rate for each share of IPO stock they sell. The net commission (payout) to the individual broker is routinely calculated on the highest payout rate in the compensation plan regardless of where the broker would normally fall in the payout schedule i.e., if the broker would normally be paid out at a 20% rate and the highest pay-out rate in the compensation plan was 40%, then the broker would be paid at the 40% rate. If the compensation per share is fifty cents and the broker is paid out at forty percent then the broker receives twenty cents for each share sold. Using these numbers, it is easy to calculate that if a single broker sold all of the 200,000 shares of stock that broker would net forty thousand dollars ($200,000 X .50 X.40 = $40,000). It should be pretty obvious that every broker wants to sell every share of the IPO. As a result a great demand for the stock is developed before the shares actually come to market. The total demand created by the brokers usually substantially exceeds the supply of stock and that pushes the price of the stock up in the after market. This provides a benefit to the brokerage house in four different ways: 1. If the price of the stock moves up, the brokerage house will not have to support the price by buying shares of falling stock in its own account. 2. The clients of the brokerage house who purchased the IPO will be happy because the new stock that they own is moving up in price and will be inclined to do business with that firm in the future. 3. The stock will trade heavily in the after market thereby generating significant additional commission revenue to the brokerage house. 4. The company that went public will be pleased with the investment-banking firm and will be more likely to do business with them in the future and this will generate additional fees and income. Additionally, if the investment-brokerage firm received stock in the company as part of its fee, then the value of the stock held in its own account (and in effect the fee it received for bringing the company public) will also increase. Based on our pro-forma projections for “The Typical Men’s Retail Store,” five years after the IPO the book value per share should increase to $25.22 (See Chapter 10, Illustration 10-7) and the earnings per share should grow to $5.04. (In our company, “The Typical Men’s Retail Store,” net income and retained earnings in any given year would be the same amount since we do not pay out any dividends.) In Illustration 10-6 we show the increase in retained earnings to be $2,017,319. If we divide that number by the 400,000 shares outstanding we arrive at $5.04 earning per share. Owners of the stock should expect the market price of the stock to grow to some multiple of those numbers. The relationship of the book value of a company to its market capitalization is known as a price to book ratio. The formula is: Price to Book Ratio = Market Price of Stock ÷ Book Value Assuming that the Price to Book Ratio will remain constant over the next five years, we can use a simple formula to determine the projected future market price of the stock. If we multiply both sides of the equation by the book value we can come up with a formula that allows us to calculate the expected Market Price of the stock. The formula would look like this. Price to Book Ratio x Book Value = Market Price of Stock                (Current)            (Projected)            (Projected) The calculations use numbers on a per share basis. As of early August 2000 the average price to book ratio of the Dow Jones Industrial Index was approximately eight and one-half to one which is simply expressed as eight and one half (8.5). If five years after the IPO the market was to value stock in “The Typical Men’s Retail Store” using that same ratio, we could expect our stock to be selling at $214.37!  Book Value per share                                                 $25.22 Dow Jones Average Price to Book Ratio                  X 8.50 Projected Market Price                                            $214.37 The relationship of the earning of a company to its market capitalization is known as a price to earnings ratio, or simply the Price Earnings Ratio (PE). The formula is: PE = Market Price of Stock ÷ Earnings per Share Again, using simple algebra we can come up with a formula to determine the projected market price of the stock. By multiplying both sides of the equation by the company’s earnings, we can come up with a formula that allows us to calculate the expected Market Price of the stock. The formula would look like this: Market Price of Stock = Earnings x Price Earnings Ratio This is also calculated using numbers on a per share basis. As of early August 2000 the average price earnings ratio of the Dow Jones Industrial Index was approximately twenty-six to one which is simply expressed as twenty-six (26). Assuming that five years after the IPO the market would value stock in “The Typical Men’s Retail Store” using that same ratio, we could calculate the price that we would expect our stock to be selling at in five years. In order to perform the calculation we would first have to calculate the pro-forma earnings per share for the stock five years after the IPO. Earnings in the fifth year after the IPO divided by the number of outstanding shares = earnings per share. The earnings in the fifth year after the IPO were $2,017,319. (See Chapter 10, Illustration 10-6) The number of shares outstanding would be 400,000. Earnings ÷ number of outstanding shares = earnings per share (EPS). $2,017,319 ÷ 400,000 = $5.04 EPS The EPS multiplied by the expected average PE ratio would give us a projected price of $131.13. Earnings per share                                                      $5.04 Dow Jones Average Price Earnings Ratio                 X 26 Projected Market Price                                           $131.13 P/B and P/E ratios are just two of dozens of ratios that can be used to evaluate whether a company’s stock price is overvalued or undervalued and to project future pricing. Using these two very basic methods of calculating the potential future price of our stock in five years, we come up with estimates ranging from $131.13 to $214.37 or an average of $172.82. Over a five-year hold period that would represent a compounded rate of return of sixty-three percent. That is why investors are willing to pay fifteen dollars for a stock that has a book value of eight dollars and twenty-two cents and a price earnings ratio of 100. Exhibit 10-3 showed earnings of $61,035. Immediately after the IPO there were 400,000 shares outstanding. The EPS at that time would be $61,035/400,000 or fifteen cents a share (.15). The P/E ratio would be $15/.15 or 100. The investors are banking on the idea that the growth projections are valid and that the P/E and P/B ratios will remain constant. If these assumptions are true then the market value of their stock will rise along with the projected increases in the earnings and the book value of company. Logically, the price of the stock should rise over time as the validity of the pro-forma projections prove to be accurate. P/E and P/B ratios are just two of many tools used to evaluate the market value of a company by looking at financial performance, statistics and ratios. When applied to the stock market this process is known as fundamental analysis. Let’s see what might happen on the first day that the stock is trading when the emotions of fear and greed come into play. We will see how supply and demand affects the market price of the stock, and how to some extent the brokerage firms manipulate supply and demand. In our scenario we assumed that ten percent of our clients placed indications of interest to purchase one round lot of the IPO. With two hundred thousand clients trying to purchase one hundred shares each, the total demand would be for two million shares of stock. Since only two hundred thousand shares are being offered for sale in the IPO, that would leave an overhanging demand for purchase of one million eight hundred thousand shares. The demand would literally be ten times higher than the supply! Nobody likes to miss out on an opportunity, so when you talked to your broker and were told that you didn’t get any shares, you would be tempted to buy shares in the aftermarket. After all, you were already pre-sold on the idea that the stock was a winner. The problem that you would encounter is that the people who bought the stock bought it with the expectation that the stock price might soar to $173 over the next five years. That would represent close to twelve times the IPO price, and that would provide them with a compounded rate of return of approximately sixty-three percent for the next five years. That is a pretty attractive rate of return and most of the people who were lucky enough to get the stock would certainly not be willing to sell it at the fifteen dollars they paid for it. You would have to offer more. Assuming a three percent commission rate, some people might be willing to sell their stock for sixteen dollars on the same day that they bought it. Their return after commission would be fifteen dollars and fifty-two cents, a 3.47% profit in less than one day. That is a one thousand two hundred and sixty-six percent simple annualized return (3.47 X 365 = 1,266). If we used daily compounding to calculate our annualized return it would be more than two hundred and fifty thousand percent (1.0347^365 = 255,431)! This makes it pretty obvious why there are day traders out there who are willing to take very small percentage gains on their trades. These are the people who will be willing to sell out and take their profit at sixteen dollars per share. Even though the stock price has moved up to sixteen dollars per share, it is likely that only a few thousand shares will be sold at sixteen dollars so there is still a great demand for the stock. A few thousand more shares might sell at sixteen and a quarter, then one-half, then three-quarters then seventeen. The higher the annualized return that the original purchaser sees through a sale of the stock, the more motivated he is to sell. At seventeen dollars we would net $16.49 after our three percent commission. That would provide us with a net profit of $1.49 or 9.93 percent. The simple annualized return after commission would be three thousand six hundred twenty six percent! (If we used daily compounding to calculate our annualized return it would be more than one thousand trillion percent!) These are the calculations that motivate day traders and that is why you may see a stock move up twenty, thirty, fifty or more percent in the first hours of trading. At higher and higher prices, the holders of the original stock are more and more motivated to take short-term profits. At the same time, as prices are going up people who don’t yet own the stock are getting more and more excited about the upward price movement and greed becomes a more and more important factor bringing more and more buyers into the stock. Ironically, fear of not getting in on a good thing also comes into play. With both fear and greed working at the same time, we could see a feeding frenzy develop. It is conceivable that the stock could double or more in price in the first day of trading and rise to over $100 a share in a matter of weeks. People who had no interest in the stock initially but who watch for stocks that are moving up rapidly in price will also jump into the market creating further demand and pushing the price of the stock up even higher. Now people are buying the stock based only on its price movement. As the stock moves dramatically up, the media begins to report on it and create even more interest. Initially it shows up on lists of the most actively traded stocks and stocks that have the highest daily percentage increase. After a short time it may start to get coverage in articles in business newspapers, magazines and newsletters. Nothing draws a crowd like a crowd and everyone wants in. The stock shoots up in price dramatically until the demand created by the brokers prior to the initial public offering and the lust of the traders who came into the market based exclusively on the price movement of the stock is satisfied. The excess demand initially created by the brokers working for the investment-banking firm set in motion a series of events that led to totally irrational trading in the stock. The fundamental value of the stock becomes practically irrelevant as a form of “Magical Thinking” comes into play. (“…the belief that just because you have overpaid for a stock, someone else will be willing to pay you even more to buy it from you.”) Finally, when the demand for the stock has been satisfied the stock will stop moving up in price. Price movement can be compared to a ball that is tossed up into the air. Just before it starts to come down, it stops moving up. That should be your warning signal. Frequently what happens is that a lot of people see the warning signal at the same time and put their stock up for sale. The stock price starts to drop, usually just as fast or faster than it moved up. Once it starts to move down, volume increases and the move down accelerates. Magical thinking in the form of “I will sell it when it goes back up to a particular price” sets in and people with different psychological profiles will sell out at different price levels as the stock moves down until capitulation finally occurs. This may be a price at or even significantly below the original offering price. Remember that different investors bought at different prices as the stock moved up and the fear factor and magical thinking impact them at different price levels as the stock moves down in price. This is why the stock may drop over a period of time until the majority of the remaining holders of stock will eventually sell and head for the door at the same time. The bottom line is that often the brokerage houses initially create the demand that pushes a stock price up and that demand becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Emotion in the form of fear and greed drives the market until reason takes over and the stock price starts to move down. Ironically, fear may push it below a reasonable price level and there may be some point at which the stock is a good buy on a fundamental basis. Even so, depending on how much emotion was involved and pain was inflicted, the investors who had purchased the stock in the past may or may not return to the stock at a later time. The price of the stock could flounder for a very long time. In the next chapter I will show you some of the additional conflicts of interest that may exist between the brokerage firm and the investing public both in the IPO market and by extrapolation in the secondary markets. In the next chapter we will address how Wall Street brings IPOs to market and how that impacts the price of the stock in the after-market. We will look at how investment-banking firms make money by drawing in IPO clients. We will see how they keep these clients happy in an attempt to develop subsequent business. We will also look at how brokers are compensated for these “commission free” trades. You will see how IPO shares are delivered to the public and how the investment-banking firm can effectively manipulate the secondary market through the broker network.

          “The most dangerous criminal may be the man gifted with reason, but with no morals.” — Martin Luther King, Jr. 

        Chapter 12 Conflicts of Interest I am not certain if the following story is true or merely a joke, but it makes a point. The New York Mob hired a deaf-mute man to collect its protection money, figuring he can’t sing if he gets caught. In his first week the collector picks up more than $50,000. The second week he stashes the money and tries to leave town, but the mob guys catch him and use an interpreter to grill him. “Ask him where the money is,” says the mob boss, and the interpreter signs, “Where’s the money?” The collector signs, “I don’t know what you’re talking about,” and the interpreter says, “He don’t know what you’re talking about.” The mob boss then pulls out a .38 and puts it in the deaf guy’s ear. “Now ask him where the money is.” The deaf man signs frantically, “It’s in Central Park, in the third tree stump on the left from the West 81st Street entrance. “The interpreter says, “He says he still don’t know what you’re talking about, and that you don’t have the guts to pull the trigger.” I define a Conflict of Interest as a situation in which someone who is supposed to be working for you and looking out for your interests is placed in a position where he might in some way gain personally by placing his own interests ahead of his responsibility to fulfill his duty to you. Although the mere existence of a conflict of interest does not ensure that an individual will not do the right thing, based on the state of ethics that seems to be prevalent in the securities industry today I would not be willing to take the chance. The story above is not really funny in the “ha ha” sense. It is one of those jokes that catches us by surprise and the satisfaction or payoff in the story is in the tickling of our brain. A little light goes off in our heads as we recognize how inescapable the trap is for the victim. In a way we have to admire the interpreter as we would admire a brilliant chess player who in one swift stroke places his opponent in checkmate. And although we grimace at the callousness of the story, most of us would tend to identify with the interpreter rather than the deaf mute man. We like to think we are the smart ones. As investors we like to see ourselves as emotion free, rational and coldly calculating. In reality we may just be one of the poor saps who gets caught in a trap when we try to play with the big bad boys, the professionals. In prior chapters I spoke about “The Buy Bias” and “The Myth of Long-Term Holding.” In a broad sense these are conflicts of interest because they are used to manipulate the non-institutional investor (you and me) to the advantage of the Wall Street institutions. The analysts you hear being referred to in the press and on television and radio as sell-side analysts are the analysts who work for the brokerage firms. In this chapter I will talk about the pervasiveness of the conflicts of interest that are faced by the sell-side analysts who provide us with investment recommendations. You will find out how and why they are compensated and how their employers (the brokerage firms) drive them to manipulate the market and how the large players (corporate and institutional clients) are kept happy largely at the expense of the small investor. You will see how the buy bias and the perpetuation of the myth of long-term holding are part of a larger strategy designed to consolidate wealth in the hands of the brokerage houses and their larger clients. You will get a clearer picture of how the individual brokers fit into the overall scheme of things. You will see how the brokers themselves are manipulated by the system and forced into conflicts of interest with their clients. In order to appreciate how Wall Street came to be where it is today we have to understand the environment that directed its evolution. Before the SEC took away the NYSE’s power to fix commission rates across the brokerage industry (and thus its ability to effectively eliminate competition), transaction costs (commission fees for trading stocks) were extremely high. Stockbroker commissions represented well over fifty percent of revenue for the major Wall Street brokerage houses. With the introduction of competitive rates, discount brokerage houses have been taking stock commission business away from the major firms at an incredible rate. At the same time, the major brokerage houses have had to lower commissions dramatically on the business they managed to retain. Today stockbroker commissions at the major brokerage firms probably represent less than ten percent of revenue. The brokerage firms had to find a way to make up this shortfall in revenue if they were to survive and thrive. A lot of the shortfall has been made up through an increase in investment banking business. In the past the sell-side analysts’ evaluations of companies and the buy and sell recommendations that they generated justified their paychecks. Since commission rates were fixed (and very high relative to today’s commissions), there was no competition between firms based on commission fees. Clients would choose the brokerage firm that they would do commission business with based on the quality of the analysts’ reports provided by the brokerage firm and the accuracy of their buy and sell recommendations. Today, with heavy competition from discount brokerage firms and the recognition that analysts’ recommendations over time generally under-perform the market as a whole, analysts have to provide some additional value to their brokerage firms in order to justify their salaries (if not their existence). In addition, retail customers of brokerage firms (the small players, you and I) are finding that information is available for free on the Internet and on cable television. Because commissions rates are now so low (relatively) the commission revenue that analysts can help to generate through retail customers is relatively insignificant. As a result the sell-side analysts have to provide some additional value to the brokerage houses. That value is provided through developing investment-banking business that generates huge revenue and in keeping the big players, the mutual fund managers and other institutional investors happy. Investment banking is the business of offering security in the form of newly issued stocks and bonds to the public (underwriting securities offerings) in order to raise money for a corporation. Investment banking is a lucrative business. Fees for underwriting are substantial. They average around eight percent of the total dollars raised through the underwriting process. Investment banking firms offer stock to the public either as primary or secondary offerings. The primary offering is the Initial Public Offering or IPO that was discussed in detail in previous chapters. Secondary offerings are any subsequent offerings of additional stock to the public. Obviously there are more publicly traded stocks than any investor could possibly investigate. If a publicly traded company is not followed by an analyst who recommends the purchase of the stock, the odds are that for all practical purposes very few investors will be aware of the company’s existence. There will be very little interest on the part of investors in buying that stock. With little or no demand for the stock, not only will the price of the stock not move up, but also since the stock will be thinly traded (not much buying or selling of the stock) the stock will be relatively hard to liquidate. Once purchased, it would be difficult to sell the stock without taking a bath. We have already looked at the impact that an IPO can have on the net worth of the original owners as well as the ability of the company to grow and expand its business. It should be evident that there are tens of thousands of companies that would just love to go public. It should be clear that sell-side broker sponsorship of a stock is critical to companies that are offering stock either in an IPO or through a secondary offering. As I mentioned earlier, the business of underwriting IPOs and secondary stock offerings is extremely lucrative for investment banking firms. This is where analyst conflicts of interest arise. The changes in commission fee structure based on competition and the awareness among the informed that sell-side analysts’ recommendations were something short of stellar made it difficult for analysts to justify the pay checks they were receiving from their brokerage house employers. The brokerage houses began to put pressure on the analysts to generate revenue to justify their jobs. Since they still possessed the power to move stock prices—at least with the small retail clients who were not as aware as the more sophisticated (large) clients and institutions—they looked for a way to turn this ability into a new revenue stream. They didn’t have to look far. The investment banking business (the underwriting of both IPOs and secondary offerings of securities) was a clear and easy target. Theoretically, there existed a “Chinese Wall” between analysts and the investment-banking arm of brokerage houses. The wall was intangible and its function was to keep sellside analysts independent of the investment bankers. After all, you wouldn’t want the investment bankers exerting influence on the analysts’ objectivity in evaluating the merits of an investment banking client’s stock. The sell-side analyst’s job is supposed to be the objective evaluation of the value and prospects for a security. In theory, the sell-side analyst is working for the clients of the brokerage firm. It just wouldn’t be fair to have the investment bankers tell the sell-side analyst that an investment banking client wanted the analyst to put out a buy recommendation on the stock and that the analyst’s job might be in jeopardy if he didn’t cooperate. As revenues from brokerage commissions began to fall, so did the Chinese wall. As I said earlier, there are tens of thousands of privately held companies that would love to go public. The problem they have is that without brokerage and sellside analyst sponsorship no one would buy the stock. This makes it fairly easy for sell-side analysts to get IPO investment banking business. All they have to do is find a company that can justify a large enough offering of stock to generate a large fee. If they offer to follow the company (issue an opinion on the stock) they can bring the underwriting business to their brokerage firm’s investment-banking group. A positive buy recommendation by the analyst is all but guaranteed. You are already aware of the way in which demand is created among individual investors who are the clients of the brokerage houses. One of the ironies of the IPO market is that, even though huge demand is created among individual investors, most of the IPO stock is offered to institutional investors. This lowers the supply available to individual investors, which of course only heats up demand even more. The demand pushes up the price of the post offering stock and provides a dumping ground (the individual small investor) for the institutional holders of the stock. The result is that the institutions who bought into the IPO are almost certain of making a quick profit by “flipping” (quickly selling out) the stock. The result is that the investment-banking firm can easily place the IPO stock and generate their lucrative underwriting fees while their institutional clients chalk up large overnight profits. At the same time that the investment-banking arm of the brokerage house is making a massive fee on the underwriting, the brokerage house is collecting commission fees from the institutions that are selling the stock and from their retail clients who are buying the stock. After a short period of time (the quiet period in which the underwriting company can not make any comments on the company they underwrote), the analyst issues a buy recommendation. This provides additional support for the stock and allows any remaining institutional investors to get out. By almost ensuring that the institutions that bought initial IPO stock will make a profit, the brokerage firm keeps them loyal to their firm and insures future commissions. The large institutional investors ride to the bank on the backs of the brokerage firms’ retail clients. But there is still another advantage to the brokerage house, and this one is not quite as obvious. Before a company goes public, it will frequently raise capital through one or more private offerings of stock. These are known as private equity funds, venture capital partnerships or simply as private placements. Except for the founders of the company, practically no one buys stock in a company more cheaply than investors in these private placements. These are offerings to private investors of substantial net worth and financial sophistication or to financial institutions. These shares of stock are frequently sold for pennies on the dollar when compared to the price of shares offered through the IPO. For instance, a stock that is offered to the public in an IPO at fifteen dollars a share might be purchased through one of these private offerings prior to the IPO at seventy-five cents a share. When the IPO is sold to the public the owners of this stock would be able to dump their stock at twenty times the price that they paid for it. That’s a two thousand percent profit! The conflict of interest comes into play when the underwriting firm, the brokerage house which is its distribution arm, executives of either the underwriting firm or the brokerage house, or the analyst assigned to follow the stock own some of these private placements shares. It is not uncommon for the underwriting firm with ties to the brokerage house responsible for distributing the IPO shares to the public to own these low-cost pre-IPO shares. In many cases the underwriting firm or brokerage house takes these low priced shares as part of its fee or commission. These shares are also frequently provided to the sell-side analyst as a bonus for seeking out underwriting business for the firm. Think about this situation. You are an analyst who just received a seventy-five thousand dollar bonus for bringing an investment-banking client to the table. You receive your seventy-five thousand dollar bonus in the form of one hundred thousand shares of private stock valued at seventyfive cents a share (100,000 shares X .75/share = $75,000). The stock goes public through an IPO at fifteen dollars a share. You still own one hundred thousand shares but your bonus just jumped to one and one half million dollars (100,000 shares X $15/share = $1,500,000)! Of course the company going public would not have given your underwriting firm the business and you would not have received your bonus if it was not understood in advance that you would provide support for the stock by touting it to the public via a buy recommendation. While I consider myself to be an extremely ethical person, I wouldn’t want the kind of ethical pressure that a conflict of interest such as that must generate for a sellside analyst. But the bonus to the analyst may be small potatoes compared to the profits to be made by the underwriting arm of the brokerage firm. Their fee may be eight percent of the gross revenues raised based on the IPO price. Assume fifty million dollars is raised in an IPO stock underwriting. Eight percent of fifty million dollars is four million dollars. If one percent of the fee was taken in stock and the remaining seven percent was taken in cash the underwriting firm would receive three and one half million dollars in cash and one half million dollars in stock at the private stock placement price of seventyfive cents a share. That would equate to 666,667 shares ($500,000/.75 = 666,667 shares). The underwriting firm could offer their shares to the public along with the other IPO shares at $15/share. The proceeds of that sale would provide the underwriter with ten million dollars (666,667 X $15 = $10,000,000). After selling the stock the underwriter has received a total of thirteen and one half million dollars on an underwriting of fifty million dollars of stock. If he takes just one eighth of his fee (one percent of the gross revenue) in pre-IPO stock at seventy-five cents a share the fee jumps from eight percent to twenty-seven percent of total revenue raised. It’s a sweet deal for the brokerage firms. While their analysts are strongly recommending purchase of a particular stock to their brokers and their brokers’ clients, they are selling that same stock out of their own accounts. Depending on the terms of the private placement deal, restrictions may be placed on the sale of pre-IPO stock. The company that is going public may be fearful that if the owners of private placement stock dump it on the market it will drive down the price of their newly issued shares. To prevent this from happening they might place a restriction on the sale of the pre-IPO stock that forces the owners to hold the stock for some period of time after the IPO. In a situation like this, if you were an owner of restricted pre-IPO stock, wouldn’t you be sorely tempted to do everything you could to keep the stock price moving up or at the very least try to keep the price from falling regardless of the underlying value of the company? This is just a further incentive to the sell-side analyst to issue and maintain a buy recommendation on the stock. When such a situation exists, the individual investor, your average Joe, may be advised by his broker to buy more stock or at least hold his position even though the stock may already be overvalued. I am not laying the blame for this on the broker. Brokers depend on the information provided to them by the analysts of the firm. Further, the brokerage firm usually has regulations that force brokers to inform clients when they are making a recommendation against the judgment of their company’s analysts. That tends to stop individual investors in their tracks. Investors don’t like mixed messages from their brokers and the brokerage houses that they represent. By giving an honest opinion brokers often risk losing their credibility, commission on a potential transaction and possibly the investor’s account. On top of that if a broker tells you to buy more stock he will get a larger commission when you eventually sell out simply because you will be selling more stock. The broker is also in jeopardy if he makes a valid sell recommendation based on his own fundamental analysis of the company. If the client sells the stock and the stock continues to move up (even if the move up is purely a result of the analyst’s buy recommendation and the demand created by the army of brokers pushing the stock on other clients based on the analyst’s recommendation), the investor may decide to sue the broker for churning the account. (Churning is the term applied to the practice of encouraging excessive trading in an account for the purpose of generating commissions.) The broker may have been looking out for the client’s interest and may have been totally innocent of any wrongdoing, but when the broker sits in front of an arbitration board and tries to explain why he told the investor to sell when the brokerage house had a buy or even a hold position on the stock, he looks as guilty as sin. To compound the problem, the broker will not receive much support in the litigation from his brokerage firm. The brokerage firm may pose as a complete innocent and label the poor sucker who tried to do the right thing a rogue broker. The broker may be in personal financial jeopardy. Usually a brokerage firm will stand behind a broker as long as the broker is touting the company line. If a fine is levied against the broker, the brokerage firm will pay it for him. But, if the broker is not marching to their orders, the firm may decline to pay the broker’s fine unless the broker agrees to resign from the firm. The brokerage firm is sending a message to its other brokers. Go against our analysts’ recommendations at your own risk. Don’t underestimate the power of the legal departments of the brokerage houses over the brokers. The brokerage houses have huge legal staffs and very deep pockets while individual brokers usually don’t. Brokerage firms usually don’t worry too much about attorney’s fees. They have armies of salaried lawyers on staff and regard the expense as just another cost of doing business. On the other hand, if the brokerage firm chooses to defend the firm but not the individual broker, the legal fees can bankrupt the broker. The brokerage houses can often affect the outcome of litigation simply by delaying tactics that wear down individual investors (and brokers who are defending themselves at their own expense). Litigation can become very expensive for an individual broker if he has to defend himself without support from the firm. The firm can hang a broker out to dry if he or she doesn’t seem to be marching in step with the company’s directives. It doesn’t matter much that the firm may be marching in the wrong direction. Another benefit to the brokerage house in creating overhanging demand at the time of the IPO and in maintaining a buy recommendation on the stock after the offering is that they keep the individual investors who purchased shares in the IPO happy. Investors like to see the market value of their shares increase. It usually ensures that they will come back for more IPOs and probably do additional stock trading with the firm. As a matter of fact, individual investors are usually cut out of IPOs if they are not doing other stock transactions through the firm. The brokers along with the brokerage houses use IPOs as a perk to their better clients. Ironically, most retail investors don’t make money on IPO stock. The run-up in price is usually temporary because it is based on the excess demand created by the brokerage firm’s hype. Once that demand is satisfied the stock drops back to a realistic level based on the financial fundamentals of the underlying company. Most of the time that price is below the price at which the stock was offered in the IPO. Still most investors don’t blame their brokers when they don’t make a profit when the IPO stock drops in price. Instead they kick themselves for not having sold when the stock was up and they anxiously await the next IPO opportunity. So pervasive is the illusion among individual investors that they will make a killing in IPO stock that some brokers will use IPO stock to open accounts. In some instances a broker will distribute a small amount of their allocation of IPO stock to prospective clients in order to get them to open an account. The overhanging demand usually insures that the price of the stock will rise (at least in the short term) and the investor is hooked. If the new account does not do any additional non-IPO business they will be told that they will not receive any shares in the next IPO. An ancillary benefit to placing practically indiscriminate buy recommendations on stock is that stocks with a buy recommendation by an analyst tend to move up and a stock that is moving up generates a lot of transactions. Seasoned investors will often view upward volatility as a short-term opportunity and will even day trade shares. The broker and brokerage firm receive commissions on both the buy and sell side of the transaction. The use of buy recommendations to the detriment of the small investor is not limited to IPOs. When a firm is underwriting a secondary offering of stock the commission to the broker selling the stock is often richer than the normal commission that the broker would receive for an equivalent trade. Add to that the fact that from the retail client’s perspective secondary offerings are sold commission free (and thus an easier sale for the broker) and you have a motivated sales force that will devote a significant effort to selling the secondary offering stock. It should be apparent that secondary offerings also generate large underwriting fees. This business is based on a positive relationship between the firm that is underwriting and the company that is offering stock to the public. You have to realize that it would be extremely unusual (perhaps totally absurd would be a better phrase) for a company to give its investment-banking business to a firm if that firm had an analyst who issued a negative opinion on the company’s stock. Once more they are pitching the company stock and creating demand with retail clients. Later on the brokers will go back to their retail clients to tell them of the new buy recommendation. Of course they will tell them that the stock is now an even better deal. They will tick off all of the reasons stated in the latest analyst’s report for buying the stock. The objective is to get the retail clients to buy more stock. For a broker a new or reiterated buy recommendation is always a good reason to get on the phone and generate some commissions. At the same time, institutional brokers will be placing the secondary offering shares with institutional clients. Just as with IPOs, the institutions will be given most of the secondary offering stock. These institutional clients know that the brokerage firm will come out shortly with an initial buy or a reiteration of a buy recommendation that will move the stock price up. Retail clients will be the buyers when the buy recommendation is made and the institutions will be the sellers. In effect, the institutions get to dump their stock at a profit on the retail clients. Even when there is no IPO or secondary offering involved, institutional investors and mutual fund managers are frequently given a heads up before a new or reiterated buy recommendation is issued by an analyst. The institutions then buy the stock in anticipation of the buy recommendation, which they know will be supported by an army of stockbrokers working for the brokerage firm. The additional demand created by the brokers will push the price of the stock up. Frequently the brokerage firm’s own trading department will build inventory in a stock in advance of a buy recommendation by one of their analysts. Even though the brokerage firm will claim that they are acquiring the stock in anticipation of client purchases, they will go to the market to buy stock for their retail clients and the result will be an increase in the price of the stock. Then the institutional clients and the brokerage firm will both dump their stock on unsuspecting retail clients at a nice profit. It’s like taking candy from a baby. A variation on the conflict of interest can occur when a preferred customer of the firm (usually a very large or an institutional client) intends to sell out a large position that they own in a non-IPO stock. If the firm maintains a strong buy on the stock, it will have the effect of reassuring other current holders of the stock so that they will not place sell orders which would increase the supply of stock available for sale and push down the price. At the same time it will attract other new investors to the stock. The end result is that the buy recommendation will provide support for the stock price while favored (perhaps spelled B I G) clients dump the stock. In those rare cases where a sell-side analyst is planning to downgrade his or her opinion of a stock, large clients will often be given advance notice. In some cases brokerage firms may actually delay downgrading their opinion of a stock until their favored clients have an opportunity to get out. Institutional clients are huge players in the securities markets. Brokerage houses want to retain their institutional clients (mutual funds, money managers, pension funds etc.) for their commission business even if the commissions are sharply discounted. The sheer size of the trades that they execute makes these transactions worthwhile for the brokerage firms. If you want to continue to do business with these clients, you had better not put out a sell recommendation on a stock they hold in their portfolios. As a result, brokerage firms will often let their institutional clients know about an impending reduction in an analyst’s rating before it is publicly announced. They may even reiterate a buy recommendation and push the stock onto retail clients through their army of brokers to give the institutions a chance to get out. Analysts can be big rainmakers for a firm. They can draw in investment banking clients and they can develop a following in the public sector. That following may choose to deal with whatever brokerage house a particular analyst is associated with. This makes analysts very powerful figures and they may have enough leverage to dictate the terms of the policies concerning ethics under which they will operate. As I mentioned in Chapter Nine, not all of the information or recommendations you receive from the gurus on Wall Street is unbiased. In this chapter I have talked about some of the conflicts of interest that exist between you as an investor in the public sector and the owners, executives and analysts of the brokerage industry. I have also touched upon the conflicts that the individual broker or financial consultant may be faced with. In the next chapter I will try to give you an inside perspective on the conflicts that your broker, in fact all brokers, are faced with on a day-to-day basis. It is not without good reason that I have titled the next chapter, “Pity the Broker.” 

          “For me, there is a deeper joy in filling sandbags in a flood, than in building sandcastles on a beach.” — James J. Keenan, CFP 

          “The enemy is anyone who is going to get you killed, no matter which side he’s on.” — Joseph Heller Catch 22, 1960 

        Chapter 13 Pity The Broker My objective in this chapter is to present to you as accurate a picture of the world in which securities brokers work as I can. It is based on fourteen years of personal experience as a broker and represents nothing more or less than my observations, perceptions and opinions. What I will do is attempt to provide you with a balanced view of the challenges that brokers face in attempting to meet your objectives, their personal objectives and the objectives of their employers on a day to day basis. Have you ever been relaxing at home in the evening when the phone rang? When you answered it there was an unfamiliar voice on the other end of the line. He or she might start out by saying, “Good evening Mr. Prospect, this is John Doe calling. I am a financial consultant at “A Famous Securities Firm, Inc.” and I just wanted to take a moment or two to share with you an investment recommendation that I think you would be interested in hearing about. Do you have a few minutes now, or would you rather I call you back later?” In Sales, that is known as a closing question. A closing question is one that either asks for an actual order, or for something that moves the potential purchaser closer to the sale transaction. That particular type of question is known as the alternative close. When you are given a choice you usually select one. Most people will spend a moment on the phone just to be polite before telling the financial consultant that they are not interested. That gives the caller an opportunity to gather some information about you that will qualify you as a prospective client. Some of the follow-up questions are likely to be “Are you currently invested in the market?” If your answer was yes, the follow-up questions will serve to focus in on where your specific interests in the market lie. Do you invest in individual stocks or mutual funds? Is your primary objective in purchasing stocks for growth, dividend income or a combination of both? Are you aggressive or conservative in your investment approach? If the answer to the initial question was no, the next question will probably be in the form of a statement question, something like, “That’s interesting, since you are not invested in the market, would you mind telling me in what areas you invest your discretionary funds?” This opens up the possibility of a discussion about the advantages of the stock or bond markets as compared to your current investment strategy. After gathering some information about your financial condition, the size of your investment portfolio, your risk tolerance, past experience and your current interests and objectives, the financial consultant is in a position to make a determination as to what type of securities investments might be suitable for you. He or she is not being nosey. It would be totally unprofessional to make a recommendation blindly, without knowing if that recommendation would be appropriate for you. It is actually a New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) requirement for a broker to have some financial and investment history, and know the goals and objectives of a client or potential client before providing investment advice or making investment recommendations (NYSE Rule 405, the “Know Your Customer” rule). He or she also uses this information to make a determination as to whether you are worth his or her time. If you meet the broker’s criteria he will attempt to open an account for you and may make an investment recommendation as early as the initial call. He or she will of course first want to know if you are in a position to invest right now or if you have future potential. The next question might be, “If I could show you an investment that would meet your criteria (the criteria you provided to him), would you be able to invest (some specific dollar amount)?” If you say yes, the broker will make an investment recommendation and try to close a sale. If you say no, the next question might be “Why? Is it a lack of funds or is there some other issue?” The process is a classic sales process. The purpose of these questions is to uncover all of the objections you might have so that they can be addressed. At least theoretically, when all objections have been answered, a sale will result. If the problem is simply a current lack of funds, you can expect to be asked when you expect to be in a position to transact some business. There is no point in scaring you off making a recommendation and seeming too aggressive if you are not in a position to transact some business right now. A skilled broker knows when to back off and when to move you to the next level. All of this is standard sales solicitation procedure. The idea is to develop a relationship and gather information in order to open an account and to make a sale. Once a broker has met the licensing requirement by passing the Series 7 licensing exam, the majority of the training that he receives throughout the balance of his career is simply sales training. Scripts are often provided and sales literature is exactly that, sales literature. Questioning techniques and the various probing skills are taught. A lot of emphasis is placed on developing closing expertise. A good broker will deliver up to six trial closes in a single conversation. The objective is to open an account or make a sale and opening an account with an initial transaction is a two-run homerun. Once you have an account opened, you are going to accept calls from your broker. It is no longer an unsolicited call from a stranger. A professional business relationship has been established. Your broker may hold some of your securities in the account and the call may be to give you vital information. The relationship changes dramatically once the transition from prospect to client has been accomplished. Product training emphasizes features and benefits with the emphasis on benefits. The difference between a feature and a benefit is best explained by analogy. If you were buying a car, a salesperson could tell you about a feature such as the color of the car. He could say, “The car is red.” An alternative would be to convert the feature into a benefit by saying, “People really notice you in a red car.” The benefit appeals to the psychological needs and emotions of the buyer, in this case the almost universal psychological need for recognition. A feature is without passion. Good sales people know that the buyer’s psychology and emotion play a large part in a buying decision. They convert features into benefits based on the perceived needs and desires of the prospect. The point I am making is that financial consultants are trained to be skilled sales people. The company they work for only makes money when there are commissions generated, and commissions are only generated through sales. From a broker’s perspective every transaction represents a sale because he makes a commission whether you are buying or selling. That’s the reason why you generally don’t get calls from brokers unknown to you suggesting that you sell something. It is always a buy recommendation because when you are prospecting for clients buy recommendations generate more transactions. If I am beating the bushes prospecting for new clients, I have a limited resource in the amount of time that I have available to devote to the activity. I want to use that time efficiently. Imagine I am going to dial one hundred numbers a day in an attempt to find new clients. Even if I had a good list of current numbers for good prospects, I would be lucky to have forty people pick up the phone. A large number of the people I call will be out or screening calls through their voice mail systems or caller I.D. When I finally get someone on the line, if I want to tell that individual of a security he or she should be selling, I first have to find someone who owns the security. The odds of someone owning a particular security are astronomically negative. If I asked one hundred people at random if they owned a particular stock, I would be lucky to find one person who did. With only forty contacts for one hundred dials, I would have to dial two hundred and fifty numbers to reach one hundred people to find one person who owned that stock. That only provides me with one chance in two hundred and fifty calls to make a sale. You can’t pay the mortgage working that way. Of course you wouldn’t get the sale anyway for several different reasons. The potential client will probably want to sell the stock where it was bought. If the prospect bought it over the Internet or through a no frills (or advice) discount brokerage he will be inclined to sell it through the same medium. The prospect has no tie to the prospecting broker and usually doesn’t want to pay him for the advice received. It’s just human nature. If he made the purchase through a full service broker, you can be sure that when he hangs up the phone with the prospecting broker, the next call he makes will be to the broker who sold him the security. Since the broker who sold him the stock originally did not make the sell recommendation, he will probably put up some defense for holding the stock. At the same time, if he is a veteran broker, he will make it clear that it is the client’s decision. If the broker takes too strong a position with a client who is now nervous, he could risk antagonizing him. If the client held the stock based on the broker taking a very strong position, the broker would be in jeopardy of losing the client if the stock did turn out to be a loser. If the client does sell, the original broker gets the commission and the prospecting broker is forgotten. Client retention and commissions are always an issue for a commission broker and at times a broker would be ill-advised to provide his best advice to a client and risk losing him. It is a delicate balancing act for even the most ethical brokers and there is nothing that can be done about it. It is simply the nature of the business. So where does this all leave the prospecting broker? He has called two hundred and fifty numbers, spoken to one hundred people and has not made a sale or opened an account! Obviously this doesn’t work out very well for the broker, his starving family, or his firm. The alternative is to make a prospecting call with a purchase (buy) recommendation. The broker would still have to dial two hundred and fifty numbers to make one hundred contacts, but every one of those contacts would be a potential sale. Again, the broker would have ninety-nine prospects to make a presentation to. He would have an arsenal of facts provided through the firm’s analysts’ strong buy recommendation and, since you don’t already own the stock, he would most likely be presenting you with a recommendation that you had not received from your other broker. For that one-out-of-one hundred situation in which the prospect already owns the stock, the broker would be confirming the prospect’s wisdom in having bought it and could suggest an additional purchase. After all, the prospect wouldn’t own the stock if he didn’t believe it was a good stock. The buy bias is at work at all levels in the brokerage industry. Since the broker is telling this story over and over, he is probably pretty good at it and should be very convincing. You would of course challenge him by asking questions, but he would have known in advance that he was going to be tested on all aspects of the investment. You, on the other hand, weren’t even thinking about this stock when he called. Unless the broker is a total jerk, the weight of facts will be on the broker’s side. The broker probably reviewed the company’s strongest buy recommendations and found one that he strongly agreed with. Conviction on the part of a professional who seems well informed carries a fair amount of weight with investors. I am not saying that the investment isn’t a good one. The point I am making is that regardless of the market environment, brokers will solicit new prospects with a buy recommendation simply because they will do infinitely more business that way. It just doesn’t make sense to prospect when the sponsoring brokerage house has a neutral or a sell recommendation, even if the market as a whole is going down. Sell recommendations can be hazardous to a broker’s financial health. Even if a broker is dealing with an existing client and wants a client to sell a stock, he will probably start the conversation with a purchase recommendation. Let’s assume that the analyst has downgraded a stock in your portfolio from a buy to a hold. The broker knows that it is rare for an analyst to go from a buy to a sell recommendation and that it is likely that there will be a further downgrade in the rating at some later date. If the broker starts out by making a buy recommendation on another stock, the client will usually bring up the source of funds question and at that point the broker will mention the downgrade on the stock currently held. This could result in two commissionable transactions, the sale of the downgraded stock and the purchase of the recommended stock. If a broker is prospecting in a true bear market, he will tend to approach prospects by asking them how their portfolio is doing. In a bear market the answer is usually, “not too well.” No surprise there. It takes an exceptional stock to do well in a bad market. Those stocks are in fact exceptions because most stocks do go down in a bear market (and up in a bull market). The old expression on Wall Street is, “All ships rise and fall on the tide.” The broker may commiserate with the prospect and suggest that he might want to consider placing some assets with them. If assets are transferred in the form of cash, they will obviously end up going towards a purchase either now or when the market turns up. Certainly the broker will be able to find some “undervalued” stocks even in a down market. If stock is transferred, stocks that are not followed by the new broker’s firm will be sold over a period of time principally because they will be replaced by stocks that have a buy recommendation by the new firm’s analyst. The client will be presented with a new purchase recommendation and will be told about the high expectations for the new stock. He will be motivated to buy and if he does not have cash available, he will probably ask the broker if he should consider raising funds by selling some of his other stocks. Because of the buy bias on Wall Street, there are not a lot of stocks with outright sell recommendations. As you review your other stocks with the new broker, he will be more than happy to bring to your attention that some of your stocks that are followed by the new brokerage firm have a “hold” or “neutral” rating. And while that is not a sell recommendation, it might make sense to move to the stock, which he is recommending, since it has a strong buy recommendation. The broker might say something like “there isn’t a sell recommendation on the old stock so there might still be some hope for it, but if it were my account I would probably sell the old stock and buy the new one.” The broker has presented a reasonable case for the purchase. Unless he is making unreasonable presentations to generate commissions without consideration for the performance of the portfolio, he will not be in jeopardy of being accused of churning the account. Since he is following the company’s analysts’ recommendations on the buy side, he will have the backing of the firm if the transaction ever comes into question. You have elicited the sell recommendation and the broker has explained that the analyst had not rated the stock as an outright sell. It was your decision and the broker provided full disclosure. Again, he is protected should litigation become an issue. In a perfect world everyone makes out well. The broker gets two commissions and, if the analyst is competent and not hampered by a conflict of interest, you have probably made a good decision. There are very few brokers who don’t care if their clients prosper. The more money their clients make, the more money they ultimately make. Statistically brokers will make more on commissions if they are working with clients with million-dollar portfolios than ones with one hundred thousand-dollar portfolios. It is only reasonable that they would want to maximize the growth of the clients’ account. Still, you must remember that in every transaction there is a buyer and a seller. One of them is right and the other is less right. Most intelligent brokers know this. They recognize that statistically every transaction they process has only a fifty percent chance of being in the best interest of the client. The balancing act that the ethical brokers face is to generate commissions while providing the best advice that they can. You must recognize that they are working under severe restraints in that they are for all practical purposes limited to the recommendations of their companies’ analysts. There is a reason for those restraints. The most obvious one is to ensure that you are not dealing with some harebrained megalomaniac broker who makes decisions based on a Ouija board, or messages from aliens, or a feeling in their bones. The second reason has to do with the litigious society we live in. The majority of litigation that is initiated against brokerage houses is based on the actions of the individual broker. Rarely is the litigation based on the quality of the analytical expertise of the brokerage firm. If the broker can show that he was acting based on the expert information that was provided by the firms’ analysts, his position is more readily defensible. Since the brokerage houses usually don’t have many stocks with sell recommendations, the sell decision is usually the client’s idea and as such an unsolicited transaction. If the broker is smart, it will actually show “unsolicited” on the trade confirmation for the sale. Brokers working for the major Wall Street firms do not receive a salary. They work for commission only. From the company’s perspective, this ensures that they will be productive assets rather than expenses to the corporation. When you get right down to it, that’s a pretty effective way to run a business. It does however have the potential to create a number of problems for the clients of these firms. One of the problems with the compensation program is that commissions are paid based on a sliding scale. A sliding scale compensation program is one that pays out at a higher percentage based on total year-to-date production (sales commissions generated). For instance, if you generate $1 to $99,999 in gross production you might get paid 15% of that amount as compensation. If you generate from $100,000 to $149,999 you might get paid 20% of gross production. From $150,000 to $189,999 might be 25%. From $190,000 to $224,999 could go to 30% and you might max out at 40% at $225,000 and above. Usually the new rate is applied retroactively to every dollar in gross production. The effect is that as you pass each milestone you are actually receiving a bonus. For instance, once you exceed $100,000 you get paid an additional five percent pay out on every new dollar of commissions plus you get $5,000 retroactively on your first $100,000 in gross commissions. At $150,000 you get paid an additional five percent pay out on every new dollar of commissions plus you get $7,500 retroactively on your first $150,000 in gross commissions. At $190,000 you get paid an additional five percent pay out on every new dollar of commissions plus you get $9,500 retroactively on your first $190,000 in gross commissions. At $225,000 you get paid an additional ten percent pay out on every new dollar of commissions plus you get $22,500 retroactively on your first $225,000 in gross commissions. (See Illustration 13-1) In this example it is pretty clear that the person producing $300,000 in gross commissions actually earns eight times more money than the person who produces just under $100,000 in gross commission. Three times the production yields eight times the compensation. I would call that highly motivational! The structure of the compensation packages strongly encourages the generation of high volumes of sales. The production count returns to zero at the beginning of each year. You are usually allowed to start out the new year at the same payout percentage that you attained at the end of the prior year. Your production is evaluated quarterly and if you drop below the annualized rate for the prior year, you are charged back. This is a powerful incentive to keep production up. Most people get accustomed to spending the money they are paid and having to pay some of it back is extremely painful. The problem is that there are a lot of brokers who really don’t manage their personal finances very well. Although everyone on Wall Street acknowledges that there are bull markets and bear markets, when times are good, some brokers tend to overextend themselves financially. I personally know of brokers who purchased homes that were incredibly expensive and took on huge mortgages when the markets were booming. They often drove Porsches or other image cars and dined only at the finest restaurants. Some of them lived from paycheck to paycheck. They made no plans for those times when the market would cool down and when that did happen, the bills were still there to be paid. They placed themselves in a position where they would have to continue to generate sales even if the market or economic environment told them it wasn’t appropriate. Some branch managers actually encouraged this type of behavior. They knew it was a very effective motivator in increasing sales. Even if brokers managed their personal finances properly and had liquid funds available to carry them through the slow periods, the companies they work for place brokers under constant pressure to sell securities, regardless of the investment climate, or the quality of the firm’s recommendations. If they succumb to this pressure, it can place their interests in direct conflict with the interests of their clients. Clients often inadvertently contribute to this behavior because there is a certain status associated with working with a successful broker and clients like to tell their friends that they are dealing with the top broker at a particular firm. Unfortunately, often the measure of a broker’s success is not how the clients’ investments perform, but the image of success the broker presents to the public. Ironically the broker who appears to be most successful may be under the greatest pressure to place the client’s interest after his own. I am not saying that you should avoid brokers who appear to be very successful in making money for themselves. What I am saying is that they are not necessarily the best brokers from the client’s perspective and in some instances, they may be the worst. Money is not the only motivating factor for brokers to increase production. There are self-image issues. Sales is a tough job. That is why it pays so well. Sales persons are not being compensated just for the sale that they make. They are being compensated for the rejection they constantly face when prospects and clients say no. Close rates are not always high and it is difficult not to take a dismissal of a recommendation personally. For this reason, recognition within the organization and among their peer group becomes very important. One of the forms that recognition takes is in the amount of resource the company provides. The office is the first and most visible status symbol. The higher the production, the larger the office. It is a constant reminder of the pecking order that management establishes and there is no question of one’s value to the company when you look at the size of his office. This is invariably based on the broker’s production level. Another important recognition factor is the level of sales support given. Each broker receives some level of support, which is provided by a sales assistant. An average producer will share one sales assistant with anywhere from one to four other brokers. The higher his production, the fewer people he has to share his support person with. This leaves more time to sell because even though they are called sales support personnel or sales assistants, their primary job is to handle administrative tasks. In addition to the increase in productivity that having one or more assistants assigned exclusively provides, there is a significant status or recognition factor. Sales assistants are also extremely important to the client. With the exception of direct investment advice, they are your primary contact for problem resolution. They will answer questions that you may have on your statement and research problems for you. They will walk you through procedures when you are dealing with title transfers and other issues that could be difficult for you to handle on your own. A good sales assistant provides significant value to the client as well as to the broker. The quality of the individual assistant is also a critical factor. Typically they are not well compensated by the company and if they regard their position as just another job, their motivation may not be very high. Frequently brokers will have to compensate assistants out of their own pockets in order to keep them motivated. Often there is political in fighting involved in the assignment of sales assistants. Since the branch manager ultimately determines what sales assistant supports whom, gross production is once again the determining factor. Another form of recognition is the resort destination meeting. The ostensible purpose of these meetings is additional training. Sometimes it involves a particular product or product line and sometimes it is based on overall production. In effect, they are contest prizes and the contest winners are always determined by the amount of commission generated. Invariably the destinations are four star hotels and the trip covers everything from soup to nuts. There are banquets with open bars, and prepaid tours and side trips as well as golf and other perks. The trip may cover anything from a long weekend to eight or even ten days and frequently a spouse or other guest is included. There is always a brief but mandatory meeting in which business issues are discussed or some training (often sales training) is conducted. This serves to legitimatize the trip. I have been on several of these excursions myself and I must admit they are memorable. Although I can honestly say I never sold anything to win a trip, I would be lying if I told you that it was not exciting to be included. From top to bottom, day in and day out, a broker is reminded that his only value to the company is his production number. If one does not start out with a highly developed value structure and a strong sense of ethics, he can begin to believe that this is the true measure of his value as a person. I have seen people whom I respected greatly succumb to this “brainwashing” over a period of time. This constant barrage of production feedback can lead people in directions they never thought they would go. There are other motivational tools that sales managers in the industry use. It is a common practice to distribute accounts when a broker leaves the firm. The broker may have developed these accounts over a number of years and have a solid relationship with the clients, but the branch manager wants to keep those revenue-producing accounts in his or her office. The best accounts, the ones that generate the most commission and fee revenue, will be assigned to the best brokers in the office. Once again, gross production is the measure of the best brokers and the brokers who have proven themselves to be the best salespeople get the best accounts. From the perspective of the branch manager, whose compensation is based on the total commission generated by the entire branch office, this makes good business sense. But the broker who generates the most commission may or may not be the broker who has the best interests of the client in mind. Brokers who help the branch manager reach specific product quotas, particularly in the sale of “dogs,” will get more favored treatment when accounts are to be assigned. The same is true in the assignment of clients who are transferring their accounts from other offices because they have physically relocated. Most large account clients will contact the branch manager directly and ask for a broker recommendation. Even though most brokerage offices have a rotating “Broker of the Day” who will theoretically get all unsolicited call-in or walk-in clients referred to him or her, in some branches the receptionist/operator is instructed to refer any call-ins or walk-ins that look as if they have large commission potential to the branch manager. The assignment of these clients is political currency to pay for production and/or blind loyalty to the firm and its products. Most firms have a broker’s card imprinted with the title Financial Consultant as soon as they pass the brokerage exam. Anyone can call himself or herself a financial consultant. There is no training requirement or credential required. If you want to work with someone with a real credential you should look for a person who is a “Certified Financial Planner” or CFP. Those designations are earned through course study, examinations and practical experience. In order to maintain the license to continue to use those trademarked designations, the CFPs have an ongoing responsibility to satisfy continuing education requirements. They must adhere to a rigid code of ethics and are monitored by the CFP Board of Standards and Practices in Denver Colorado. There are some brokers out there who use the non-regulated title Financial Consultant who should have their cards changed to say Commission Salesperson. I have been in a branch meeting where an otherwise respectable man, a producing marketing manager, responded to several individual brokers who had pointed out the obvious risks involved in a product that was being introduced by saying, “I’ve been in this business for over twenty years. I can’t tell if an investment is good or bad for the client. My job is to present it to them and let them make a decision as to whether it is a good or a bad investment. My job is to sell and so is yours.” What finally drove me from the business in complete disgust was a situation that developed within Prudential Securities, the securities firm that I had the misfortune to be affiliated with in the early nineties. The situation I am about to describe represents my best recollection of the facts at the time. I have no doubt that the company would stick to their official line and disagree wholeheartedly. At the time, Prudential Securities was under investigation by the SEC due to abuses in the sale of limited partnerships. I, along with many other brokers working for the firm, had invested my own funds heavily in some of these partnerships based on the information that was given to us by the managers and other representatives of the programs. This was the same information that we were encouraged to pass on to our clients. The most outrageous example of misrepresentation was Prudential’s Energy Growth Fund. The deal as it was presented to us was a no-brainer. On the surface it seemed foolproof. At the time oil prices were around ten to twelve dollars a barrel. Banks had loaned substantial amounts of money to oil exploration companies when oil prices were significantly higher. As oil prices dropped the companies went into default on the loans and were only making minimal partial interest payments. The loans were sitting on the banks’ books as assets, but they were non-performing assets. Bank regulators were not happy that they were carrying these loans on their books and the banks wanted to book their losses and move on. As a result, we had the opportunity to purchase these loans at approximately twenty cents on the dollar. Since they were paying about three percent in interest on the full principal amount, it equated to a fifteen percent return on our investment. In addition to that, the loan amount would not be forgiven and the debtor still owed us the full face value of the loan. That was five times what we paid for it. To make the deal even sweeter, the unpaid interest beyond the three percent being paid on the face amount of the loan would continue to accrue at interest to the new holders of the loan, us. But, what made the investment really interesting was that the loans were backed by collateral that was substantial (though temporarily unmarketable). The proven oil reserves in the ground, which were backing the loan, exceeded the face value of the loan. The problem was that, at current oil prices, it did not make economic sense to pump them out. Oil prices rise and fall and with the next move up in price, those reserves would be converted to cash. Beyond that there were substantially larger unproven reserves. If even a fraction of these proved out, we would be in even better shape. The net of the deal was that it looked like we would get a fifteen percent cash flow on our investment and when oil prices returned to a reasonable level we would be paid five times our initial investment plus the accrued unpaid interest as a windfall. If you are thinking that this sounds too good to be true, you are not alone. That’s exactly what I thought. I had always been a believer that risk and reward are directly related. The higher the reward, the more likely it is that the risk involved is also higher. In a way the rule that ties risk and reward together is simply a variation on the law of supply and demand. If two investments yield the same return, but one of the investments involves a substantially higher risk, then no rational person is going to buy the higher risk investment. Because the demand for the high risk investment will be lower than the supply the offerer of the high risk investment has to do something to increase demand. The variable that always brings supply and demand into balance is price. By offering a higher return for each dollar invested (by in effect lowering the price for each dollar of return or yield) you will attract more buyers. They will be willing to accept additional risk for the potentially greater return. One of the most interesting underlying principles of investing that I have discovered is that the market will price an investment based on the level of risk associated with its potential yield or return regardless of whether that risk is real or merely an illusion. If the risk is merely a perceived risk, if the risk is merely an illusion, then the opportunity for extraordinary profit is exceptional. Keep in mind that these opportunities are rare. In the majority of cases higher return equates to higher risk, but there are those wonderful exceptions. The Cash Management Account® that was initially offered by Merrill Lynch back in the nineteen seventies is an excellent example. In 1979 and 1980 inflation was in double digits and banks were offering three percent on savings accounts. Since these accounts were demand deposits (customers could take their money out at any time) the banks were investing in high grade and short term paper such as government notes and commercial paper. Merrill Lynch was offering clients an account that would pay a “money market” rate that would exceed inflation. I can recall that rate being four times what banks were paying on savings accounts. How could they do that? Easily. They simply invested in the same things that the banks invested in, but they passed along to the client a lot of the money that banks were keeping as profit. Merrill was trying to draw potentially substantial clients (you had to have $20,000 in cash and/or securities to open one of these accounts) away from the banks and introduce them to the world of securities brokerage. If you look at this situation realistically, you have to ask yourself why Merrill Lynch would offer twelve percent to attract clients when banks were only offering three percent? Why wouldn’t they offer just six percent and keep an additional six percent profit for themselves? The client would still be getting double what the banks were paying. Surely that would attract new customers. You would think so, but it really didn’t. Today we think of money market accounts as being risk free (maybe we shouldn’t but that’s another discussion), but these accounts were brand new twenty-plus years ago and the average person was generally less sophisticated when it came to securities markets and investment. Even though the money market funds were invested in substantially the same portfolio of securities that the banks invested in, potential clients saw some differences that in their minds spelled risk with a capital “R.” First, brokerage houses were places where you bought stocks and therefore dealing with a brokerage house was risky. Second, and what seemed to be the most important factor to potential clients, the bank accounts were F.D.I.C. insured and the brokerage money market accounts were not. The first concern was simply fear born of prejudice. The prospectus for the money market accounts spelled out precisely the limitations on the types of investments in which the money managers could invest. Stocks were simply not even a consideration. The second concern, a lack of insurance, was for all practical purposes irrelevant. Think of insurance as a safety net, a means of providing protection if something goes wrong. If I had to walk across a plank of wood one foot wide and thirty feet in the air, I would want to have a safety net in case I slipped. If that same plank was only one inch over the ground, having a safety net wouldn’t provide any additional protection. It would be irrelevant. For all practical purposes, insurance on those money market accounts would have been just as irrelevant, but because people didn’t understand what the money market funds were invested in they wanted the reassurance of insurance. They wanted this perception of protection so much that they were not willing to invest for a paltry six percent (a 100% higher return than their bank accounts offered). It wasn’t until the brokerage house offered approximately four times the return a bank account provided that significant numbers of people were willing to take the “additional risk” of placing their money in what was basically the same investment that the bank was offering. The point I am making is that there are rare circumstances where the return on an investment is totally out of proportion to the risk involved simply because the investment is too novel or too complicated for the average investor to understand. This appeared to be the case with the Energy Growth Funds. At first glance, the average investor tended to look at the investment as an investment in oil and at that point everyone knew that oil was a volatile and risky investment. In fact the deal that was presented to brokers was an offer of deeply discounted, over collateralized bonds that came with deferred accrued interest and equity participation kickers. It was an unusual opportunity created by the bubble in oil prices and the inflation of the late seventies and early eighties. This was truly exciting. I and a lot of other brokers invested significant amounts of our own money into this deal. I was so comfortable with the structure of the program that I personally invested well over $100,000! My clients bought additional millions. It appeared that this was one of those situations where risk and reward were totally out of balance. I had analyzed the program from every conceivable perspective and everything looked great. The only thing I could see that would make this deal a loser was an out and out economic depression or a complete collapse of the American oil industry. I checked and double-checked the numbers. I met personally with the corporate executives who had put these deals together and verified that my understanding of the investment was complete and accurate. The logic of the deal was sound and the numbers all added up. The one thing that I had not considered was absolutely inconceivable to me at the time… The deal was a fraud, a total con. Never was the term con more appropriate. “Con” is a slang abbreviation for confidence man, a term derived from the modus operandi of non-violent criminals who first gained the trust and confidence of their victims in order to have them willingly turn their money over to them. The people who put the deal together were classic con men: individuals in positions of respect and authority who had the confidence of the brokers and, through the brokers, the clients of the firm. It wasn’t until several years later that the energy deals began to fall apart. We discovered that the investments that had been described to us represented only a minuscule portion of the program and that the rest of the money was placed in much less desirable investments. Although the prospectus gave the fund managers discretion as to what they would invest in, the brokers were presenting the program to clients based on what had been presented to them. I know that the purpose of a prospectus is to protect the investor by providing full disclosure, but the prospectuses are so full of warnings that they become all but meaningless. After a while we become accustomed to the language of the prospectus and the warnings become just so much background noise. The result is often the opposite of the intent. The investor ignores the warnings because they are so pervasive and, as a result, is not really protected. If a problem later develops with the investment, the offerer points to the prospectus and says, “I warned them of the risks.” Like “The Purloined Letter” of Edgar Allan Poe, the information is hidden in plain sight. The SEC began an investigation of the firm’s entire Direct Investment Program. Clients were screaming foul, and rightfully so. The SEC reached a settlement with the firm requiring them to notify all holders of Limited Partnerships of a settlement offer. I personally found it difficult to understand why the people who put these deals together never faced criminal charges, but ultimately it became apparent (after a number of conversations with the legal department). The firm’s position was that the brokers simply misrepresented the programs to clients without the knowledge of the management of the firm or the Direct Investments Group. It was claimed that brokers were selling these investments for the rich commissions. The commissions did range from five to eight percent (they were generally seven percent) and compared to a stock trade that is a high commission. What no one looked at was the fact that if that money had been invested in a portfolio of stocks and bonds in a moderately active account, it would have generated that same commission in a two to three year period. The reality was that the money was being tied up for eight to ten years and the commissions generated on the sale of the direct investment over that long a period would be substantially less than if the monies were placed in marketable securities such as stocks or bonds. The other consideration was so obvious as to be maddening. Why would brokers personally invest in the deal themselves? What kind of broker would invest a dollar in a loser to generate seven cents in gross commission? The maximum pay out on that seven-percent commission would be forty percent and after paying taxes on the earnings the broker would be receiving less than two cents for each dollar invested. Only an idiot would throw away a dollar for a payback of less than two cents. You would be guaranteeing yourself a ninety-eight percent loss! But this was the firm’s argument to the SEC and the SEC bought it. This turned out to be a double benefit to the firm in that they then declared that they would not reimburse brokers for their investment as they were reimbursing clients since the brokers knew the deals were no good. Total insanity. If clients accepted the settlement offer that would be the end of it. If they didn’t, they could sue the firm as individuals or go to arbitration. This usually resulted in a higher settlement amount for the client. The firm ensured that every item that went to arbitration was a black mark on the broker’s record. This was an attempt to limit the financial liability of the firm by encouraging brokers to let their clients take the initial offer. Prudential Securities established a policy that did not allow the brokers to advise clients as to whether they should accept the settlement offered or go to arbitration. In theory, this policy was put in place to prevent brokers who had made the initial recommendation from providing advice to clients with whom they would have a conflict of interest. In reality, the firm knew that the brokers were angry that they had been made pawns in this travesty and were likely to advise clients to go to arbitration and receive a higher settlement. With this conflict of interest policy in place, I was forced to adhere to the firm’s policy of not advising clients as to whether they should accept the settlement offered or go to arbitration. The majority of my clients still trusted me and asked if they would be better off rejecting the settlement and taking the issue to arbitration. I told them that I would love to advise them but I was specifically directed by company policy not to answer that particular question. Most of my clients asked other questions that I could answer. I spent the last year and one half as an active securities broker dealing with the administrative nightmare that was the result of this debacle. I had little faith in the recommendations of the firm and so I did not solicit much business during that period. What bothered me more than the loss of money was the fact that a few of my clients painted me with the same brush that was used to paint the firm. Although the vast majority of my clients understood that I had been lied to by the company and remained loyal to me personally and continued to do business with me, some encouraged me to move to another firm and told me that they couldn’t do business with me as long as I stayed with the company. I knew that I could stay in the business and move to another firm but I also knew that I had grown too skeptical of the industry as a whole. Ironically, other firms on The Street were calling me and offering me substantial upfront bonuses to move to their firms and bring my dissatisfied (but personally loyal) clients with me. At that point I was not that concerned with making money as a broker. I was completely disillusioned by the lack of ethics within the industry and knew that I would leave the business. I stayed as long as I thought there was a chance to do some good for my clients, but a conversation with one of the managers in the legal department convinced me I had better leave while I still had my sanity. There was no doubt in my mind that this individual had always understood exactly what had happened. I sat there like an idiot reiterating that what the company had done was wrong and that the way that it was handling the settlement was unfair to investors. I was absolutely stunned when this person smiled at me and then leaned over the desk and said words to this effect. “You know you should really grow up. It isn’t a matter of morality or right or wrong to us. We don’t care about that. It’s a matter of the law and the law says that we can do it this way.” In retrospect, I guess that person did me a favor. I finally saw the light and I resigned shortly after. I had done all that I could to rectify the situation and there was no reason to stay.

         “For the great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie deliberate, contrived and dishonest, but the myth…. We enjoy the comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought.” — John F. Kennedy Commencement address Yale University June, 1962 

          Only the most extreme optimist believes that predicting the future is merely difficult! James J. Keenan 

        Chapter 14 Conclusion Bernard Baruch, one of the legends of Wall Street, once said words to this effect: “I can be wrong half of the time and still make a fortune if I simply cut my losses and let my profits run.” Becoming wealthy is not simply a matter of making money; it is a matter of keeping the money you have made. Most of us work very hard to make money. It would be foolish not to think long and hard about how we are investing it. It is critical to your financial success that you take responsibility for your investment decisions and not just depend on the recommendations of others. As former president Reagan said: “Trust, but verify.” There are many inherent conflicts of interest between those people representing the Wall Street Establishment and individual investors. It is imperative that you take these conflicts of interest into consideration when you are making investment decisions. When you are evaluating an investment you have to consider the source of your information and understand the potential motivation of the supplier of that information. This is true whether you are listening to a financial commentator on CNN, participating in a chat room on the internet, or talking to a stockbroker. There are many fine financial consultants out there and, as you might expect, none of them work for free. Some work exclusively as commission brokers, some work only for fees, and some work for a combination of both. You need to understand completely how your advisors are compensated in order to recognize potential conflicts of interest. It is imperative that you seek out counselors who maintain the highest ethical standards to minimize the chance that the unscrupulous representatives of the industry will victimize you. Seek out individuals with professional earned designations such as Certified Financial Planner. It does not guarantee the desired outcome for any specific investment that you might make, but it is indicative of a superior level of education, adherence to a code of ethics, and a commitment to ongoing training. The best way to find an ethical financial consultant is to ask friends, family and business associates who you are certain will provide you with an objective referral. Make sure that they are referring someone that they use themselves and only give serious consideration to consultants that they have used on an ongoing basis for an extended period of time. Do not limit yourself to one or two referrals. Ask for referrals from a half dozen or more people. After you have those names, set up appointments and interview all of the candidates. This is no small decision and the person you select may well be your financial advisor for the rest of your life. Become a “Devil’s Advocate.” Practice “Critical Thinking.” Ask questions and then ask more questions. Be wary of simply accepting the platitudes of Wall Street. Be mindful of The Myth of Long Term Holding. Establish specific goals for your investments and before you make any investment consider how you will protect your gains when you have reached those goals. Every investment should have an exit strategy established at the outset. Understand that for the most part the stock market is not an economic investment. With few exceptions (initial and secondary offerings of stock by the issuing company) the vast majority of monies that move in the stock market have no economic purpose other than to provide marketability (the ability to sell your investment at some price). Whenever a transaction occurs in the market there is a buyer and a seller. The cold reality is that one of them has made a mistake. When you are in the stock market, you are betting against the person on the other side of the transaction. To some extent, one of you will win, and one of you will lose. As in gambling, the only certain winner is the house because it collects a percentage of every transaction. Because you are betting against the person on the other side of the transaction, there will be times when you are wrong. Take heed of Bernard Baruch’s words and be prepared to cut your losses. Remember that your financial advisors are not infallible. They depend upon information provided to them and sometimes that information or the projections developed from that information are inaccurate. Only the most extreme optimists believe that predicting the future is merely difficult. You must recognize that your financial advisor is just that, an advisor. The final decision to make an investment is yours and unless your advisor is totally incompetent or criminal in their behavior you will live with the result of your investment decisions without recourse. The easiest way to lose money is to pretend that you are not ultimately responsible for your financial well-being. Personal responsibility is an onerous burden, but one you simply cannot afford to abdicate! I hope that this book has provided you with some insights into the workings of the public securities markets and that it will help you to make better investment decisions in the future. Thank you for letting me share it with you. —James J. Keenan, CFP 

        Glossary The vast majority of the definitions provided in the glossary were taken (with permission) from Campbell R. Harvey’s Hypertextual Finance Glossary, the largest financial glossary on the Internet. His complete glossary can be accessed via his home page http://www.duke.edu/~charvey. A Accounting formula, basic: Total assets equal Total Liabilities + Total stockholders’ Equity Analyst: Employee of a brokerage or fund management house who studies companies and makes buy-and-sell recommendations on their stocks. Most specialize in a specific industry. Annual percentage rate (APR): The periodic rate times the number of periods in a year. For example, a 5% quarterly return has an APR of 20%. Annual percentage yield (APY): The effective, or true, annual rate of return. The APY is the rate actually earned or paid in one year, taking into account the affect of compounding. The APY is calculated by taking one plus the periodic rate and raising it to the number of periods in a year. For example, a 1% per month rate has an APY of 12.68% (1.01^12). Annualized gain: The percentage gain in a period times the number of periods in a year. If a stock appreciates 2% in one month, the annualized gain is 24%. Arithmetic mean (average) return: An average of the subperiod returns, calculated by summing the subperiod returns and dividing by the number of subperiods. Articles of incorporation: Legal document establishing a corporation and its structure and purpose. Asset: Any item of economic value owned by an entity and measured in monetary terms. Authorized shares: Number of shares authorized for issuance by a firm’s corporate charter. Average: An arithmetic mean of selected stocks intended to represent the behavior of the market or some component of it. One good example is the widely quoted Dow Jones Industrial Average, which adds the current prices of the 30 DJIA’s stocks, and divides the results by a predetermined number, the divisor. B Balance sheet: Also called the statement of financial condition or position statement it is a summary of assets, liabilities, and owners’ equity. Basis: it is the price an investor pays for a security plus any out-of-pocket expenses. It is used to determine capital gains or losses for tax purposes when the stock is sold. Bear market: A bear market is a prolonged period of falling stock prices, usually by 20% or more. Generally speaking the term is applied to any market in which prices are in a declining trend. Benchmark index: The performance of a predetermined set of securities, for comparison purposes. The Dow Jones, S&P 500 and NASDAQ are benchmark indexes. Best-efforts sale: A method of securities distribution/ underwriting in which the securities firm agrees to sell as much of the offering as possible and return any unsold shares to the issuer. As opposed to a guaranteed or fixed price sale, where the underwriter agrees to sell a specific number of shares (with the securities firm holding any unsold shares in its own account if necessary). Blow-off top: A steep and rapid increase in price followed by a steep and rapid drop. This is an indicator seen in charts and used in technical analysis of stock price and market trends. Bond: Bonds are debt and are issued for a period of more than one year. When an investor buys bonds, he or she is lending money. The seller of the bond agrees to repay the principal amount of the loan at a specified time. Interest-bearing bonds pay interest periodically. Book value: A company’s book value is its total assets minus intangible assets and liabilities, such as debt. Book value per share: The ratio of stockholder equity to the average number of common shares. Broker: An individual who is paid a commission for executing customer orders. Bull market: Any market in which prices are in an upward trend. Bullish, bearish: Words used to describe investor attitudes. Bullish refers to an optimistic outlook while bearish means a pessimistic outlook. Buy: To purchase an asset; taking a long position. Buy-and-hold strategy: A passive investment strategy with no active buying and selling of stocks from the time the portfolio is created until the end of the investment horizon. Buy-side analyst: A financial analyst employed by a non-brokerage firm, typically one of the larger money management firms that purchase securities on their own accounts. C Calendar effect: The tendency of stocks to perform differently at different times. Call option: An option contract that gives its holder the right (but not the obligation) to purchase a specified number of shares of the underlying stock at the given strike price, on or before the expiration date of the contract. Capital: Money invested in a firm. Capital gain: When a stock is sold for a profit, it’s the difference between the net sales price of securities and their net cost, or original basis. Capital loss: When a security is sold for a loss. It is the difference between the net sales price of securities and their net cost, or original basis. Capital surplus: Amounts of directly contributed equity capital in excess of the par value. Capitalization: The debt and/or equity mix that funds a firm’s assets. Cash dividend: A dividend paid in cash to a company’s shareholders. The amount is normally based on profitability and is taxable as income. A cash distribution may include capital gains and return of capital in addition to the dividend. Chinese wall: Communication barrier between financiers (investment bankers) and traders. This barrier is erected to prevent the sharing of inside information that bankers are likely to have. Churning: Excessive trading of a client’s account in order to increase the broker’s commissions. Clear a position: To eliminate a long or short position, leaving no ownership or obligation. Collective wisdom: The combination of all of the individual opinions about a stock’s or security’s value. Commission: The fee paid to a broker to execute a trade, based on number of shares, bonds, options, and/or their dollar value. In 1975, deregulation led to the creation of discount brokers, who charge lower commissions than full service brokers. Full service brokers offer advice and usually have a full staff of analysts who follow specific industries. Discount brokers simply execute a client’s order -- and usually do not offer an opinion on a stock. Common stock: These are securities that represent equity ownership in a company. Common Shares let an investor vote on such matters as the election of directors. They also give the holder a share in a company’s profits via dividend payments and the capital appreciation of the security. Competence: Sufficient ability or fitness for ones needs. Possessing the necessary abilities to be qualified to achieve a certain goal or complete a project. Compound interest: Interest paid on previously earned interest as well as on the principal. Compounded Annualized gain: The percentage gain in a period raised exponentially by the number of periods in a year. If a stock appreciates 2% in one month, the compounded annualized gain is 26.824% 2.0212 = 26.824%. Compounding: The process of accumulating the time value of money forward in time. For example, interest earned in one period earns additional interest during each subsequent time period. Comprehensive due diligence investigation: The investigation of a firm’s business in conjunction with a security offering to determine whether the firm’s business and financial situation and its prospects are adequately disclosed in the prospectus for the offering. Consumer Price Index: The CPI, as it is called, measures the prices of consumer goods and services and is a measure of the pace of U.S. inflation. The U.S. Department of Labor publishes the CPI very month. Corner A Market: To purchase enough of the available supply of a commodity or stock in order to manipulate its price. Corporate charter: A legal document creating a corporation. Corporation: A legal “person” that is separate and distinct from its owners. A corporation is allowed to own assets, incur liabilities, and sell securities, among other things. Credit risk: The risk that an issuer of debt securities or a borrower may default on his obligations, or that the payment may not be made on a negotiable instrument. Current assets: Value of cash, accounts receivable, inventories, marketable securities and other assets that could be converted to cash in less than 1 year. Current liabilities: Amount owed for salaries, interest, accounts payable and other debts due within 1 year. Current yield: For bonds or notes, the coupon rate divided by the market price of the bond. D Dead cat bounce: A small upmove in a bear market. Debt: Money borrowed. Debt securities: IOUs created through loan-type transactions - commercial paper, bank CDs, bills, bonds, and other instruments. Debt service: Interest payment plus repayments of principal to creditors, that is, retirement of debt. Default risk: Also referred to as credit risk, the risk that an issuer of a bond may be unable to make timely principal and interest payments. Dow Jones industrial average: This is the best known U.S. index of stocks. It contains 30 stocks that trade on the New York Stock Exchange. The Dow, as it is called, is a barometer of how shares of the largest U.S. companies are performing. Downgrade: A classic negative change in ratings for a stock, or other rated security. E Earnings: Net Income for the company during the period. Earnings per share (EPS): A company’s profit divided by its number of outstanding shares. Effective annual interest rate: An annual measure of the time value of money that fully reflects the effects of compounding. Effective annual yield: Annualized interest rate on a security computed using compound interest techniques. EPS: Earnings per share Equity: Represents ownership interest in a firm. Equity market Equity multiplier: Total assets divided by total common stockholder’s equity. Equity options/Stock Options: Securities that give the holder the right to buy or sell a specified number of shares of stock, at a specified price for a certain (limited) time period. Typically one option equals 100 shares of stock. Ethics: Standards of conduct or moral judgement. Expiration: The time when the option contract ceases to exist (expires). F Financial analysts: Also called securities analysts and investment analysts, professionals who analyze financial statements, interview corporate executives, and attend trade shows, in order to write reports recommending either purchasing, selling, or holding various stocks. Financial risk: The risk that the cash flow of an issuer will not be adequate to meet its financial obligations. Fundamental analysis: Security analysis that seeks to detect improperly valued securities by an analysis of the firm’s business prospects. Research analysis often focuses on earnings, dividend prospects, expectations for future interest rates, and risk evaluation of the firm. G Generally Accepted Accounting Principals (GAAP): A technical accounting term that encompasses the conventions, rules, and procedures necessary to define accepted accounting practice at a particular time. Greater Fool Theory: The idea that when you have overpaid for something, someone else will be willing to pay even more to buy it from you Greed: is that force that makes it practically impossible for you to sell stock while it is still moving up. H Holding period: Length of time that an individual holds a security. I Individual investors: Persons who invest solely for themselves in their own accounts. Non-institutional investors. Inflation: The rate at which the general level of prices for goods and services is rising. Inflation risk: Also called purchasing power risk, the risk that changes in the real return the investor will realize after adjusting for inflation will be negative. Initial public offering (IPO): A company’s first sale of stock to the public. Institutional investors: Organizations that invest, including insurance companies, depository institutions, pension funds, investment companies, mutual funds, and endowment funds. Interest: The price paid for borrowing money. It is expressed as a percentage rate over a period of time Interest on interest: Compound interest. Interest earned on reinvestment of each interest payment on money invested. Interest rate risk: The risk that a security’s value changes due to a change in interest rates. Internal rate of return: Dollar weighted rate of return. Discount rate at which net present value (NPV) investment is zero. The rate at which a bond’s future cash flows, discounted back to today, equals its price. Investment bank: Financial intermediaries who perform a variety of services, including aiding in the sale of securities, facilitating mergers and other corporate reorganizations, acting as brokers to both individual and institutional clients, and trading for their own accounts. Underwriters. Investment manager: Also called a portfolio manager and money manager, the individual who manages a portfolio of investments. Investor: The owner of a financial asset. L Lead underwriter: The head of a syndicate of financial firms that are sponsoring an initial public offering of securities or a secondary offering of securities. Could also apply to bond issues. Liability: A financial obligation, or the cash outlay that must be made at a specific time to satisfy the contractual terms of such an obligation. Limited liability: Limitation of possible loss to what has already been invested. Limited partner: A partner who has limited legal liability for the obligations of the partnership. Limited partnership: A partnership that includes one or more partners who have limited liability. Liquidity: A market or an investment is liquid when it has a high level of trading activity, allowing buying and selling with minimum price disturbance. Also a market characterized by the ability to buy and sell with relative ease. Liquidity risk: The risk that arises from the difficulty of selling an asset. It can be thought of as the difference between the “true value” of the asset and the likely price, less commissions. Long: One who has established a market position and who has not yet closed out this position through an offsetting sale; the opposite of short. M Magical thinking: is that force that keeps you from selling a stock once it starts to move down. It’s a belief that somehow (magically) the stock will go back up just so you can get the price that you feel you should. Marginal tax rate: The tax rate that would have to be paid on any additional dollars of taxable income earned. Market capitalization: The total dollar value of all outstanding shares. Computed as shares times current market price. It is a measure of corporate size. Market prices: The amount of money that a willing buyer pays to acquire something from a willing seller, when a buyer and seller are independent and when such an exchange is motivated by only commercial consideration. Marketability: A negotiable security is said to have good marketability if there is an active secondary market in which it can easily be resold. Multiple: another name for price/earnings ratio. N Net income: The company’s total earnings, reflecting revenues adjusted for costs of doing business, depreciation, interest, taxes and other expenses. Net worth: Common stockholders’ equity which consists of common stock, surplus, and retained earnings. O Offering memorandum: A document that outlines the terms of securities to be offered in a private placement. Offset: Elimination of a long or short position by making an opposite transaction. Option: Gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an asset at a set price on or before a given date. Investors, not companies, issue options. Investors who purchase call options bet the stock will be worth more than the price set by the option (the strike price), plus the price they paid for the option itself. Buyers of put options bet the stock’s price will go down below the price set by the option. An option is part of a class of securities called derivatives, so named because these securities derive their value from the worth of an underlying investment. Outstanding shares: Shares that are currently owned by investors. Oversubscribed issue: Investors are not able to buy all of the shares or bonds they want, so underwriters must allocate the shares or bonds among investors. This occurs when a new issue is under-priced or in great demand. P Paper gain (loss): Unrealized capital gain (loss) on securities held in portfolio, based on a comparison of current market price to original cost. Par value: For stocks; it is the nominal dollar value assigned to a stock when it is first issued. The dollar value has no relation to the market price of the stock. For bonds; Also called the maturity value or face value, the amount that the issuer agrees to pay at the maturity date. P/B (ratio): See Price/book ratio P/E (ratio): See Price/Earnings ratio. Performance measurement: The calculation of the return realized by a money manager over some time interval. Portfolio manager: Investment manager Price/book ratio: Compares a stock’s market value to the value of total assets less total liabilities (book value). Determined by dividing current stock price by common stockholders equity per share (book value), adjusted for stock splits. Market price of a share divided by book value per share. Also called Market-to-Book. Price/Earnings ratio: The current market price of a share of stock (adjusted for stock splits) divided by its (trailing or projected) annual earnings per share. Also known as the P/E ratio, the P/E, the stock’s multiple, or simply the multiple. Assume XYZ Co. sells for $25.50 per share and has earned $2.55 per share this year; XYZ stock sells for 10 times earnings. $25. 50/$2. 55 = 10 Primary market: The first buyer of a newly issued security buys that security in the primary market. All subsequent trading of those securities is done in the secondary market. Primary offering: A firm selling some of its own newly issued shares to investors. Principal/Principal amount: The face amount of debt; the amount borrowed or lent. Private placement: The sale of a bond or other security directly to a limited number of investors. Pro forma statement: A financial statement showing the forecast or projected operating results and balance sheet, as in pro forma income statements, balance sheets, and statements of cash flows. Prospectus: Formal written document to sell securities that describes the plan for a proposed business enterprise, or the facts concerning an existing one, that an investor needs to make an informed decision. Prospectuses describe the objectives, risks and other essential information of the securities that will be sold. Public offering: The sale of registered securities by the issuer (or the underwriters acting in the interests of the issuer) in the public market. Also called public issue. Purchase: To buy, to be long, to have an ownership position. Purchase and sale: A method of securities distribution in which the securities firm purchases the securities from the issuer for its own account at a stated price and then resells them, as contrasted with a best efforts sale. Purchasing power risk: Also called inflation risk, the risk that changes in the real return the investor will realize after adjusting for inflation will be negative. Put option: This security gives investors the right to sell (or put) a fixed number of shares at a fixed price within a given time frame. R Retail investors/individual investors: Small investors who commit capital for their personal account. Non-institutional investors. Retained earnings: Accounting earnings that are retained by the firm for reinvestment in its operations; earnings that are not paid out as dividends. Return on assets (ROA): Indicator of profitability. Determined by dividing net income for the past 12 months by total average assets. Result is shown as a percentage. Return on equity (ROE): Indicator of profitability. Determined by dividing net income for the past 12 months by common stockholder equity (adjusted for stock splits). Result is shown as a percentage. S SEC: The Securities and Exchange Commission, the primary federal regulatory agency of the securities industry. Secondary issue: (1) Procedure for selling blocks of seasoned issues of stocks. (2) More generally, sale of already issued stock. Secondary market: The market where securities are traded after they are initially offered in the primary market. Most trading is done in the secondary market. Securities & Exchange Commission: The SEC is a federal agency that regulates the U.S. financial markets. Securities analysts: financial analysts Security: Piece of paper that proves ownership of stocks, bonds and other investments. Selling short: If an investor thinks the price of a stock is going down, the investor could borrow the stock from a broker and sell it. Eventually, the investor must buy the stock back on the open market. For instance, you borrow 1000 shares of XYZ on July 1 and sell it for $8 per share. Then, on Aug 1, you purchase 1000 shares of XYZ at $7 per share. You’ve made $1000 (less commissions and other fees) by selling short. Sell-side analyst: Also called a Wall Street analyst, a financial analyst who works for a brokerage firm and whose recommendations are passed on to the brokerage firm’s customers. Shareholders’ equity: This is a company’s total assets minus total liabilities. A company’s net worth is the same thing. Shares: Certificates or book entries representing ownership in a corporation or similar entity. Short sale: Selling a security that the seller does not own but is committed to repurchasing eventually. It is used to capitalize on an expected decline in the security’s price. Simple compound growth method: A method of calculating the growth rate by relating the terminal value to the initial value and assuming a constant percentage annual rate of growth between these two values. Simple interest: Interest calculated only on the initial investment. Stated annual interest rate: The interest rate expressed as a per annum percentage, by which interest payment is determined. Stock: Ownership of a corporation which is represented by shares which represent a piece of the corporation’s assets and earnings. Stockholder equity: Balance sheet item that includes the book value of ownership in the corporation. It includes capital stock, paid in surplus and retained earnings. Stock market: Also called the equity market, the market for trading equities. Stockholder: Holder of equity shares in a firm. Stockholder’s equity: The residual claims that stockholders have against a firm’s assets, calculated by subtracting total liabilities from total assets. Street: Brokers, dealers, underwriters, and other knowledgeable members of the financial community; from Wall Street financial community. T Technical analysis: Security analysis that seeks to detect and interpret patterns in past security prices. Technical analysts: Also called chartists or technicians, analysts who use mechanical rules to detect changes in the supply of and demand for a stock and capitalize on the expected change. Total return: In performance measurement, the actual rate of return realized over some evaluation. Considers all sources of return (dividends, interest, interest on interest, and any capital gain/loss) over some investment horizon. Trade: A verbal (or electronic) transaction involving one party buying a security from another party. Once a trade is consummated, it is considered “done” or final. Settlement occurs 1-5 business days later. Treasury bills: Debt obligations of the U.S. Treasury that have maturities of one year or less. Maturities for T-bills are usually 91 days, 182 days, or 52 weeks. Treasury bonds: Debt obligations of the U.S. Treasury that have maturities of 10 years or more. Treasury notes: Debt obligations of the U.S. Treasury that have maturities of more than 1 years but less than 10 years. Treasury securities: Securities issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. U Underwrite: To guarantee, as to guarantee the issuer of securities a specified price by entering into a purchase and sale agreement. To bring securities to market. Underwriter: A party that guarantees the proceeds to the firm from a security sale, thereby in effect taking ownership of the securities. Or, stated differently, a firm, usually an investment bank, that buys an issue of securities from a company and resells it to investors. Underwriting: Acting as the underwriter in a purchase and sale. Underwriting fee: The portion of the gross underwriting spread that compensates the securities firms that underwrite a public offering for their underwriting risk. Underwriting syndicate: A group of investment banks that work together to sell new security offerings to investors. The lead underwriter leads the underwriting syndicate. Also: lead underwriter. Unrealized capital gain/loss: An increase/decrease in the value of a security that is not “real” because the security has not been sold, or in the case of a short sale has not been purchased. U.S. Treasury bill: U.S. government debt with a maturity of less than a year. U.S. Treasury bond: U.S. government debt with a maturity of more than 10 years. U.S. Treasury note: U.S. government debt with a maturity of 1 to 10 years. W Wall Street: Generic term for firms that buy, sell, and underwrite securities. Wall Street analyst: Sell-side analyst. Wash: Gains equal losses. Wash: Gains equal losses. Winner’s curse: Problem faced by uninformed bidders. For example, in an initial public offering uninformed participants are likely to receive larger allotments of issues that informed participants know are overpriced. Z Zero-sum game: A type of game wherein one player can gain only at the expense of another player. 

        Index A Accounting Formula 100 Allocation of stock 123 - 125 Alternative close 153, 154 Amount contributed in excess of par 104 Analysts 4, 9-10, 77, 84-85, 88-89, 92-95, 136-140, 143-145, 148-149, 158, 161-162, Assets 99 B Balance sheet 100 Beanie Babies 15-18 Book Value 10, 102 Book Value Per Common Share 103 Broker of the Day 167 Bull 57, 65-66, 85, 87, 160, 164 Bullish 85-86, 88-89, 91, 94-95 Bullish bias 89, 91 Buy bias 89, 91, 95-96, 136-137, 158, 160 C Capital gains taxes 22, 23, 25, 34, 36-37 Capital gain definition 25 Capital loss definition 25 Excess losses 33 Maximum deduction 32 New 2001 regulations 34 Capitulation 22, 133 Certified Financial Planner 168, 180 Chinese Wall 140 Churning 145, 160 Climactic sell-off 22 Closing 154-155 Conflict(s) of Interest 4, 83, 133, 135-137, 139, 142, 143, 148-149, 161, 175, 179-180 Contest(s) 166 Cogito ergo sum iv D Disclaimers 1, 122 Discounted Cash Flow 118-119 Dividend(s) 106-107, 117, 127, 154 E Emotion 10, 12, 20, 22, 72, 119, 130, 133, 136, 156 Equity/Equities 62, 64, 99-117, 141-172 Ethics/Ethical vii, 12, 13, 136, 143, 149, 158, 161, 166, 168, 176, 180 Expenses 8, 91-92, 106, 111, 137, 145, 162 F Fundamental analyst(s)/analysis 9, 10, 119, 130, 144 G Greater Fool Theory 19 Greed viii, 12, 17, 20-22, 39, 56-57, 130-131, 133 H Herd instinct 84 Holding period 28, 36, 57 Hot stock 39, 123-125 I IBM ix, 7, 9 Income 25, 32-34, 63, 78, 83, 89, 106-107, 117, 126-127, 154 (See Profit) Initial Public Offering 5, 94, 110-113, 123, 132, 138 Investment banking 95, 122-123, 137-140, 149 Investment-banking fee 122-123 Investment-banking firm 95, 112, 119, 122-124, 126, 132-133, 138-139, 141 IPO 94-96, 103, 114-119, 121-133, 138-150 L Liability/Liabilities 1, 10, 25, 30, 40-41, 43, 45-49, 51-53, 55, 57, 63-64, 99-103, 105-106, 111, 114, 175 Limited liability 99, 101 Liquidation value 10, 114 Long term 4, 22, 28, 30-34, 36, 58, 61, 65-66, 70, 72, 75-78, 81, 87-89, 136-137, 180 Long Term Hold 22, 87-89 Long term hold philosophy 87-89 The Myth of Long Term Holding 180 M Magical thinking 20, 22, 39, 46, 56, 87, 132-133 Media 91, 94, 132 Mission 3 Morning call 9-10 Multiple of book value 114, 117 Myth(s) 1, 3-5, 58, 61, 81, 136-137, 177, 180 Myth of long term holding 180 O Odds 8, 11, 139, 157 Off to the races! 17 Option(s) 11, 41, 46-51, 55 Overhanging demand 130, 146 Overheated market 19, 37, 39, 57 Owner’s equity 100, 110, 116 P P/B Ratio 129 P/E Ratio 129 Paid in surplus 102 Par Value 101-102, 104, 106, 112 Past price performance 10, 18 Pity the broker v, 150, 153 Portrait of Dorian Gray 16 Pressure to sell 13, 72, 164 Price Earnings Ratio 128-129 Price to Book Ratio 119, 127-128 Private equity funds 141 Private offerings 141, 142 Private placements 125, 141-144 Problems v, 1, 2-5, 11, 40, 49, 53, 55-57, 70, 72, 82, 84, 130, 140, 145, 155, 162, 164-165, 169, 173 Profit 11, 12, 28, 34-36, 39, 40, 45, 46, 51, 57, 65, 83, 89, 91, 103, 106-109, 114, 125, 130, 131, 141-143, 146, 148, 170, 171, 179 (See Income) Pro-forma statements 121 Promise to support 121 Prospectus 121, 122, 171, 173 Publicly traded company 4, 111, 117, 138 Purchasing Power/Risk 67 Q Quotes “All ships rise on the tide” Anon  59 “A little knowledge is a dangerous thing.” Alexander Pope · 6 “Education costs money, but then so does ignorance.” Sir Claus Moser · 24 “For the great enemy of the truth is very often not the lie deliberate, contrived and dishonest, but the myth…. We enjoy the comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought.” John F. Kennedy · 177 “How often the sight of means to do ill deeds make deeds ill done.” William Shakespeare · 80 “It’s necessary to relax your muscles when you can. Relaxing your brain is fatal.” Stirling Moss · 38 “No error is so monstrous that it fails to find defenders among the ablest men.” Lord Acton · 60 “The enemy is anyone who is going to get you killed, no matter which side he’s on.” Joseph Heller 152 “The first step in finding a solution is to define the problem” Anon 2 “The greatest mass of people…will more easily fall victim to a big lie than to a little one.” Adolph Hitler 120 “The most dangerous criminal may be the man gifted with reason, but with no morals.” Martin Luther King Jr. · 134 “The truth is rarely pure and never simple.” Oscar Wilde · 74 “There are three kinds of lies lies, damned lies, and statistics.” Benjamin Disraeli · 90 “Those friends thou hast, and their adoption tried, grapple them to thy soul with hoops of steel; but do not dull thy palm with entertainment of each new-hatch’d, unfledg’d comrade.” William Shakespeare…97 “Trust but verify.” Ronald Reagan · 98 “We learn geology the morning after the earthquake.” Ralph Waldo Emerson · 14 R Real impact, v, 73, 75 Realized Gains or Losses 35-58 Retained Earnings 106, 107, 117, 127 Return on Assets 103-109 Return on Equity 62, 64, 103, 106, 108, 115 Revenue 12, 91, 94, 106, 126, 137, 138-140, 143, 167 S Scarcity mentality 122 Secondary offerings 94-95, 138-139, 147-148, 180-181 Self-fulfilling prophecy 20, 133, 186 Sell-offs 22 Sell-side analysts 136-140 Sentiment 10, 16, 119 Short sale 35, 36 Short-term 12, 28, 30, 32-34, 36, 43, 55, 75, 131, 147 Sliding scale compensation program 162 Stock is passing into stronger hands 22 Stockholders Equity 100, 102-108, 110, 115 Story of Girlie Girl v, 15 Supply and demand 20, 21, 121, 130, 170 Supporting the price 121 T Tax-selling season 40 Technical analysis/analysts 10, 119 Thirty-one day rule (wash sale rule) 36, 56 Transparent commissions 125 U Underlying forces 16 Underwrite/er vii, 94, 143 Unrealized/Unrecognized Gains or Losses 35 V Venture capital partnerships 141 Venture capital stock 125 W, X, Y, Z Wash sale 36, 56 

The Treasury Myth

What You Need To Know Before You Invest In Fixed Income Securities

Special Report # 1 by James J. Keenan, CFP

Today people everywhere are awakening to the realities of a stock market gone bad. What was once a no-brainer that fostered a can’t-lose approach to investing now seems complex and frightening. Indeed, people are coming to realize that the market is, and has been for a long time, fraught with danger that is just now becoming visible to the non-professional investor. It is highly probable that the Enron/Anderson debacle is just the tip of the iceberg. It is no wonder that people are anxious to leave the stock market. And it is perfectly understandable that they are reluctant to do so not only because they are still clinging to “magical thinking,” but also because they don’t know where to go next.

The professionals who didn’t talk to their clients about Wall Street’s deceptive practices, the risks of an over-priced stock market or the danger of being invested heavily in their own company’s stock in their pension plans are now mentioning it in every article or report they write and every television or radio interview they give. It seems that Ralph Waldo Emerson was right when he wrote, “We learn geology the morning after the earthquake.”

Now that it has become apparent that some change in the way we invest is necessary the common wisdom seems to be that we should migrate to the safety of fixed income. Once more, the wizards of Wall Street are neglecting to tell us in advance about the risks that are involved in an entire class of investments. The difference is that this time it’s the bond market instead of the stock market.

Don’t make the mistake of leaping from the frying pan into the fire. Before you decide what your next move will be you must read James J. Keenan’s special report on fixed income, The Treasury Myth.

For additional tools and resources go to the ignorance is risk website.”

https://ignoranceisrisk.com/

Discounted Cash Flow Explained

Special Report #2 by James J. Keenan, CFP

Discounted cash flow analysis is a process that allows you to make better financial investment decisions and this report will provide you with the clearest, simplest explanation of how it works that you will ever find.

Using this basic tool can make or save you tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of dollars over your lifetime. The sooner you learn what it is and how to apply it to your decision-making process, the faster you will reach your personal financial goals.

It provides a method of comparison that allows you to look at multiple investments that generate a variety of cash flows over a period of time and determine which one gives you the best return on your investment.

It will tell you what your best financing option is when you are trying to figure out which mortgage actually costs you less. (It may not be the same as the recommendation you receive from your banker.)

It will let you calculate whether you are better off leasing or purchasing your next car. (Again… this may not be the recommendation you receive from your car salesperson.)

It will give you a tool to measure the level of expertise of your financial advisors. (If they can’t do the calculation for you, they shouldn’t be financial advisors.)

You will find out not only how to do this critical calculation, but also what objective third parties should be willing to do the calculation for you…for free.

Don’t make another financing or investment decision without reading this report. Waiting can only cost you money.

For additional tools and resources go to the ignorance is risk website.”

https://ignoranceisrisk.com/

For additional Articles, Tools and Resources visit:

https://IgnoranceIsRisk.com